Bid Coordination In Sponsored Search Auctions

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Bid Coordination In Sponsored Search Auctions

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Author : Francesco Decarolis
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2023

Bid Coordination In Sponsored Search Auctions written by Francesco Decarolis and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2023 with Auctions categories.

Bid delegation to specialized intermediaries is common in the auction systems used to sell internet advertising. When the same intermediary concentrates the demand for ad space from competing advertisers, its incentive to coordinate client bids might alter the functioning of the auctions. This study develops a methodology to detect bid coordination, and presents a strategy to estimate a bound on the search engine revenue losses imposed by coordination relative to a counterfactual benchmark of competitive bidding. Using proprietary data from auctions held on a major search engine, coordination is detected in 55 percent of the cases of delegated bidding that we observed, and the associated upper bound on the search engine’s revenue loss ranges between 5.3 and 10.4 percent.

Common Agency And Coordinated Bids In Sponsored Search Auctions

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Author : Francesco Decarolis
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013

Common Agency And Coordinated Bids In Sponsored Search Auctions written by Francesco Decarolis and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.

As auctions are becoming the main mechanism for selling advertisement space on the web, marketing agencies specialized in bidding in online auctions are proliferating. We analyze theoretically how bidding delegation to a common marketing agency can undermine both revenues and efficiency of the generalized second price auction, the format used by Google and Microsoft-Yahoo!. Our characterization allows us to quantify the revenue losses relative to both the case of full competition and the case of agency bidding under an alternative auction format (specifically, the VCG mechanism). We propose a simple algorithm that a search engine can use to reduce efficiency and revenue losses.

Let Talk About Bidding

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Author : Jeannette Brosig
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006

Let Talk About Bidding written by Jeannette Brosig and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with categories.

Bidding Behavior In Internet Auction Markets

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Author : Radovan Vadovic
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006

Bidding Behavior In Internet Auction Markets written by Radovan Vadovic and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with categories.

In this dissertation I study bidding behavior in Internet Auction Markets. I focus on practice called"multiple bidding" which occurs when a single bidder places numerous bids throughout the same auction. Multiple bidding appears frequently in the data but the incentives that motivate it are not well understood. In the first chapter I develop a theoretical model in which multiple bidding is an equilibrium behavior by rational bidders. The model has a dynamic auction with two bidders who can search for outside prices while bidding in the auction. Each bidder has a search cost which is her private information. When outside prices are private (independently drawn and identically distributed), then, there is an equilibrium in which bidders with the lower search costs bid only late and always search, while the bidders with higher search costs bid both early and late and search as if they coordinated their search decisions, i.e., the bidder with the lower search cost searches and the other bidder does not. This equilibrium by itself provides an explanation of two frequently occurring bidding patterns (late and multiple bidding). In the second chapter I study experimentally the effect of early bids in dynamic auctions on how bidders search for outside prices. The design has two bidders participating in an ascending clock-auction during which any one of the bidders can pause the auction clock. This I interpret as placing an early bid. Once the auction is paused both bidders can simultaneously search for an alternative outside price. Results indicate that pausing decisions by subjects impact their subsequent searching for outside prices, i.e., whether a subject decides to search or not depends on whether she has paused the auction or not. Subjects behave as if they coordinated their searching decisions: the bidder who pauses the auction also searches with high frequency and the other bidder does not. Because this type of behavior increases both the efficiency and the profitability of the auction we favor the use of policies that promote early bidding inpractice, such as, longer auctions and lower public reserve prices.

Bid Management

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Author : Emma Jaques
language : en
Publisher: Kogan Page Publishers
Release Date : 2011-02-03

Bid Management written by Emma Jaques and has been published by Kogan Page Publishers this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011-02-03 with Business & Economics categories.

While it is becoming increasingly common for contracts to be awarded through formal procurement processes, smaller business are missing out. Without the training and confidence needed to write a successful bid or proposal valuable business can be lost. Bid Management is an easy-to-read practical guide which will teach the reader how to think like a professional bid manager. It covers the basics of how to find opportunities, understanding the rules of the game and how to get to know your customer. It also gives essential advice on how to compete with other bidders, present a deliverable and profitable bid, project manage your bid, work out a pricing strategy, clinch the deal and learn from success as well as failure. With an insightful interview with the Director behind the London 2012 Olympic bid, Bid Management uncovers the myths of bidding and teaches all the skills needed to get noticed, retain existing clients and win new ones.

Sponsored Search Auctions

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Author : Song Yao
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010

Sponsored Search Auctions written by Song Yao and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with categories.

