Auctions With Endogenous Bidder Participation
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A Note On Auctions With Endogenous Participation
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Author : Flávio Marques Menezes
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996
A Note On Auctions With Endogenous Participation written by Flávio Marques Menezes and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with Auctions categories.
In this paper, we study an auction where bidders only know the number of potential applicants. After seeing their values for the object, bidders decide whether or not to enter the auction. Players may not want to enter the auction since they have to pay participation costs. We characterize the optimal bidding strategies for both first- and second- price sealed-bid auction when participation is endogenous. We show that only bidders with values greater than a certain cut-off point will bid in these auctions. In this context, both auctions generate the same expected revenue. We also show that, contrarily to the predictions of the fixed-n literature, the seller's expected revenue may decrease when the number of potential participants increases. In addition, we show that it is optimal for the seller to charge an entry fee, which contrasts greatly with results from the existing literature on auctions with entry.
Auctions With Endogenous Bidder Participation
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Author : Ronald M. Harstad
language : de
Publisher:
Release Date : 1993
Auctions With Endogenous Bidder Participation written by Ronald M. Harstad and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1993 with categories.
Sequential Asymmetric Auctions With Endogenous Participation
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Author : Flavio M. Menezes
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1994
Sequential Asymmetric Auctions With Endogenous Participation written by Flavio M. Menezes and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1994 with Auctions categories.
Auctions With Endogenous Participation And Quality Thresholds
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Author : Antonio Estache
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Auctions With Endogenous Participation And Quality Thresholds written by Antonio Estache and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.
Infrastructure projects are often technically complicated and highly customized. Therefore, procurement competition tends to be limited. Competition is the single most important factor toward auction efficiency and anti-corruption. However, the degree of competition realized is closely related to bidders' entry decision and the auctioneer's decision on how to assess technical attributes in the bid evaluation process. This paper estimates the interactive effects among quality, entry, and competition. With data on procurement auctions for electricity projects in developing countries, it is found that large electricity works are by nature costly and can attract only a few participants. The limited competition would raise government procurement costs. In addition, high technical requirements are likely to be imposed for these large-scale projects, which will in turn add extra costs for the better quality of works and further limit bidder participation. The evidence suggests that quality is of particular importance in large infrastructure projects and auctioneers cannot easily substitute price for quality.
Asymmetric Auctions With Endogenous Participation
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Author : Robert Marquez
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2018
Asymmetric Auctions With Endogenous Participation written by Robert Marquez and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018 with categories.
We study endogenous participation in asymmetric second price auctions where one bidder is "special". We show seller revenue decreases whenever the special bidder becomes more dominant in the sense of FOSD, or more generally whenever the other bidders' profits are reduced. We also establish an equivalence result for second price auctions - any arbitrary distribution of the special bidder's value is "competitively equivalent" to one that is a power function of the value distribution of the other bidders. Finally, we analyze first-price auctions numerically and show that our results extend to this alternate mechanism.
Putting Auction Theory To Work
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Author : Paul Milgrom
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2004-01-12
Putting Auction Theory To Work written by Paul Milgrom and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004-01-12 with Business & Economics categories.
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
On The Timing Of Auctions
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Author : Alex Arsenault Morin
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2022
On The Timing Of Auctions written by Alex Arsenault Morin and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2022 with categories.
This paper empirically explores how varying the timing of a sequence of auctions affects both bidder behavior and the welfare of procurers and bidders. We develop a structural auction model with endogenous participation in which bidding may be either simultaneous or sequential, and bidders may perceive auctioned objects as either complements or substitutes. We then apply this model to data on auctions for roof-maintenance projects in Montreal. We show that complementarities can account for as high as 17% of the total size of a contract combination. Finally, we develop an algorithm to search a schedule of auctions and show that the total cost of projects can be reduced by more than 8%.
Inference Of Bidders Risk Attitudes In Ascending Auctions With Endogenous Entry
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Author : Hanming Fang
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Inference Of Bidders Risk Attitudes In Ascending Auctions With Endogenous Entry written by Hanming Fang and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with Economics categories.
Bidders' risk attitudes have key implications for choices of revenue-maximizing auction formats. In ascending auctions, bid distributions do not provide information about risk preference. We infer risk attitudes using distributions of transaction prices and participation decisions in ascending auctions with entry costs. Nonparametric tests are proposed for two distinct scenarios: first, the expected entry cost can be consistently estimated from data; second, the data does not report entry costs but contains exogenous variations of potential competition and auction characteristics. In the first scenario, we exploit the fact that the risk premium required for entry - the difference between ex ante expected profits from entry and the certainty equivalent - is strictly positive if and only if bidders are risk averse. Our test is based on identification of bidders' ex ante profits. In the second scenario, our test builds on the fact that risk attitudes affect how equilibrium entry probabilities vary with observed auction characteristics and potential competition. We also show identification of risk attitudes in a more general model of ascending auctions with selective entry, where bidders receive entry-stage signals that are correlated with private values.
Auction Hosting Site Pricing And Market Equilibrium With Endogenous Bidder And Seller Participation
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Author : George Deltas
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Auction Hosting Site Pricing And Market Equilibrium With Endogenous Bidder And Seller Participation written by George Deltas and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
This paper characterizes the payoffs and pricing policies of auction hosting sites when both the bidders' and the sellers' participation is endogenous. Sellers have heterogeneous opportunity costs and make a listing decision depending on the fee and the expected revenue from the sale. On the other side of the market, factors such as interface layout and prior bidding experience result in bidder heterogeneity with respect to participation costs. Bidders participate if their ex ante expected payoff from searching the site exceeds their participation costs. The auction site earns revenue by setting positive listing fees, trading off the increased revenue per seller resulting from a higher fee with the revenue reduction from the loss of sellers. Though this appears to be a classic monopoly problem, there are important differences. The reduction in the number of sellers participating in a site has feedback effects, as it affects the number of bidders who would choose to visit that site, which in turn again affects the attractiveness of the site for seller, and thus further reduces seller participation. In this environment, the monopolist's ability to extract rents is severely limited, even if one considers rent extraction from the seller side of the market only. It is demonstrated that the inverse demand curve is flatter than the demand curve obtained from the (inverse) distribution of seller costs. Moreover, the inverse demand curve has at least one and possibly multiple flat segments, leading to discontinuities in the profit function. Thus, small changes in the environment can lead to large changes in the optimal fee and market participation.
Inference Of Bidders S Risk Attitudes In Ascending Auctions With Endogenous Entry
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Author : Hanming Fang
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Inference Of Bidders S Risk Attitudes In Ascending Auctions With Endogenous Entry written by Hanming Fang and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.