A Study Of Ceo Compensation And Firm Performance Across Companies With High Medium And Low Managerial Discretion
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A Study Of Ceo Compensation And Firm Performance Across Companies With High Medium And Low Managerial Discretion
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Author : Richard Murphy
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1999
A Study Of Ceo Compensation And Firm Performance Across Companies With High Medium And Low Managerial Discretion written by Richard Murphy and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with Chief executive officers categories.
Manipulation Effects Of Managerial Discretion On Executive Compensation
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Author : Changzheng Zhang
language : en
Publisher: Nova Science Publishers
Release Date : 2016
Manipulation Effects Of Managerial Discretion On Executive Compensation written by Changzheng Zhang and has been published by Nova Science Publishers this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with Business & Economics categories.
Facing with the ever increasing change of the business environment, the firms have recognized that their persistent competitive edge increasingly depends on whether or not they own the dedicated, experienced and capable CEOs. In the global practice, more and more firms have tried, or are trying, or will try to change their CEOs in order to get higher firm performance or just to get out of recession. Especially it is true in China. However, in theory, the literature in the related fields, such as the corporate governance, the strategic human resource management, the strategy management, the principal-agent theory and so on, has only addressed how to arrange managerial discretion and executive compensation reasonably under the normal circumstances, while ignoring the conditions of CEO change. Therefore, each stakeholder in the post-CEO change period has no clear theoretical guidances on how to reallocate managerial discretion and reset executive compensation for the fresh CEOs. Such a theoretical research gap has leaded to a large number of failures in the issue of CEO change. In order to make up this gap, this book tries to investigate the relationship between managerial discretion and executive compensation under the conditions of CEO change, which can not only practically guide the re-balancing of the corporate governance and further improve the success possibility of CEO change, but can theoretically enrich the contributions in managerial discretion approach and executive compensation theory. Based on the comparative study perspective, by drawing on the data from Chinese listed companies as the sample and adopting the Correlation Analysis, Multiple Linear Regression and Hierarchical Models as the statistical analysis methods, the book investigates how managerial discretion, respectively for the fresh CEOs and the senior CEOs, manipulates each dimension of executive compensation, i.e. executive compensation level, CEO pay-performance sensitivity, executive compensation gap and executive-employee compensation gap. The book makes two valuable new findings: First, the book confirms that both the fresh CEOs and the senior CEOs have the motives and capabilities to manipulate each dimension of executive compensation, but varying by intent and intention; Second, the book proves that the fresh CEOs show higher firm-serving motives when they manipulate each dimension of executive compensation by performing managerial discretion, while the senior CEOs show relatively higher self-serving motives. Based on the research results, the book builds the fresh-keeping mechanisms of firm-serving motives of the fresh CEOs during their whole CEO tenure, which are of great meanings for the government, the scholars and the practitioners and so on.
Ceo Pay And Firm Performance
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Author : Paul L. Joskow
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1994
Ceo Pay And Firm Performance written by Paul L. Joskow and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1994 with Chief executive officers categories.
This study explores the dynamic structure of the pay-for- performance relationship in CEO compensation and quantifies the effect of introducing a more complex model of firm financial performance on the estimated performance sensitivity of executive pay. The results suggest that current compensation responds to past performance outcomes, but that the effect decays considerably within two years. This contrasts sharply with models of infinitely persistent performance effects implicitly assumed in much of the empirical compensation literature. We find that both accounting and market performance measures influence compensation and that the salary and bonus component of pay as well as total compensation have become more sensitive to firm financial performance over the past two decades. There is no evidence that boards fail to penalize CEOs for poor financial performance or reward them disproportionately well for good performance. Finally, the data suggest that boards may discount extreme performance outcomes -both high and low - relative to performance that lies within some `normal' band in setting compensation.
Origin Of Ceo And Compensation Strategy
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Author : Yoshio Yanadori
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2002
Origin Of Ceo And Compensation Strategy written by Yoshio Yanadori and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002 with Personnel management categories.
An Empirical Study Of Executive Management Team Compensation And Company Performance
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Author : Gregory A. Jonas
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
An Empirical Study Of Executive Management Team Compensation And Company Performance written by Gregory A. Jonas and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with Corporations categories.
Increasing compensation disclosures mandated by the Securities Exchange Commission provide transparency that allows more shareholders to question the results produced by highly compensated executives. The popular business press often decries the apparent imbalance between executive pay and firm performance. Published academic research has responded with hundreds of studies attempting to explain executive pay in terms of firm performance. The preponderance of these studies focus on Chief Executive Officers. This study empirically examines executive compensation for team effects on future firm performance. Applying a firm specific fixed-effects model to a sample of 13,021 firm-year observations from ExecuComp, the current study regresses top management team compensation and control variables on firm performance averaged one, three, and five years following the year of compensation. One accounting based measure of performance (return on assets) and one market based measure of firm performance (shareholder return) is examined over the one three and five year horizons. Consistent with increasing concerns raised by investors regarding excess executive pay, this study finds evidence that higher top management team pay is associated with companies experiencing lower rates of return in the future. However, higher management team pay is associated with higher profits and market value measured in dollars. Theses effects are significantly different between the short-term and long term components of compensation. Although compensation of the team is highly correlated with the CEO, the compensation of the executive team has incremental effects on future firm performance of the company. This study contributes to the executive compensation literature by providing evidence that the compensation of the top management team affects future company performance. The observed impact of management team compensation on company performance is: incremental to CEO effects noted in prior studies, differential between short- and long-term components of compensation, sensitive to the proxy used for company performance, and attenuates over time. These findings suggest that further research on executive management team compensation is merited in order to address an interesting gap in the extant literature.
