Sequential Auctions With Synergies
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Synergies And Price Trends In Sequential Auctions
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Author : Flavio F. Menezes
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1999
Synergies And Price Trends In Sequential Auctions written by Flavio F. Menezes and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with Auctions categories.
Sequential Auctions With Synergies
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Author : Kasper Leufkens
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
Sequential Auctions With Synergies written by Kasper Leufkens and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with categories.
Sequential Auctions With Synergies
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Author : Kasper Leufkens
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
Sequential Auctions With Synergies written by Kasper Leufkens and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with categories.
Sequential Auctions With Synergies An Example
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Author : Fernando Branco
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996
Sequential Auctions With Synergies An Example written by Fernando Branco and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with categories.
Stochastic Synergies In Sequential Auctions
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Author : Dakshina G. De Silva
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004
Stochastic Synergies In Sequential Auctions written by Dakshina G. De Silva and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with categories.
We consider sequential construction contracts in which bidders may benefit from one auction to the next due to synergistic tasks across the projects auctioned. Theoretical considerations indicate that winners in the former auctions are more likely to participate in latter auctions. Moreover, conditional on participation, past winners place lower bids, on average, and are so more likely to win in later auctions. We present evidence in support of these predictions using sequential construction auctions conducted by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation.
An Experimental Comparison Of Sequential First And Second Price Auctions With Synergies
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Author : Kasper Leufkens
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
An Experimental Comparison Of Sequential First And Second Price Auctions With Synergies written by Kasper Leufkens and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
Three Essays On Auction Theory
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Author : Xiaoshu Xu
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Three Essays On Auction Theory written by Xiaoshu Xu and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
Abstract: My dissertation consists of three chapters in theoretical auction analysis. The first chapter considers optimal sequential auctions with new bidders arriving in each period. The second chapter examines how resale affects bidding strategies and auction outcomes in an auction environment with costly entry. The third chapter investigates how resale affects bidding strategies and auction outcomes in a sequential auction setting where the values of items auctioned in different periods exhibit synergies. The first chapter gives a full characterization of the optimal sequential second-price (or ascending English) auctions with sequentially arriving bidders. There are n bidders in the first period and m new bidders arrive in the second period. Based on the auctioneer's commitment power, we study two cases: full commitment and noncommitment. In both cases, we establish the existence of a symmetric equilibrium characterized by a threshold strategy - -a bidder does not bid in the first auction when her valuation is below this threshold and bids according to an increasing function otherwise. In the noncommitment case, the auctioneer chooses an optimal reserve price to maximize the expected revenue from the second period; thus her decision of whether to include previous bidders as potential buyers is endogenously determined by the reserve price in the first auction. This might create multiple equilibria depending on the beliefs of the auctioneer and the bidders. We apply a fairly intuitive rule to establish the uniqueness. We also extend our analysis to allow for opportunities for resale, where the winner in the first auction can opt to resell the item to new bidders. The second chapter, joint with Dan Levin and Lixin Ye, studies how resale affects auctions with costly entry in a model where an arbitrary number of bidders possess two-dimensional private information signals: entry costs and valuations. We establish the existence of symmetric entry equilibrium and identify sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. Our analysis suggests that the opportunity of resale induces motivation for both speculative entry and bargain hunting abstentions. By following the uniform distribution for numerical analysis, our results suggest that while the entry probability and efficiency are always higher when resale is allowed, the auctioneer's expected revenue is lower when resale is allowed for almost all parameter values. We also compare this model to one where bidders may follow "strong" or "weak" distributions in terms of valuations. The third chapter, joint with Dan Levin and Lixin Ye, studies a sequential second-price auction of two objects with two bidders, where the winner of the package obtains a synergy from the second object. If reselling after the two auctions occurs, it proceeds as either monopoly or monopsony take-it-or-leave-it offer. I find that a post-auction resale has a significant impact on bidding strategies in the auctions. When seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer in resale, there is no equilibrium where at least one bidder reveals her type with positive probability. When buyer makes the offer instead, there exist symmetric increasing equilibrium strategies for both items. While allowing resale always improves efficiency, I demonstrate that the effect of resale is ambiguous on expected revenue as Ill as the probability of exposure. I also extend this model to allow for three bidders and provide the equilibrium analysis.
Sequential Auctions With Continuation Costs
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Author : Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1993
Sequential Auctions With Continuation Costs written by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1993 with Auctions categories.
Sequential Auctions With Supply Uncertainty
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Author : Paul Pezanis-Christou
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996
Sequential Auctions With Supply Uncertainty written by Paul Pezanis-Christou and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with Auctions categories.
Combinatorial Auctions For Procurement
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Author : Marcelo Olivares
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Combinatorial Auctions For Procurement written by Marcelo Olivares and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
In this paper we conduct an empirical investigation of a large-scale combinatorial auction (CA); the Chilean auction for school meals in which the government procures half a billion dollars worth of meal services every year. Our empirical study is motivated by two fundamental aspects in the design of CAs: (1) which packages should bidders be allowed to bid on; and (2) diversifying the supplier base to promote competition. We use bidding data to uncover important aspects of the firms' cost structure and their strategic behavior, both of which are not directly observed by the auctioneer; these estimates inform the auction design. Our results indicate that package bidding that allows firms to express their cost synergies due to economies of scale and density seems appropriate. However, we also found evidence that firms can take advantage of this flexibility by discounting package bids for strategic reasons and not driven by cost synergies. Because this behavior can lead to inefficiencies, it may be worth evaluating whether to prohibit certain specific combinations in the bidding process. Our results also suggest that market share restrictions and running sequential auctions seem to promote competition in the long-run, without significantly increasing the short-run cost for the government due to unrealized cost synergies. Our results highlight that the simultaneous consideration of the firms' operational cost structure and their strategic behavior is key to the successful design of a CA. More broadly, our paper is the first to provide an econometric study of a large-scale CA, providing novel and substantive insights regarding bidding behavior in this type of auctions.