Sponsored Search And Sequential Auctions
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Sponsored Search And Sequential Auctions
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Author : Emmanuel Lorenzon
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Sponsored Search And Sequential Auctions written by Emmanuel Lorenzon and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.
This thesis is a collection of three essays in theoretical auction analysis. Chapter 1 considersbid delegation in the GSP auction mechanism. In a game involving side-contracts and a compensationpolicy set by an agency, the first-best collusive outcome is achieved. We offer a characterization of the implementablebid profiles for the two-position game with three players. Chapter 2 considers the sequentialsale of an object to two buyers: one knows his private information and the other buyer does not. Buyershave a multi-unit demand and private valuations for each unit are perfectly correlated. An asymmetricequilibrium exists when the uninformed player adopts an aggressive bidding strategy. Conversely, hisinformed opponent behaves more conservatively by using bid shading. The bidding behaviour of theuninformed bidder is driven by the opportunity to learn his private valuation for free. This dynamic is atthe root of the decline in the equilibrium price across both sales. In chapter 3, information is observableduring the first-stage auction in a sequential-move game in which the first-mover bidder is observed byhis opponent. A separating equilibrium exists in which the informed bidder bids aggressively when he isthe first-mover which entails a non-participation strategy from his uninformed competitor. Conversely,the latter adopts a conservative behaviour when he is the first-mover. A pooling equilibrium in which theinformed bidder blurs his valuation can only exist if his uninformed opponent adopts a non-participatingstrategy.
Sponsored Search Auctions
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Author : Song Yao
language : en
Publisher: Now Publishers Inc
Release Date : 2009
Sponsored Search Auctions written by Song Yao and has been published by Now Publishers Inc this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with Brand loyalty categories.
Sponsored Search Auctions reviews current academic research on this nascent topic with a focus on future practical and research opportunities
Budget Constraints And Optimization In Sponsored Search Auctions
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Author : Yanwu Yang
language : en
Publisher: Elsevier
Release Date : 2013-11-23
Budget Constraints And Optimization In Sponsored Search Auctions written by Yanwu Yang and has been published by Elsevier this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013-11-23 with Computers categories.
The Intelligent Systems Series publishes reference works and handbooks in three core sub-topic areas: Intelligent Automation, Intelligent Transportation Systems, and Intelligent Computing. They include theoretical studies, design methods, and real-world implementations and applications. The series' readership is broad, but focuses on engineering, electronics, and computer science. Budget constraints and optimization in sponsored search auctions takes into account consideration of the entire life cycle of campaigns for researchers and developers working on search systems and ROI maximization. The highly experienced authors compiled their knowledge and experience to provide insight, algorithms and development techniques for successful optimized/constrained systems. The book presents a cutting-edge budget optimization approach that embraces three-level budget decisions in the life cycle of search auctions: allocation across markets at the system level, distribution over temporal slots at the campaign level, and real-time adjustment at the keyword level. Delivers a systematic overview and technique for understanding budget constraints and ROI optimization in sponsored search auction systems, including algorithms and developer guides for a range of scenarios Explores effects of constraints on mechanisms, bidding and keyword strategies, and the strategies for budget optimization that developers can employ An informative reference source for both software and systems developers working in the search auctions, marketing and sales strategy optimization, services development for online marketing and advertisement, e-commerce, social and economic networking
Bid Coordination In Sponsored Search Auctions
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Author : Francesco Decarolis
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2023
Bid Coordination In Sponsored Search Auctions written by Francesco Decarolis and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2023 with Auctions categories.
Bid delegation to specialized intermediaries is common in the auction systems used to sell internet advertising. When the same intermediary concentrates the demand for ad space from competing advertisers, its incentive to coordinate client bids might alter the functioning of the auctions. This study develops a methodology to detect bid coordination, and presents a strategy to estimate a bound on the search engine revenue losses imposed by coordination relative to a counterfactual benchmark of competitive bidding. Using proprietary data from auctions held on a major search engine, coordination is detected in 55 percent of the cases of delegated bidding that we observed, and the associated upper bound on the search engine’s revenue loss ranges between 5.3 and 10.4 percent.
