Bidding Lower With Higher Values In Multi Object Auctions
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Bidding Lower With Higher Values In Multi Object Auctions
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Author : David McAdams
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2002
Bidding Lower With Higher Values In Multi Object Auctions written by David McAdams and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002 with categories.
Multi-object auctions differ in an important way from single-object auctions. When bidders have multi-object demand, equilibria can exist in which bids decrease as values increase! Consider a model with n bidders who receive affiliated one-dimensional types t and whose marginal values are non-decreasing in t and strictly increasing in own type ti. In the first-price auction of a single object, all equilibria are monotone (over the range of types that win with positive probability) in that each bidder's equilibrium bid is non-decreasing in type. On the other hand, some or all equilibria may be non-monotone in many multi-object auctions. In particular, examples are provided for the as-bid and uniform-price auctions of identical objects in which (i) some bidder reduces his bids on all units as his type increases in all equilibria and (ii) symmetric bidders all reduce their bids on some units in all equilibria, and for the as-bid auction of non-identical objects in which (iii) bidders have independent types and some bidder reduces his bids on some packages in all equilibria. Fundamentally, this difference in the structure of equilibria is due to the fact that payoffs fail to satisfy strategic complementarity and/or modularity in these multi-object auctions.
Auction Theory
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Author : Vijay Krishna
language : en
Publisher: Academic Press
Release Date : 2009-09-28
Auction Theory written by Vijay Krishna and has been published by Academic Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009-09-28 with Business & Economics categories.
Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points
Auctions Of Identical Objects With Single Unit Demands
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Author : Flavio M. Menezes
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1999
Auctions Of Identical Objects With Single Unit Demands written by Flavio M. Menezes and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with Auctions categories.
Multi Object Auctions With Resale
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Author : Marco Pagnozzi
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Multi Object Auctions With Resale written by Marco Pagnozzi and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.
We analyze the effects of resale through bargaining in multi-object uniform-price auctions with asymmetric bidders. The possibility of resale affects bidders' strategies, and hence the allocation of the objects on sale and the seller's revenue. Our experimental design consists of four treatments: one without resale and three resale treatments that vary both the bargaining mechanism and the amount of information available in the resale market. As predicted by theory: without resale, asymmetry among bidders reduces demand reduction; resale increases demand reduction by high-value bidders; low-value bidders speculate by bidding more aggressively with resale. Therefore, resale induces speculation and demand reduction which reduce auction efficiency. In contrast to what is usually argued, resale does not necessarily increase final efficiency and may not reduce the seller's revenue. Features of the resale market that tend to increase its efficiency also reduce the seller's revenue.
Auction Theory
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Author : Pak-Sing Choi
language : en
Publisher: Springer Nature
Release Date : 2021-05-24
Auction Theory written by Pak-Sing Choi and has been published by Springer Nature this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021-05-24 with Business & Economics categories.
This textbook provides a short introduction to auction theory through exercises with detailed answer keys. Focusing on practical examples, this textbook offers over 80 exercises that predict bidders’ equilibrium behaviour in different auction formats, along with the seller’s strategic incentives to organize one auction format over the other. The book emphasizes game-theoretic tools, so students can apply similar tools to other auction formats. Also included are several exercises based on published articles, with the model reduced to its main elements and the question divided into several easy-to-answer parts. Little mathematical background in algebra and calculus is assumed, and most algebraic steps and simplifications are provided, making the text ideal for upper undergraduate and graduate students. The book begins with a discussion of second-price auctions, which can be studied without using calculus, and works through progressively more complicated auction scenarios: first-price auctions, all-pay auctions, third-price auctions, the Revenue Equivalence principle, common-value auctions, multi-unit auctions, and procurement auctions. Exercises in each chapter are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise title, which allows students to pace their studies accordingly. The authors also offer a list of suggested exercises for each chapter, for instructors teaching at varying levels: undergraduate, Masters, Ph.D. Providing a practical, customizable approach to auction theory, this textbook is appropriate for students of economics, finance, and business administration. This book may also be used for related classes such as game theory, market design, economics of information, contract theory, or topics in microeconomics.
Multiple Object Auctions With Budget Constrained Bidders
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Author : Jean-Pierre Benoit
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2000
Multiple Object Auctions With Budget Constrained Bidders written by Jean-Pierre Benoit and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2000 with categories.
A seller with two objects faces a group of bidders who are subject to budget constraints. The objects have common values to all bidders, but need not be identical and may be either complements or substitutes. In a simple complete information setting we show: (1) if the objects are sold by means of a sequence of open ascending auctions, then it is always optimal to sell the more valuable object first; (2) the sequential auction yields more revenue than the simultaneous ascending auction used recently by the FCC if the discrepancy in the values is large, or if there are significant complementarities; (3) a hybrid simultaneous-sequential form is revenue superior to the sequential auction; and (4) budget constraints arise endogenously.
