Dynamic Effects Of Patent Policy On Sequential Innovation
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Dynamic Effects Of Patent Policy On Sequential Innovation
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Author : BonWoo Koo
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010
Dynamic Effects Of Patent Policy On Sequential Innovation written by BonWoo Koo and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with categories.
When one patented innovation enables another, endogenous delay of the latter has important implications for the economics of patent life and scope, if licensing is negotiated ex post.Optimal patent life may be finite under competition, even if the royalty imposes no deadweight loss and there is no competitive dissipation of rent. Reduced scope of the first patent eliminates delay of costly enabled innovations, whether monopolized or competitive, and a combination of limited scope and infinite life can be optimal. If the second innovation is negotiated ex ante, its patentability can increase or decrease the first innovator's profit, depending on cost and market structure of the second innovation, and patent life.
Innovation Specific Patent Protection And Growth
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Author : Silvia Galli
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012
Innovation Specific Patent Protection And Growth written by Silvia Galli and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with Economic development categories.
In this thesis, I am undertaking the analysis of the effects of increasing intellectual property rights on the reallocation of different kinds of research and development within an endogenous growth framework. This thesis' approach considers the innovation process as sequential and cumulative in nature and studies the effects of different property rights regimes on a country's innovative performance. In particular, by explicitly modelling basic and applied research and development (R & D) within a general equilibrium framework, I try to overtake the existing growth theory, which usually aggregates all sources of R & D and innovation, neglecting intermediate inventive steps. My approach is certainly inspired by the current Schumpeterian growth theory (see Aghion and Howitt, 1998 and 2009), which envisages new products and processes arising from Poisson processes, whose arrival rates depend on private and public R & D. However, unlike the previous Schumpeterian models, in most of the chapters of this thesis, creative destruction itself is modelled as a two-stage processes, or more precisely, as a sequence of investment decisions in R & D, whose result is a probability to invent (basic research) or to innovate (applied research). Hence, the first step, "basic research", creates a research tool which is by itself not profitable, but has the potential to become the basis for the second step innovation. The second step is a marketable product which increases consumers' utility and, through the grant of a patent, generates the monopolistic rent for the second step innovator, i.e. the manufacturer of the new product. This is a natural and simple way to explicitly model basic and applied research, yet it entails non-trivial technical complications in the models along with strong policy implications. Chapter 2 tries to answer the following research question: in order to foster innovation and growth should basic research be publicly or privately funded? This chapter studies the impact of the shift in the U.S. patent system towards the patentability and commercialization of the basic R & D undertaken by universities. Such a shift rendered the U.S. universities more responsive to "market" forces. Prior to 1980, universities undertook research employing researchers motivated by "curiosity." After 1980, universities patent their research and behave as private firms. This move, in a context of two-stage inventions (basic and applied research) has an a priori ambiguous effect on innovation and welfare. Chapter 2 builds a Schumpeterian model and matches it to the data to evaluate this important turning point. iii Chapter 3 extends the model presented by Chapter 2 by introducing Kremer's (1998) mechanism for inducing innovation by means of auctions for new patents. Such patent buy-outs are run by the public sector in order to reward innovators and freely disseminate most of the new basic research findings. My work is the first attempt to use Kremer's idea to address the issue of the patentability of basic research and the financing of early innovation. The same Chapter 3 also quantitatively analyses the impact of the so called "research exemption" of patented basic knowledge. Under the research exemption doctrine, if the second innovator is successful in developing a saleable product or process, then he or she can patent it and yet infringe another patent. The key question that modern economies' innovation systems have been facing in the past few decades is: how should basic research be funded in view of maximizing the efficiency of the innovation system as a whole? In other words, is it possible to conceive the privatization of a country's basic knowledge and an efficient system of incentives to basic research? The study presented by Chapter 4 provides a quantitative assessment on the effects of the US patent reforms that, at the beginning of the Eighties, brought to the patentability of research tools, often invented by the university-led research activity. In particular, Chapter 4 re-examines the policy scenarios and the comparisons presented throughout Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 in order to try to provide these two with a robust empirical support. In the first scenario, only the public sector institutions undertake basic research, rendering all results publicly available for firms, racing to find patentable applications. In the second scenario, important for