A Note On Auctions With Endogenous Participation
DOWNLOAD
Download A Note On Auctions With Endogenous Participation PDF/ePub or read online books in Mobi eBooks. Click Download or Read Online button to get A Note On Auctions With Endogenous Participation book now. This website allows unlimited access to, at the time of writing, more than 1.5 million titles, including hundreds of thousands of titles in various foreign languages. If the content not found or just blank you must refresh this page
A Note On Auctions With Endogenous Participation
DOWNLOAD
Author : Flávio Marques Menezes
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996
A Note On Auctions With Endogenous Participation written by Flávio Marques Menezes and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with Auctions categories.
In this paper, we study an auction where bidders only know the number of potential applicants. After seeing their values for the object, bidders decide whether or not to enter the auction. Players may not want to enter the auction since they have to pay participation costs. We characterize the optimal bidding strategies for both first- and second- price sealed-bid auction when participation is endogenous. We show that only bidders with values greater than a certain cut-off point will bid in these auctions. In this context, both auctions generate the same expected revenue. We also show that, contrarily to the predictions of the fixed-n literature, the seller's expected revenue may decrease when the number of potential participants increases. In addition, we show that it is optimal for the seller to charge an entry fee, which contrasts greatly with results from the existing literature on auctions with entry.
Sequential Asymmetric Auctions With Endogenous Participation
DOWNLOAD
Author : Flavio M. Menezes
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1994
Sequential Asymmetric Auctions With Endogenous Participation written by Flavio M. Menezes and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1994 with Auctions categories.
Asymmetric Auctions With Endogenous Participation
DOWNLOAD
Author : Robert Marquez
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2018
Asymmetric Auctions With Endogenous Participation written by Robert Marquez and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018 with categories.
We study endogenous participation in asymmetric second price auctions where one bidder is "special". We show seller revenue decreases whenever the special bidder becomes more dominant in the sense of FOSD, or more generally whenever the other bidders' profits are reduced. We also establish an equivalence result for second price auctions - any arbitrary distribution of the special bidder's value is "competitively equivalent" to one that is a power function of the value distribution of the other bidders. Finally, we analyze first-price auctions numerically and show that our results extend to this alternate mechanism.
Auctions With Endogenous Bidder Participation
DOWNLOAD
Author : Ronald M. Harstad
language : de
Publisher:
Release Date : 1993
Auctions With Endogenous Bidder Participation written by Ronald M. Harstad and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1993 with categories.
A Small Volume Reduction That Melts Down The Market
DOWNLOAD
Author : Karl-Martin Ehrhart
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2020
A Small Volume Reduction That Melts Down The Market written by Karl-Martin Ehrhart and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2020 with categories.
Auctions with endogenous rationing have been introduced to stimulate competition. Such (procurement) auctions reduce the volume put out to tender when competition is low. This paper finds a strong negative effect of endogenous rationing on participation when bid-preparation is costly, counteracting the aim to stimulate competition. For multiple auctioneer's objectives mentioned in directives, we derive optimal mechanisms, which differ due to different evaluation of the tradeoff between participation and bid-preparation costs. Thus, the auctioneer needs to decide on an objective. However, reducing bid-preparation costs improves the optimal values of multiple objective functions.
Auctions With Endogenous Valuations The Snowball Effect And Other Applications
DOWNLOAD
Author : Kala Krishna
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1990
Auctions With Endogenous Valuations The Snowball Effect And Other Applications written by Kala Krishna and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1990 with Auctions categories.
In most of the literature on auctions the valuations of agents are exogenously specified. This assumption may be inappropriate in a number of cases where valuations are better derived endogenously. Endogenous valuations are appropriate when there are many units being auctioned and their value is determined in a secondary market which is imperfectly competitive. The model is thus appropriate for studying the sale of quota licenses and scarce resources used in production when product markets are imperfectly competitive. A series of examples are developed to show how these models work. Particular models are developed which cast light on a number of issues in applied micro-economics. These issues include the evolution of market structure, in particular, the "snowball effect", the effect an market structure of selling quota licenses, and the relationship between increasing returns to scale and the monopolization of markets. The models also provide another resolution of the "transponder puzzle."
