An Experimental Comparison Of Sequential First And Second Price Auctions With Synergies
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An Experimental Comparison Of Sequential First And Second Price Auctions With Synergies
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Author : Kasper Leufkens
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
An Experimental Comparison Of Sequential First And Second Price Auctions With Synergies written by Kasper Leufkens and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
Synergies And Price Trends In Sequential Auctions
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Author : Flavio F. Menezes
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1999
Synergies And Price Trends In Sequential Auctions written by Flavio F. Menezes and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with Auctions categories.
Sequential Auctions With Synergies
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Author : Kasper Leufkens
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
Sequential Auctions With Synergies written by Kasper Leufkens and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with categories.
A Collection Of Surveys On Market Experiments
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Author : Charles Noussair
language : en
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
Release Date : 2013-11-27
A Collection Of Surveys On Market Experiments written by Charles Noussair and has been published by John Wiley & Sons this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013-11-27 with Business & Economics categories.
Comprised of 10 surveys by leading scholars, this collection showcases the largest and fastest growing strands of research on market behaviour in experimental economics. Covers topics such as asset markets, contests, environmental policy, frictions, general equilibrium, labour markets, multi-unit auctions, oligopoly markets, and prediction markets Focuses on the literature that has helped economists best understand how markets operate Assesses the impact of developments in theory, policy, and research methods
An Experimental Comparison Of First And Second Price Auctions Of A Complex Commodity
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1999
An Experimental Comparison Of First And Second Price Auctions Of A Complex Commodity written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with categories.
Sequential Auctions With Capacity Constraints
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Author : Isabelle Brocas
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Sequential Auctions With Capacity Constraints written by Isabelle Brocas and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with Consumer behavior categories.
We conduct a laboratory experiment where groups of 4 subjects constrained to obtain at most one good each, sequentially bid for 3 goods in first and second price auctions. Subjects learn at the beginning of each auction their valuation for the good and exit the auction once they have obtained one good. We show that, contrary to equilibrium predictions, subjects' bidding behavior is excessively similar across units and across mechanisms at the aggregate level. We provide two (complementary) explanations for these departures. One is bounded rationality. Subjects do not fully comprehend subtle differences between mechanisms. The other is self-selection. Subjects are very heterogeneous and some of them deviate more from equilibrium than others. Since deviations take mostly the form of overbidding, these subjects win the first or second good and exit the auction, leaving those who play closer to theoretical predictions to bid for the third good. Support for this hypothesis comes from the documented higher bidding, lower efficiency and lower profits associated with the first and second unit compared to the third one.
Auctions And Leaks
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Author : Sven Fischer
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2017
Auctions And Leaks written by Sven Fischer and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017 with categories.
In first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding, second movers may discover the first movers' bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first-price auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities eliminate the usual revenue dominance of first- over second-price auctions. With a high leak probability, second-price auctions generate significantly more revenue.
An Experimental Study On Sequential Auctions With Privately Known Capacities
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Author : Luca Corazzini
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2017
An Experimental Study On Sequential Auctions With Privately Known Capacities written by Luca Corazzini and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017 with categories.
We experimentally study bidding behavior in sequential first-price procurement auctions where bidders' capacity constraints are private information. Treatment differs in the ex-ante probability distribution of sellers' capacities and in the (exogenous) probability that the second auction is actually implemented. Our results show that: (i) bidding behavior in the second auction conforms with sequential rationality; (ii) while first auction's bids negatively depend on capacity, bidders seem unable to recognize this link when, at the end of the first auction, they state their beliefs on the opponent's capacity. To rationalize this inconsistency between bids and beliefs, we conjecture that bidding in the first auction is also affected by a hidden, behavioral type - related to the strategic sophistication of bidders - that obfuscates the link between capacity and bids. Building on this intuition, we show that a simple level-k model may help explain the inconsistency.
Artificial Economics
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Author : Ces Reo Hern Ndez
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2011-09-28
Artificial Economics written by Ces Reo Hern Ndez and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011-09-28 with categories.
Simulation is used in economics to solve large econometric models, for large-scale micro simulations, and to obtain numerical solutions for policy design in top-down established models. But these applications fail to take advantage of the methods offered by artificial economics (AE) through artificial intelligence and distributed computing. AE is a bottom-up and generative approach of agent-based modelling developed to get a deeper insight into the complexity of economics. AE can be viewed as a very elegant and general class of modelling techniques that generalize numerical economics, mathematical programming and micro simulation approaches. The papers presented in this book address methodological questions and applications of AE to macroeconomics, industrial organization, information and learning, market dynamics, finance and financial markets.
First Price And Second Price Auctions With Externalities
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Author : Chulyoung Kim
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2023
First Price And Second Price Auctions With Externalities written by Chulyoung Kim and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2023 with categories.
We consider a scenario where a single indivisible object is auctioned off to three bidders and among the three bidders there is one bidder whose winning imposes a positive or negative externality on the other two bidders. We theoretically and experimentally compare two standard sealed-bid auction formats, first-price and second-price auctions, under complete information. Using a refinement of undominated Nash equilibria, we analyze equilibrium bids and outcomes in the two auction formats. Our experimental results show that overbidding relative to equilibrium bids is prevalent, especially in second-price auctions, and this leads to higher revenue and lower efficiency in second- price auctions than in first-price auctions, especially under negative externalities. Our results are consistent with previous experimental findings that bidders tend to overbid more in second-price auctions than in first-price auctions, and they suggest that such a tendency is robust to the introduction of externalities.