assessing the post-1980 reforms in the US system of innovation, basic research itself is privatized, and hence patented by private firms. The most important question for the political economy of basic research is which system is most conducive to innovation and growth. The public system permits more idea dissemination, but may not give basic researchers enough incentives to focus their research on the directions most needed by the private developers downstream. The private system optimally channels basic research, but, by allowing the patentability of ideas upstream, precludes free entry into applied R & D. This generates conflicting effects, and the policy conclusions depend on the value of all the relevant parameters in the economy. In Chapter 4, I estimated the most important of these parameters with the US data immediately preceding the major reorganization of university and basic research in the 80s, and I simulated the two scenarios. The resulting simulations show that public R & D system, prevailing at that time, was indeed outperforming every privatized alternative scenario. iv Since the incentives to conduct basic or applied research play a central role for economic growth, Chapter 5 tries to answer the following research question: how does increasing early innovation appropriability affect basic research, applied research, education, and wage inequality? Chapter 5 analyses the macroeconomic effects of patent protection by incorporating a two-stage cumulative innovation structure into a quality-ladder growth model with skill acquisition. It focuses on two issues (a) the over-protection vs. the under-protection of intellectual property rights in basic research; (b) the evolution of jurisprudence shaping the bargaining power of the upstream innovators. It shows that the dynamic general equilibrium interactions may seriously mislead the empirical assessment of the growth effects of IPR policy: stronger protection of upstream innovation always looks bad in the short- and possibly medium-run. In a common law system an explicit dynamic macroeconomic analysis is appropriate; hence I have incorporated the mathematical modelling of the evolution of the common law into the rational expectations of the agents. This major modification allows me to schematically replicate the evolution of the skill premium, education, and strengthening of intellectual property rights (IPR) happened in the US during the Eighties and Nineties of the XX century. Chapter 5 also provides a simple "rule of thumb" indicator of the basic researcher bargaining power and 5 shows that IPR evolution can be introduced into a fully rational expectation framework. This helps explaining the well-known dynamics of the skill premium and education in the US, that motivated well-known theories of skill biased technical change and directed technical change (see Acemoglu 2008). Chapter 6, finally, draws inspiration from an important recent empirical literature on competition and productivity in the service sectors (see Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; Alesina et al., 2005; Griffith et al., 2006; Aghion et al., 2006) to build a theoretical framework to predict whether innovation is hampered by the lack of completion in the non-manufacturing sectors. In this final chapter, I have built a simple model of process innovation where the provision of essential services (intermediate inputs, for example financial services or transports) for the production of the final good is subject to sectorial regulation, which shapes the market structure of the intermediate sector as a non-competitive one. The structure adopted in this chapter allows examining the effects on the economy of the presence of two different monopolized tasks: the intermediate service provision and the use of the innovation. The ultimate purpose is to show how the lack of competition in an intermediate essential sector, like the service sector, is actually able to depress productivity growth in the final sector.
Sequential Innovation And Patent Policy
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Author : Alvaro Parra
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Sequential Innovation And Patent Policy written by Alvaro Parra and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.
I examine the impact of patent policy -- characterized by patent length and strength -- on R&D investment dynamics and the number of competitors in the context of sequential innovation. Overly protective policies introduce two distortions: they delay leaders' and followers' investments toward the end of the patent's life, and they decrease the number of competitors in the market. I study the policy that maximizes innovative activity, and how this policy depends on market characteristics. Patent length and strength complement each other in the sense that one tool is effective at encouraging innovation in markets where the other is not.
Patent Policy Patent Pools And The Accumulation Of Claims In Sequential Innovation
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Author : Gastón Llanes
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009
Patent Policy Patent Pools And The Accumulation Of Claims In Sequential Innovation written by Gastón Llanes and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.
We present a dynamic model where the accumulation of patents generates an increasing number of claims on sequential innovation. We study the equilibrium innovation activity under three regimes: patents, no-patents and patent pools. Patent pools increase the probability of innovation with respect to patents, but we also find that: (1) their outcome can be replicated by a licensing scheme in which innovators sell complete patent rights, and (2) they are dynamically unstable. We find that none of the above regimes can reach the first or second best. Finally, we consider patents of finite duration and determine the optimal patent length.