Understanding Auctions
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Author : Srobonti Chattopadhyay
language : en
Publisher: Routledge
Release Date : 2019-07-03
Understanding Auctions written by Srobonti Chattopadhyay and has been published by Routledge this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019-07-03 with Business & Economics categories.
The book elaborates the basic principles of Auction Theory in a non-technical language so as to make them easily accessible to even those not trained in the discipline. Auctions as allocation mechanisms have been in use across the world since antiquity and are still employed in different countries for purchase and sales of a wide range of objects, both by governments and by private agents. Auction has gained popularity over other allocation mechanisms since the rules of auctions are very precise, involve much less subjective judgements compared to other alternative allocation mechanisms and lead to a more efficient process of discovering the true willingness of the buyers to pay. Moreover, the principles of Auction Theory are used in other contexts, for example in designing contests, or in controlling emission levels through allocation of permits and licenses.
Essays In Industrial Organization Entry In Multi Object Auctions And Freemium Packages In Two Sided Markets
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Author : Renato Zaterka Giroldo
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Essays In Industrial Organization Entry In Multi Object Auctions And Freemium Packages In Two Sided Markets written by Renato Zaterka Giroldo and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.
In the first two chapters of this dissertation, I study the design of multi-object auctions. Using a large data set from the Brazilian public procurement sector, I show evidence that entry is costly and that the mix of products being auctioned off is a first-order effect to understand firm participation. In the first chapter, I find evidence that the data is consistent with a theory of selection. The average entrant has a higher product match with the session, and they are closer to auction locations. Distance affects entry decisions negatively: a 1 unit (100km) increase in the distance to the auction location lowers the odds ratio for entry 0.91 times. At the same time, an additional auction in the set of potential auctions of a firm increases the odds for entry 1.62 times. In terms of variable costs, a 1% increase in the distance to the auction location increases bid by 0.4% to 3.3%. There are also gains of scale in terms of the size of the contracts: a 1% increase in the contract quantity for a given product increases bids by 0.64% to 0.76%. The main force responsible for lowering procurement costs is the presence of additional bidders. I find that an extra bidder can lower costs between 21.2% and 32.4%. These results motivate and feed into the structural model presented in chapter 2. In the second chapter, I continue to analyze this market with the focus on estimating entry costs and answering policy questions. To do so, I build a novel model of endogenous entry in multi-object auction sessions that allows me to disentangle two forces that affect entry decisions: entry costs, and the menu of items of a given session. The model has two stages. In the first stage, firms decide whether to enter an auction session and pay a fixed cost after observing an imperfect signal of their true cost. In the second stage, both the items for which they can bid and their costs are realized, and the auction takes place. I focus the analysis on type symmetric equilibria, where bidders of the same type follow the same entry strategy. In equilibrium, marginal bidders make zero profits. This condition allows me to link the unobserved entry costs to the observed bid behavior of entrants. Having derived the equilibrium of the model, I estimate model fundamentals and turn to policy questions. The estimates provide evidence that entry is more attractive to local firms. I find that their cost distribution stochastically dominates the one from non-local firms. Moreover, conditioned on the number of items a firm can participate in, non-local firms face between 3.9% to 6.5% higher entry costs than local firms. I focus on two counterfactual simulations. In the fully efficient scenario, where firms do not incur any entry costs, I find that procurement costs would be lowered by 22.5% to 40.1%. These are bounds on the maximum cost savings and also quantifies the degree of inefficiency present in this market. The second counterfactual is a partially efficient scenario, where non-local firms face the same entry costs as local firms. This analysis focuses on a selected equilibrium where firms enter the sessions sequentially. Firms are sorted according to a lexicographic order which is determined by the strength of their signal, number of items, and firm type (non-local/local). I find that procurement costs would be lowered by 2.8% to 2.9%. Thus, on this type of equilibrium and by holding on-site auctions, the government indirectly sacrificed some efficiency to the benefit of local firms. In the third chapter, I study the pricing of platforms that offer consumers the choice between a free package, in which consumers are exposed to advertising, and a premium package, in which they pay to not be exposed to advertisements. I characterize its profit-maximizing and Pigouvian pricing, which allows me to analyze the degree to which the platform incorporates consumers' distaste for advertising in its pricing scheme, as well as the trade-offs that emerge between the free and paid packages. The results contribute to the discussion of consumers' overexposure to advertising when platforms behave as a social planner and maximize their value.
Ascending Price Multiple Object Auctions
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Author : Flavio M. Menezes
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1993
Ascending Price Multiple Object Auctions written by Flavio M. Menezes and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1993 with Auctions categories.
Common Value Auctions And The Winner S Curse
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Author : John H. Kagel
language : en
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Release Date : 2021-04-13
Common Value Auctions And The Winner S Curse written by John H. Kagel and has been published by Princeton University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021-04-13 with Business & Economics categories.
An invaluable account of how auctions work—and how to make them work Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.