Executive Pay Dispersion Corporate Governance And Firm Performance
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Author : Kin-Wai Lee
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2008
Executive Pay Dispersion Corporate Governance And Firm Performance written by Kin-Wai Lee and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with categories.
Much of the research on management compensation focuses on the level and structure of executives' pay. In this study, we examine a compensation element that has not received so far considerable research attention - the dispersion of compensation across managers - and its impact on firm performance. We examine the implications of two theoretical models dealing with pay dispersion - tournament vs. equity fairness. Tournament theory stipulates that a large pay dispersion provides strong incentives to highly qualified managers, leading to higher efforts and improved enterprise performance, while arguments for equity fairness suggest that greater pay dispersion increases envy and dysfunctional behaviour among team members, adversely affecting performance. Consistent with tournament theory, we find that firm performance, measured by either Tobin's Q or stock performance, is positively associated with the dispersion of management compensation. We also document that the positive association between firm performance and pay dispersion is stronger in firms with high agency costs related to managerial discretion. Furthermore, effective corporate governance, especially high board independence, strengthens the positive association between firm performance and pay dispersion. Our findings thus add to the compensation literature a potentially important dimension: managerial pay dispersion.
Handbook Of Leadership Theory And Practice
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Author : Nitin Nohria
language : en
Publisher: Harvard Business Press
Release Date : 2010-01-26
Handbook Of Leadership Theory And Practice written by Nitin Nohria and has been published by Harvard Business Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010-01-26 with Business & Economics categories.
Scores of books and articles have been written in the popular press and mainstream marketplace about leadership: who leaders are, what they do, and why they matter. Yet in academia, there is a dearth of rigorous research, journal articles, or doctoral programs focused on leadership as a discipline. Why do top business schools espouse mission statements that promise to "educate the leaders of the future"- yet fail to give leadership its intellectual due? The Handbook of Leadership Theory and Practice seeks to bridge this disconnect. Based on the Harvard Business School Centennial Colloquium "Leadership: Advancing an Intellectual Discipline" and edited by HBS professors Nitin Nohria and Rakesh Khurana, this volume brings together the most important scholars from fields as diverse as psychology, sociology, economics, and history to take stock of what we know about leadership and to set an agenda for future research. More than a means of getting ahead and gaining power, leadership must be understood as a serious professional and personal responsibility. Featuring the thinking of today's most renowned scholars, the Handbook of Leadership Theory and Practice will be a catalyst for elevating leadership to a higher intellectual plane - and help shape the research agenda for the next generation of leadership scholars.
Academy Of Management Journal
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Author : Academy of Management
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1998
Academy Of Management Journal written by Academy of Management and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1998 with Industrial management categories.
The Examination Of Top Manager Compensation System Of Nyse Energy Companies
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Author : Yusuf Nulla
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
The Examination Of Top Manager Compensation System Of Nyse Energy Companies written by Yusuf Nulla and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
This study investigated CEO compensation system of NYSE energy companies. It tested the relationship between CEO compensation, firm size, accounting firm performance, and corporate governance, from 2005 to 2010. The totaled twenty five companies were selected through random sampling method from NYSE index companies. The research question for this study was: is there a relationship between CEO cash compensation, firm size, accounting performance, and corporate governance?. To answer this question, nine statistical models were created. It was found that, there was a relationship between CEO salary, CEO bonus, total compensation, firm size, accounting performance, and corporate governance. The correlations between CEO salary, CEO bonus, CEO total compensation, and firm size were ranged from moderate to strong positive ratios. The correlations between CEO compensation and firm performance were ranged from low negative to strong positive ratios. The correlations between CEO compensation and corporate governance were ranged from low negative to moderate positive ratios.
Elite Ceos
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2008
Elite Ceos written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with categories.
A particular body of research examines the issue of linking executive pay to firm performance by focusing on the observation that CEO compensation varies widely across firms, even within the same industry. This research assumes that the same compensation model (i.e., structure of the model, explanatory variables, and coefficients on those variables) can be applied to all CEOs. If you will, extant research assumes a one-size-fits-all CEO compensation model approach to empirical analysis. Furthermore, much of this research also examines firm performance and similarly utilizes a one-size-fits-all firm performance model. I develop a proxy for CEO managerial power that I use to rank and classify CEOs into two groups: Elite CEOs (above a cut-off by the ranking) and Non-Elite CEOs (the remaining CEOs). As a note, I demonstrate that ranking the CEOs by my proxy for CEO managerial power is not the same as simply ranking the CEOs by their total direct compensation. My empirical results show that a one-size-fits-all model can be rejected. That is, the estimated coefficients in compensation models and firm performance models are different for Elite CEOs as compared to Non-Elite CEOs. Also, firms with Elite CEOs do not have higher performance. This suggests that Elite CEOs extract excessive compensation due to undue influence over their respective boards rather than to superior performance. These findings have both academic and corporate policy implications.