The Effects Of Pro Innovation Policies
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Author : Edwin L.-C Lai
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2023
The Effects Of Pro Innovation Policies written by Edwin L.-C Lai and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2023 with categories.
This study examines the impacts of two prevalent types of patent promotion policies (reward and subsidy policies) by constructing a tractable general equilibrium model to examine the effectiveness of patent promotion policies in promoting research activities as well as the production of high-quality and low-quality innovations. We derived testable hypotheses from the model, which we verified using the novel difference-in-differences model of Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) which allows for heterogeneity treatment timing and effects across treatment groups. We collected patent-level data in 1985-2009 from the China National Intellectual Property Administration and patent promotion policy data from Chinese provinces. Our analysis indicates that patent promotion policies effectively increase R&D research activities and patent production, though they increase almost indiscriminately both the high-quality and low-quality patents. These conclusions are robust even if we employ an alternative definition of high-quality and low-quality patents.
An Optimal Patent Policy In A Dynamic Model Of Innovation
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Author : Israel Luski
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1995
An Optimal Patent Policy In A Dynamic Model Of Innovation written by Israel Luski and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1995 with categories.
A Patentability Requirement For Sequential Innovation
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Author : Ted O'Donoghue
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
A Patentability Requirement For Sequential Innovation written by Ted O'Donoghue and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
This article investigates patent protection for a long sequence of innovations where firms repeatedly supersede each other. Incentives for R&D can be insufficient if successful firms earn market profit only until competitors achieve something better. To correct this problem, patents must provide protection against future innovators. This article proposes using a patentability requirement--a minimum innovation size required for patents. A patentability requirement can stimulate R&D investment and increase dynamic efficiency. Intuitively, requiring firms to pursue larger innovations prolongs market incumbency because larger innovations are harder to achieve, and longer market incumbency implies an increased reward to innovation.
Intellectual Property Rights And Innovation
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Author : R. B. Nicholson
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1983
Intellectual Property Rights And Innovation written by R. B. Nicholson and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1983 with Law categories.
The Breeder S Exception To Patent Rights
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Author : Viola Prifti
language : en
Publisher: Springer
Release Date : 2015-06-02
The Breeder S Exception To Patent Rights written by Viola Prifti and has been published by Springer this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015-06-02 with Law categories.
This book is the first to analyze the compliance of different types of a breeder's exception to patent rights with article 30 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. This type of exception allows using protected biological matter for breeding new varieties of plants. The breeder’s exception is widely accepted under plant variety legislation, but it is not common under patent laws despite the fact that patent rights often cover plant varieties. Only few European countries have adopted such an exception. After the entry into force of the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, the exception will be mandatory for all European Union Member states. Based on a legal and economic approach, this book offers guidance to those countries that need to incorporate a breeder's exception into their national patent systems and suggests the importance of the exception for promoting plant breeding activities.
Issues In Specialized Economic Research And Application 2011 Edition
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Author :
language : en
Publisher: ScholarlyEditions
Release Date : 2012-01-09
Issues In Specialized Economic Research And Application 2011 Edition written by and has been published by ScholarlyEditions this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-01-09 with Business & Economics categories.
Issues in Specialized Economic Research and Application: 2011 Edition is a ScholarlyEditions™ eBook that delivers timely, authoritative, and comprehensive information about Specialized Economic Research and Application. The editors have built Issues in Specialized Economic Research and Application: 2011 Edition on the vast information databases of ScholarlyNews.™ You can expect the information about Specialized Economic Research and Application in this eBook to be deeper than what you can access anywhere else, as well as consistently reliable, authoritative, informed, and relevant. The content of Issues in Specialized Economic Research and Application: 2011 Edition has been produced by the world’s leading scientists, engineers, analysts, research institutions, and companies. All of the content is from peer-reviewed sources, and all of it is written, assembled, and edited by the editors at ScholarlyEditions™ and available exclusively from us. You now have a source you can cite with authority, confidence, and credibility. More information is available at http://www.ScholarlyEditions.com/.