A Patentability Requirement For Sequential Innovation

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A Patentability Requirement For Sequential Innovation

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Author : Ted O'Donoghue
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014

A Patentability Requirement For Sequential Innovation written by Ted O'Donoghue and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.

This article investigates patent protection for a long sequence of innovations where firms repeatedly supersede each other. Incentives for R&D can be insufficient if successful firms earn market profit only until competitors achieve something better. To correct this problem, patents must provide protection against future innovators. This article proposes using a patentability requirement--a minimum innovation size required for patents. A patentability requirement can stimulate R&D investment and increase dynamic efficiency. Intuitively, requiring firms to pursue larger innovations prolongs market incumbency because larger innovations are harder to achieve, and longer market incumbency implies an increased reward to innovation.

Dynamic Effects Of Patent Policy On Sequential Innovation

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Author : BonWoo Koo
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010

Dynamic Effects Of Patent Policy On Sequential Innovation written by BonWoo Koo and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with categories.

When one patented innovation enables another, endogenous delay of the latter has important implications for the economics of patent life and scope, if licensing is negotiated ex post.Optimal patent life may be finite under competition, even if the royalty imposes no deadweight loss and there is no competitive dissipation of rent. Reduced scope of the first patent eliminates delay of costly enabled innovations, whether monopolized or competitive, and a combination of limited scope and infinite life can be optimal. If the second innovation is negotiated ex ante, its patentability can increase or decrease the first innovator's profit, depending on cost and market structure of the second innovation, and patent life.

Sequential Innovation And Patent Design

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Author : Gerard Llobet
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2000

Sequential Innovation And Patent Design written by Gerard Llobet and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2000 with Patents categories.

Anticommons And Optimal Patent Policy In A Model Of Sequential Innovation

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Author : Gastón Llanes
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009

Anticommons And Optimal Patent Policy In A Model Of Sequential Innovation written by Gastón Llanes and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.

We present a model of sequential innovation in which an innovator uses several research inputs to invent a new good. These inputs, in turn, must be invented before they can be used by the final innovator. As a consequence, the degree of patent protection affects the revenues and cost of the innovator, but also determines the incentives to invent the research inputs in the first place. We study the effects of increases in the number of required inputs on innovation activity and optimal patent policy. We find that the probability of introducing the final innovation decreases (increases) as the number of inputs increases when inputs are complements (substitutes). We also find that the optimal strength of patents on research inputs is increasing in the degree of substitution between the inputs, but decreasing in the number of inputs for any degree of substitution.

Sequential Innovation Patents And Imitation

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Author : James E. Bessen
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014

Sequential Innovation Patents And Imitation written by James E. Bessen and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.

How could such industries as software, semiconductors, and computers have been so innovative despite historically weak patent protection? We argue that if innovation is both sequential and complementary--as it certainly has been in those industries--competition can increase firms' future profits thus offsetting short-term dissipation of rents. A simple model also shows that in such a dynamic industry, patent protection may reduce overall innovation and social welfare. The natural experiment that occurred when patent protection was extended to software in the 1980?s provides a test of this model. Standard arguments would predict that R&D intensity and productivity should have increased among patenting firms. Consistent with our model, however, these increases did not occur. Other evidence supporting our model includes a distinctive pattern of cross-licensing in these industries and a positive relationship between rates of innovation and firm entry.

Sequential Innovation And Patent Policy

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Author : Alvaro Parra
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016

Sequential Innovation And Patent Policy written by Alvaro Parra and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.

I examine the impact of patent policy -- characterized by patent length and strength -- on R&D investment dynamics and the number of competitors in the context of sequential innovation. Overly protective policies introduce two distortions: they delay leaders' and followers' investments toward the end of the patent's life, and they decrease the number of competitors in the market. I study the policy that maximizes innovative activity, and how this policy depends on market characteristics. Patent length and strength complement each other in the sense that one tool is effective at encouraging innovation in markets where the other is not.

