Voting And Collective Choice
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Collective Decisions And Voting
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Author : Nicolaus Tideman
language : en
Publisher: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
Release Date : 2006
Collective Decisions And Voting written by Nicolaus Tideman and has been published by Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with Political Science categories.
Voting is often the most public and visible example of mass collective decision-making. But how do we define a collective decision? And how do we classify and evaluate the modes by which collective decisions are made? This book examines these crucial ques
Voting And Collective Choice
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Author : Prasanta K. Pattanaik
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1971
Voting And Collective Choice written by Prasanta K. Pattanaik and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1971 with Decision making categories.
Mathematics And Democracy
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Author : Bruno Simeone
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2007-01-09
Mathematics And Democracy written by Bruno Simeone and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007-01-09 with Business & Economics categories.
In this book, different quantitative approaches to the study of electoral systems have been developed: game-theoretic, decision-theoretic, statistical, probabilistic, combinatorial, geometric, and optimization ones. All the authors are prominent scholars from these disciplines. Quantitative approaches offer a powerful tool to detect inconsistencies or poor performance in actual systems. Applications to concrete settings such as EU, American Congress, regional, and committee voting are discussed.
Voting And Collective Choice
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Author : Prasanta K. Pattanaik
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge [Eng.] : University Press
Release Date : 1971
Voting And Collective Choice written by Prasanta K. Pattanaik and has been published by Cambridge [Eng.] : University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1971 with Decision-making categories.
The Public Choice Approach To Politics
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Author : Dennis C. Mueller
language : en
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Release Date : 1993-01-01
The Public Choice Approach To Politics written by Dennis C. Mueller and has been published by Edward Elgar Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1993-01-01 with Political Science categories.
'Dennis Mueller has played a significant part in the development of public choice, and this volume pays a fitting tribute to that contribution.' - Alan Hamlin, The Economic Journal The Public Choice Approach to Politics presents some of Dennis Mueller's most important contributions to public choice and public economics.
On The Possibility Of Democracy And Rational Collective Choice
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Author : Claude Hillinger
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004
On The Possibility Of Democracy And Rational Collective Choice written by Claude Hillinger and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with categories.
The paper challenges the 'orthodox doctrine' of collective choice theory according to which Arrow's 'general possibility theorem' precludes rational decision procedures generally and implies that in particular all voting procedures must be flawed. I point out that all voting procedures are cardinal and that Arrow's result, based on preference orderings cannot apply to them. All voting procedures that have been proposed, with the exception of approval voting, involve restrictions on voters expressions of their preferences. These restrictions, not any general impossibility, are the cause of various well known pathologies. In the class of unrestricted voting procedures I favor 'evaluative voting' under which a voter can vote for or against any alternative, or abstain. I give a historical/conceptual analysis of the origins of theorists' aversion to cardinal analysis in collective choice and voting theories.
Strategic Participation In Collective Choice Mechanisms
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Author : David Loren Sunding
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1989
Strategic Participation In Collective Choice Mechanisms written by David Loren Sunding and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1989 with Decision making categories.
Collective Preference And Choice
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Author : Shmuel Nitzan
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2010
Collective Preference And Choice written by Shmuel Nitzan and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with Business & Economics categories.
A study of the classical aggregation problems that arise in social choice theory, voting theory, and group decision-making under uncertainty.
Social Choice
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Author : John Craven
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 1992-01-16
Social Choice written by John Craven and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1992-01-16 with Business & Economics categories.
This textbook provides a survey of the literature of social choice. It integrates the ethical aspects of the subject, (discussing potentially desirable conditions for social judgements) with positive aspects of decision mechanisms that centre on the revelation of true preferences. The literature on the subject presently consists of a great many papers. This book draws them together in common notation and points out interpretations which are often missing in specialist papers. Applications in economics, electoral politics, and ethics are discussed. The book will be used by senior undergraduate and graduate students of economics, political science and philosophy as a text book in the subject.
Utilitarian Collective Choice And Voting
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Author : Claude Hillinger
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
Utilitarian Collective Choice And Voting written by Claude Hillinger and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with categories.
In his seminal Social Choice and Individual Values, Kenneth Arrow stated that his theory applies to voting. Many voting theorists have been convinced that, on account of Arrow's theorem, all voting methods must be seriously flawed. Arrow's theory is strictly ordinal, the cardinal aggregation of preferences being explicitly rejected. In this paper, I point out that all voting methods are cardinal and, therefore, outside the reach of Arrow's result. Parallel to Arrow's ordinal approach, there evolved a consistent cardinal theory of collective choice. This theory, most prominently associated with the work of Harsanyi, continued the older utilitarian tradition in a more formal style. The purpose of this paper is to show that various derivations of utilitarian SWFs can also be used to derive utilitarian voting (UV). By this, I mean a voting rule that allows the voter to score each alternative in accordance with a given scale. UV-k indicates a scale with k distinct values. The general theory leaves k to be determined on pragmatic grounds. A (1,0) scale gives approval voting. I prefer the scale (1,0,-1) and refer to the resulting voting rule as evaluative voting. A conclusion of the paper is that the defects of conventional voting methods result not from Arrow's theorem, but rather from restrictions imposed on voters' expression of their preferences. The analysis is extended to strategic voting, utilizing a novel set of assumptions regarding voter behavior.