We systematically overview the literature in key word search and propose several promising research directions. The paper is organized by each agent in the search process: searchers, advertisers and the search engine, and reviews the key research issues for each. For each group, we outline the decision process involved in keyword search. For searchers, this involves what to search, where to search, which results to click, and when to exit search. For advertisers, this involves where to bid and which word or words to bid on, how much to bid and how searchers and auction mechanisms moderate these behaviors. The search engine faces choices on mechanism design, website design, and how much information to share with its advertisers and searchers. These choices have implications for customer lifetime value and the nature of competition between advertisers. Overall, we list a number of potential areas of future research arising from the decision processes of these various agents.

Let S Talk About Bidding

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Author :
language : de
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006

Let S Talk About Bidding written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with categories.

Sponsored Search And Sequential Auctions

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Author : Emmanuel Lorenzon
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016

Sponsored Search And Sequential Auctions written by Emmanuel Lorenzon and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.

This thesis is a collection of three essays in theoretical auction analysis. Chapter 1 considersbid delegation in the GSP auction mechanism. In a game involving side-contracts and a compensationpolicy set by an agency, the first-best collusive outcome is achieved. We offer a characterization of the implementablebid profiles for the two-position game with three players. Chapter 2 considers the sequentialsale of an object to two buyers: one knows his private information and the other buyer does not. Buyershave a multi-unit demand and private valuations for each unit are perfectly correlated. An asymmetricequilibrium exists when the uninformed player adopts an aggressive bidding strategy. Conversely, hisinformed opponent behaves more conservatively by using bid shading. The bidding behaviour of theuninformed bidder is driven by the opportunity to learn his private valuation for free. This dynamic is atthe root of the decline in the equilibrium price across both sales. In chapter 3, information is observableduring the first-stage auction in a sequential-move game in which the first-mover bidder is observed byhis opponent. A separating equilibrium exists in which the informed bidder bids aggressively when he isthe first-mover which entails a non-participation strategy from his uninformed competitor. Conversely,the latter adopts a conservative behaviour when he is the first-mover. A pooling equilibrium in which theinformed bidder blurs his valuation can only exist if his uninformed opponent adopts a non-participatingstrategy.

A Position Paradox In Sponsored Search Auctions

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Author : Kinshuk Jerath
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010

A Position Paradox In Sponsored Search Auctions written by Kinshuk Jerath and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with categories.

We study the bidding strategies of vertically differentiated firms that bid for sponsored search advertisement positions for a keyword at a search engine. We explicitly model how consumers navigate and click on sponsored links based on their knowledge and beliefs about firm qualities. Our model yields several interesting insights and a main counter-intuitive result we focus on is the position paradox." The paradox is that a superior firm may bid lower than an inferior firm and obtain a position below it, yet still obtain more clicks than the inferior firm. Under a pay-per- impression mechanism, the inferior firm wants to be at the top where more consumers click on its link, while the superior firm is better off by placing its link at a lower position as it pays a smaller advertising fee but some consumers will still reach it in the search of a higher-quality firm. Under a pay-per-click mechanism, the inferior firm has an even stronger incentive to be at the top since now it only has to pay for the consumers who do not know the firms' reputations and, therefore, can bid more aggressively. Interestingly, as the quality premium for the superior firm increases, and/or if more consumers know the identity of the superior firm, the incentive for the inferior firm to be at the top may increase. Contrary to conventional belief, we find that the search engine may have the incentive to over-weight the inferior firm's bid and strategically create the position paradox to increase overall clicks by consumers. To validate our model, we analyze a dataset from a popular Korean search engine firm and find that: (i) a large proportion of auction outcomes in the data show the position paradox, and (ii) sharp predictions from our model are validated in the data.

Early Late And Multiple Bidding In Internet Auctions

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Author : Radovan Vadovic
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014

Early Late And Multiple Bidding In Internet Auctions written by Radovan Vadovic and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.

In Internet auctions bidders frequently bid in one of three ways: either only early, or late, or they revise their early bids. This paper rationalizes all three bidding patterns within a single equilibrium. We consider a model of a dynamic auction in which bidders can search for outside prices during the auction. We find that in the equilibrium bidders with the low search costs bid only late and always search, while the bidders with high search costs bid early or multiple times and search only if they were previously outbid. An important feature of the equilibrium is that early bidding allows bidders to search in a coordinated manner. This means that everyone searches except the bidder with the highest early bid. We also compare the static and dynamic auction and conclude that dynamic auction is always more efficient but not always more profitable.