Patent Policy Patent Pools And The Accumulation Of Claims In Sequential Innovation

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Author : Gastón Llanes
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014

Patent Policy Patent Pools And The Accumulation Of Claims In Sequential Innovation written by Gastón Llanes and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.

We present a dynamic model where the accumulation of patents generates an increasing number of claims on sequential innovation. We study the equilibrium innovation activity under three regimes: patents, no-patents and patent pools. Patent pools increase the probability of innovation with respect to patents, but we also find that: (1) their outcome can be replicated by a licensing scheme in which innovators sell complete patent rights, and (2) they are dynamically unstable. We find that none of the above regimes can reach the first or second best. Finally, we consider patents of finite duration and determine the optimal patent length.

Patentability Industry Structure And Innovation

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Author : Robert M. Hunt
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015

Patentability Industry Structure And Innovation written by Robert M. Hunt and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.

This paper presents a model of sequential innovation in which industry structure is endogenous and a standard of patentability determines the proportion of all inventions that qualify for protection (in U.S. patent law, this standard is called nonobviousness; in Europe, it is called the inventive step). The rate of innovation initially rises as this standard is raised from very low levels, but eventually falls as the standard is raised to very high levels. Hence, there is a unique patentability standard that maximizes the rate of innovation. Surprisingly, this critical standard is more stringent for industries disposed to innovate rapidly. The model suggests a number of important implications for patent policy.

Patent Scope And Innovation In The Software Industry

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Author : Mark A. Lemley
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012

Patent Scope And Innovation In The Software Industry written by Mark A. Lemley and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.

Software patents have received a great deal of attention in the academic literature. Unfortunately, most of that attention has been devoted to the problem of whether software is or should be patentable subject matter. With roughly 40,000 software patents already issued, and the Federal Circuit endorsing patentability without qualification, those questions are for the history books. The more pressing questions now concern the scope to be accorded software patents. In this paper, we examine the implications of some traditional patent law doctrines for innovation in the software industry. We argue that patent law needs some refinement if it is to promote rather than impede the growth of this new market, which is characterized by rapid sequential innovation, reuse and re-combination of components, and strong network effects that privilege interoperable components and products. In particular, we argue for two sorts of new rules in software patent cases. First, we advocate a limited right to reverse engineer patented computer programs in order to gain access to and study those programs and to duplicate their unprotected elements. Such a right is firmly established in copyright law, and seems unexceptional as a policy matter even in patent law. But because patent law contains no fair use or reverse engineering exemption, patentees could use the grant of rights on a single component of a complex program to prevent any "making" or "using" of the program as a whole, including those temporary uses needed in reverse engineering. While patent law does contain doctrines of "experimental use" and "exhaustion," it is not at all clear that those doctrines will protect legitimate reverse engineering efforts. We suggest that if these doctrines cannot be read broadly enough to establish such a right, Congress should create a limited right to reverse engineer software containing patented components for research purposes. Second, we argue that in light of the special nature of innovation within the software industry, courts should apply the doctrine of equivalents narrowly in infringement cases. The doctrine of equivalents allows a finding of infringement even when the accused product does not literally satisfy each element of the patent, if there is substantial equivalence as to each element. The test of equivalence is the known interchangeability of claimed and accused elements at the time of (alleged) infringement. A number of factors unique to software and the software industry - a culture of reuse and incremental improvement, a lack of reliance on systems of formal documentation used in other technical fields, the short effective life of software innovations, and the inherent plasticity of code - severely complicate post hoc assessments of the "known interchangeability" of software elements. A standard for equivalence of code elements that ignores these factors risks stifling legitimate, successful efforts to design around existing software patents. To avoid this danger, courts should construe software claims narrowly, and should refuse a finding of equivalence if the accused element is "interchangeable" with prior art that should have narrowed the original patent, or if the accused improvement is too many generations removed from the original invention.

Innovation And Incentives

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Author : Suzanne Scotchmer
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date : 2004

Innovation And Incentives written by Suzanne Scotchmer and has been published by MIT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with Business & Economics categories.

The economics of intellectual property and R&D incentives explained in a balanced, accessible mixture of institutional details and theory.