Endogenous Entry In First Price Auctions
DOWNLOAD
Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003
Endogenous Entry In First Price Auctions written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.
This thesis studies the first-price auction models with endogenous entry. In the first chapter, we propose using the nearest neighbor estimation technique to estimate the entry cost in the auction models. We study the large sample properties of the proposed estimator to establish sets of conditions sufficient for its consistency and asymptotic normality. To give an example, we further apply the proposed method to estimate the cost of participation in the Michigan Highway Procurement Auctions. Our study rejects the null hypothesis of zero participation costs. Based on our estimation result, we infer how the optimal auction outcomes can be realized by using the regular policy tools. We demonstrate the improvement that the Michigan government could have made on payments if the optimal auctions had been employed. In the second chapter, we propose applying the simulated non-linear least squares (SNLLS) method of Laffont, Ossard and Vuong (1995, LOV hereafter) [28] to estimate the distribution of bidders' private values in the estimation of a first-price auction model with endogenous entry. Unlike the estimation problem of LOV, however, the valuation distribution of bidders is truncated in our problem, due to the presence of the entry cost. This further causes the absence of continuous differentiability in our statistical estimation objective function, which was required in LOV's large sample analysis. Therefore, we provide a separate analysis to study the large sample behavior of the SNLLS estimator in such setup. In the third chapter, we develop a nonparametric method that allows one to discriminate among alternative models of entry in first-price auctions. Three models of entry are considered: Levin and Smith (1994) [31], Samuelson (1985) [53], and a new model in which the information received at the entry stage is imperfectly correlated with valuations. We show that these models impose different restrictions on the quantiles of active bidders' valuations, and develop.
Common Value Auctions And The Winner S Curse
DOWNLOAD
Author : John H. Kagel
language : en
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Release Date : 2021-04-13
Common Value Auctions And The Winner S Curse written by John H. Kagel and has been published by Princeton University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021-04-13 with Business & Economics categories.
An invaluable account of how auctions work—and how to make them work Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.
Endogenous Competition Alters The Structure Of Optimal Auctions
DOWNLOAD
Author : Ron Harstad
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Endogenous Competition Alters The Structure Of Optimal Auctions written by Ron Harstad and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
Potential bidders respond to a seller's choice of auction mechanism for a common-value or affiliated-values asset by endogenous decisions whether to incur an information-acquisition cost (and observe a private estimate), or forgo competing. Privately informed participants decide whether to incur a bid-preparation cost and pay an entry fee, or cease competing. Auction rules and information flows are quite general; participation decisions may be simultaneous or sequential. The resulting revenue identity for any auction mechanism implies that optimal auctions are allocatively efficient; a nontrivial reserve price is revenue-inferior. Optimal auctions are otherwise contentless: any auction that sells without reserve becomes optimal by adjusting any one of the continuous, spanning parameters, e.g., the entry fee. Seller's surplus-extracting tools are now substitutes, not complements. Many econometric studies of auction markets are seen to be flawed in their identification of the number of bidders.
A Theory Of Auctions With Endogenous Valuations
DOWNLOAD
Author : Alex Gershkov
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2018
A Theory Of Auctions With Endogenous Valuations written by Alex Gershkov and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018 with Auctions categories.
We study the revenue maximizing allocation of m units among n symmetric agents that have unit demand and convex preferences over the probability of receiving an object. Such preferences are naturally induced by a game where the agents take costly actions that affect their values before participating in the mechanism. Both the uniform m + 1 price auction and the discriminatory pay-your-bid auction with reserve prices constitute symmetric revenue maximizing mechanisms. Contrasting the case with linear preferences, the optimal reserve price reacts to both demand and supply, i.e., it depends both on the number of objects m and on number of agents n. The main tool in our analysis is an integral inequality involving majorization, super-modularity and convexity due to Fan and Lorentz (1954).