Essays On Optimal Bidding Strategies In Sponsored Search Advertising Auctions
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Author : Prabirendra Chatterjee
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Essays On Optimal Bidding Strategies In Sponsored Search Advertising Auctions written by Prabirendra Chatterjee and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with Internet advertising categories.
In this dissertation, I model generalized second price (GSP) auction for keyword search to analyze the optimal bidding strategies of the participating advertisers. The results also apply to a more general setting where multiple goods are being auctioned off. The study in chapter 3 examines the bidding strategies of the advertisers in a complete information static GSP auction. The results show that unlike in standard second price auction, truthful bidding is never a dominant strategy in general second price auction. In chapter 4, I have developed a model of static incomplete information GSP auction. I characterize all possible pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the game and show that the consideration of the click through rates ratio plays a key role in determining the equilibrium bidding strategies for the advertisers. Specifically, I find that when the click through rates ratio exceeds a critical value, there will be no pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The analysis also reveals that in a game of static incomplete information no asymmetric bidding equilibrium would prevail. The study in chapter 5 analyzes a model of incomplete information dynamic GSP auction. I find that in a dynamic game, the existence of both separating strategy equilibrium and pooling strategy equilibrium would depend upon critical values of click through rates ratio. I also prove that the advertisers with high valuation for a keyword will either reveal their identities at the very beginning or at the very end of this dynamic game. The results also show that when search engines do not publish the bidding history (i.e. there is 'minimum disclosure of information'), the advertisers will never try to mimic each other or in other words, there will be no pooling strategy equilibrium.
Sequential Auctions With Continuation Costs
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Author : Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1993
Sequential Auctions With Continuation Costs written by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1993 with Auctions categories.
Synergies And Price Trends In Sequential Auctions
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Author : Flavio F. Menezes
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1999
Synergies And Price Trends In Sequential Auctions written by Flavio F. Menezes and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with Auctions categories.
Understanding Sponsored Search
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Author : Jim Jansen
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2011-07-25
Understanding Sponsored Search written by Jim Jansen and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011-07-25 with Computers categories.
This book addresses the underlying foundational elements, both theoretical and methodological, of sponsored search. As such, the contents are less affected by the ever-changing implementation aspects of technology. Rather than focusing on the how, this book examines what causes the how. Why do certain keywords work, while others do not? Why does that ad work well, when others that are similar do not? Why does a key phrase cost a given amount? Why do we measure what we do in keyword advertising? This book speaks to that curiosity to understand why we do what we do in sponsored search. The content flows through the major components of any sponsored search effort, regardless of the underlying technology or client or product. The book addresses keywords, ads, consumers, pricing, competitors, analytics, branding, marketing and advertising, integrating these separate components into an incorporated whole. The focus is on the critical elements, with ample illustrations and with enough detail to lead the interested reader to further inquiry.
Simplified Mechanisms With Applications To Sponsored Search And Package Auctions
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Author : Paul R. Milgrom
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Simplified Mechanisms With Applications To Sponsored Search And Package Auctions written by Paul R. Milgrom and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
A simplified mechanism is a direct mechanism modified by restricting the set of reports or bids. An example is the auction used to place ads on Internet search pages, in which each advertiser bids a single price to determine the allocation of eight or more ad positions on a page. If a simplified mechanism satisfies the quot;best-reply-closurequot; property, then all Nash equilibria of the simplified mechanism are also equilibria of the original direct mechanism. For search advertising auctions, suitable simplifications eliminate inefficient, low-revenue equilibria that are favored in the original direct mechanism when bidding costs are positive.
An Experimental Study Of Sponsored Search Auctions
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Author : Yeon-Koo Che
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
An Experimental Study Of Sponsored Search Auctions written by Yeon-Koo Che and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
We study the Generalized Second Price auctions - a standard method for allocating online search advertising - experimentally, considering both the static environment assumed by the prevailing theory and a dynamic game capturing the salient aspects of real-world search advertising auctions. We find that subjects tend to overbid in both treatments relative to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves outcome suggested as most plausible by the theory, but that their behavior in the dynamic game resembles the behavior in the static game. Our analysis thus lends support to the use of a static game as modeling proxy, but calls into question the prevailing equilibrium predictions.