Auctions With Weakly Asymmetric Interdepent Values

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Auctions With Weakly Asymmetric Interdependent Values

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Author : Gadi Fibich
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003

Auctions With Weakly Asymmetric Interdependent Values written by Gadi Fibich and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with Auctions categories.

Auctions With Weakley Asymmetric Interdependent Values

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Author : Gadi Fibich
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003

Auctions With Weakley Asymmetric Interdependent Values written by Gadi Fibich and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.

Auctions With Weakly Asymmetric Interdepent Values

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Author : Gadi Fibich
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003

Auctions With Weakly Asymmetric Interdepent Values written by Gadi Fibich and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.

Auctions With Weakly Interdependent Values

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Author : Gadi Fibich
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003

Auctions With Weakly Interdependent Values written by Gadi Fibich and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with Auctions categories.

Pure Strategy Equilibria Of Single And Double Auctions With Interdependent Values

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Author : Aloisio Araujo
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013

Pure Strategy Equilibria Of Single And Double Auctions With Interdependent Values written by Aloisio Araujo and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.

We prove the existence of monotonic pure strategy equilibrium for many kinds of asymmetric auctions with n bidders and unitary demands, interdependent values and independent types. The assumptions require monotonicity only in the own bidder's type. The payments can be a function of all bids. Thus, we provide a new equilibrium existence result for asymmetrical double auctions and a small number of bidders. The generality of our setting requires the use of special tie-breaking rules. We present an example of a double auction with interdependent values where all equilibria are trivial, that is, they have zero probability of trade. This is related to Akerlof's “market for lemmons” example and to the “winner's curse,” establishing a connection between them. However, we are able to provide sufficient conditions for non-trivial equilibrium existence.

Studies Of Informational Assymetries In Standard Auctions

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Author : Jinwoo Kim
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003

Studies Of Informational Assymetries In Standard Auctions written by Jinwoo Kim and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.

Auction Theory

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Author : Vijay Krishna
language : en
Publisher: Academic Press
Release Date : 2009-09-28

Auction Theory written by Vijay Krishna and has been published by Academic Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009-09-28 with Business & Economics categories.

Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points

Asymmetric English Auctions

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Author : Vijay Krishna
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2000

Asymmetric English Auctions written by Vijay Krishna and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2000 with categories.

This paper studies equilibria of the n-bidder single-object English, or open ascending price, auction in a setting with interdependent values and asymmetric bidders. Maskin (1992) showed that if the values satisfy a "single crossing" condition, then the two-bidder English auction has an efficient equilibrium. In this paper two extensions of the single crossing condition, the "average crossing" condition and "cyclical crossing" condition, are introduced. The main result is that under either of these conditions the n-bidder English auction has an efficient equilibrium.

Three Essays In Empirical Auctions

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Author : Sudip Gupta
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005

Three Essays In Empirical Auctions written by Sudip Gupta and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with categories.

Monotonicity In Asymmetric First Price Auctions With Affiliation

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Author : David McAdams
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2008

Monotonicity In Asymmetric First Price Auctions With Affiliation written by David McAdams and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with categories.

I study monotonicity of equilibrium strategies in first-price auctions with symmetric bidders, risk-aversion, affiliated types, and interdependent values. I prove that every mixed-strategy equilibrium is outcome equivalent to a monotone pure strategy equilibrium under the priority rule for breaking ties. This provides a missing link to establish uniqueness in Milgrom and Weber (1982)'s general symmetric model. Non-monotone equilibria can exist under the coin-flip rule but they are distinguishable: all non-monotone equilibria have positive probability of ties whereas all monotone equilibria have zero probability of ties. This provides a justification for the standard empirical practice of restricting attention to monotone strategies.