Multiple Object Auctions With Budget Constrained Bidders
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Multiple Object Auctions With Budget Constrained Bidders
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Author : Jean-Pierre Benoit
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2000
Multiple Object Auctions With Budget Constrained Bidders written by Jean-Pierre Benoit and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2000 with categories.
A seller with two objects faces a group of bidders who are subject to budget constraints. The objects have common values to all bidders, but need not be identical and may be either complements or substitutes. In a simple complete information setting we show: (1) if the objects are sold by means of a sequence of open ascending auctions, then it is always optimal to sell the more valuable object first; (2) the sequential auction yields more revenue than the simultaneous ascending auction used recently by the FCC if the discrepancy in the values is large, or if there are significant complementarities; (3) a hybrid simultaneous-sequential form is revenue superior to the sequential auction; and (4) budget constraints arise endogenously.
An Efficient Multi Item Dynamic Auction With Budget Constrained Bidders
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Author : Dolf Talman
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
An Efficient Multi Item Dynamic Auction With Budget Constrained Bidders written by Dolf Talman and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
An auctioneer wishes to sell several heterogeneous indivisible items to a group of potential bidders. Each bidder has valuations over the items but faces a budget constraint and may therefore not be able to pay up to his valuations. In such markets, a competitive equilibrium typically fails to exist. We develop a dynamic auction and prove that the auction always finds a core allocation in finitely many rounds. The core allocation consists of an assignment of the items and its associated supporting price vector.
Multi Unit Auctions With Budget Constrained Bidders
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Author : Gagan Pratap Ghosh
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012
Multi Unit Auctions With Budget Constrained Bidders written by Gagan Pratap Ghosh and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with Auctions categories.
I derive various qualitative features of this equilibrium, among which are: (1) under mild assumptions, there always exist bidder-types who submit unequal bids in equilibrium, (2) the equilibrium is monotonic in the sense that bidders with higher valuations prefer more unequal splits of their budgets than bidders with lower valuations and the same budget-level. With a formal theory in place, I carry out a quantitative exercise, using data from the 1970 OCS auction. I show that the model is able to match many aspects of the data. (1) In the data, the number of tracts bidders submit bids on is positively correlated with budgets (an R2 of 0.84), even though this relationship is non-monotonic; my model is able to capture this non-monotonicity, while producing an R2 of 0.89 (2) In the data, the average number of bids per tract is 8.21; for the model, this number is 10.09. (3) Auction revenue in the data was $1.927 billion; the model produced a mean revenue of $1.944 billion.
An Ascending Multi Item Auction With Financially Constrained Bidders
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Author : Gerardus Laan
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2008
An Ascending Multi Item Auction With Financially Constrained Bidders written by Gerardus Laan and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with categories.
Ascending Price Multiple Object Auctions
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Author : Flavio M. Menezes
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1993
Ascending Price Multiple Object Auctions written by Flavio M. Menezes and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1993 with Auctions categories.
Budget Constraints And Optimization In Sponsored Search Auctions
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Author : Yanwu Yang
language : en
Publisher: Elsevier
Release Date : 2013-11-23
Budget Constraints And Optimization In Sponsored Search Auctions written by Yanwu Yang and has been published by Elsevier this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013-11-23 with Computers categories.
The Intelligent Systems Series publishes reference works and handbooks in three core sub-topic areas: Intelligent Automation, Intelligent Transportation Systems, and Intelligent Computing. They include theoretical studies, design methods, and real-world implementations and applications. The series' readership is broad, but focuses on engineering, electronics, and computer science. Budget constraints and optimization in sponsored search auctions takes into account consideration of the entire life cycle of campaigns for researchers and developers working on search systems and ROI maximization. The highly experienced authors compiled their knowledge and experience to provide insight, algorithms and development techniques for successful optimized/constrained systems. The book presents a cutting-edge budget optimization approach that embraces three-level budget decisions in the life cycle of search auctions: allocation across markets at the system level, distribution over temporal slots at the campaign level, and real-time adjustment at the keyword level. Delivers a systematic overview and technique for understanding budget constraints and ROI optimization in sponsored search auction systems, including algorithms and developer guides for a range of scenarios Explores effects of constraints on mechanisms, bidding and keyword strategies, and the strategies for budget optimization that developers can employ An informative reference source for both software and systems developers working in the search auctions, marketing and sales strategy optimization, services development for online marketing and advertisement, e-commerce, social and economic networking
Bidding Lower With Higher Values In Multi Object Auctions
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Author : David McAdams
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2002
Bidding Lower With Higher Values In Multi Object Auctions written by David McAdams and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002 with categories.
Multi-object auctions differ in an important way from single-object auctions. When bidders have multi-object demand, equilibria can exist in which bids decrease as values increase! Consider a model with n bidders who receive affiliated one-dimensional types t and whose marginal values are non-decreasing in t and strictly increasing in own type ti. In the first-price auction of a single object, all equilibria are monotone (over the range of types that win with positive probability) in that each bidder's equilibrium bid is non-decreasing in type. On the other hand, some or all equilibria may be non-monotone in many multi-object auctions. In particular, examples are provided for the as-bid and uniform-price auctions of identical objects in which (i) some bidder reduces his bids on all units as his type increases in all equilibria and (ii) symmetric bidders all reduce their bids on some units in all equilibria, and for the as-bid auction of non-identical objects in which (iii) bidders have independent types and some bidder reduces his bids on some packages in all equilibria. Fundamentally, this difference in the structure of equilibria is due to the fact that payoffs fail to satisfy strategic complementarity and/or modularity in these multi-object auctions.
Sequential Second Price Auctions With Budget Constrained Bidders
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Author : Gagan Pratap Ghosh
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Sequential Second Price Auctions With Budget Constrained Bidders written by Gagan Pratap Ghosh and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.
We study an auction game in which two units of a good are sold via two second price auctions sequentially. Bidders value the units identically and have one of two budget levels, high or low. Bidders do not know each others budgets. We show that this game has a unique symmetric equilibrium in which the probabilistic presence of high budget bidders can make bidders bid more aggressively in the first auction, thus lowering prices in the second. As a result if the possibility of competition from high budget bidders is large, then the equilibrium strategies generate declining prices.
Negotiation Auctions And Market Engineering
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Author : Henner Gimpel
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2008-02-05
Negotiation Auctions And Market Engineering written by Henner Gimpel and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008-02-05 with Computers categories.
This book contains a selection of papers presented at the International Seminar "Negotiation and Market Engineering", held at Dagstuhl Castle, Germany, in November 2006. The 17 revised full papers presented were carefully selected and reviewed. The papers deal with the complexity of negotiations, auctions, and markets as economic, social, and IT systems. The authors give a broad overview on the major issues to be addressed and the methodologies used to approach them.
Auctions Of Identical Objects With Single Unit Demands
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Author : Flavio M. Menezes
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1999
Auctions Of Identical Objects With Single Unit Demands written by Flavio M. Menezes and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with Auctions categories.