Central Bank Independence And Output Variability
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Central Bank Independence And Output Variability
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Author : Mark Crosby
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996
Central Bank Independence And Output Variability written by Mark Crosby and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with Banks and banking, Central categories.
Price Variability Output Variability And Central Bank Independence
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Author : Tuck Meng Ow-Yong
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996
Price Variability Output Variability And Central Bank Independence written by Tuck Meng Ow-Yong and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with categories.
Central Bank Independence Targets And Credibility
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Author : Francesco Lippi
language : en
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Release Date : 1999-01-27
Central Bank Independence Targets And Credibility written by Francesco Lippi and has been published by Edward Elgar Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999-01-27 with Business & Economics categories.
This book integrates new political and economic elements into the analysis of monetary policy credibility and central bank independence. The author considers imperfect monetary control, rational voters, distributional issues and uncertainty about future policy objectives in his welfare analysis of central banking. The role played by the different institutional elements that contribute to the making of an independent central bank is also assessed. A distinction is made between central bank independence and targets offering new insights into how a more inflation averse monetary policy may actually be achieved. Finally, explanations for the variation of central bank independence and conservatism across different countries are provided. This book will appeal to researchers, academics and policy makers in the fields of monetary policy, financial economics, money and banking and political economy.
Effective Central Bank Independence And The Inflation Output Trade Off
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Author : Demosthenes N. Tambakis
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1999
Effective Central Bank Independence And The Inflation Output Trade Off written by Demosthenes N. Tambakis and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with categories.
What is the impact of changing central bank independence (CBI) on the inflation-output trade-off? This paper introduces the notion of effective CBI and distinguishes its political from its economic effects on the trade-off by analyzing the interaction between the government, the median voter and the central bank. It is found that the two effects may work in opposite directions, with the political effect counteracting or reinforcing the economic effect. A taxonomy of possible combinations of expected inflation and inflation-output variability is built based on the equilibrium response of the median voter's expected loss to changes in effective CBI. Also, a threshold degree of CBI is obtained such that increasing effective CBI from below the threshold induces greater absolute change in inflation variability than output variability, the stylized fact underlying the claim that CBI is a free lunch.
A Political Agency Theory Of Central Bank Independence
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Author : Mr.Eric Le Borgne
language : en
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Release Date : 2003-07-01
A Political Agency Theory Of Central Bank Independence written by Mr.Eric Le Borgne and has been published by International Monetary Fund this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003-07-01 with Business & Economics categories.
We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency. We apply this theory to monetary policy by extending a standard dynamic "New-Keynesian" stochastic general equilibrium model. This model gives a new theory of central bank independence that is unrelated to the standard inflation bias problem. We derive several new predictions and show that they are consistent with the data. Finally, we show that while instrument independence of the central bank is desirable, goal independence is not.
On The Sources Of The Inflation Bias And Output Variability
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Author : Gustavo Piga
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005
On The Sources Of The Inflation Bias And Output Variability written by Gustavo Piga and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with categories.
Why do dynamic inconsistencies in monetary policy exist? In this paper a traditional model without put inefficiencies is introduced, but monetary policy is allowed to be influenced by the various constituencies in the economy, that pressure Congress in turn to pressure the central bank to adopt a particular policy stance. The paper shows that in this economy an inflation bias arises due to the lobbying pressures of outsiders. Furthermore, it shows that if lobbying pressures are high enough, an inflation bias cannot be avoided for any finite level of central bank independence. It also shows that introducing the realistic feature of lobbying pressures has an impact on the stabilization properties of monetary policy. When a supply shock occurs, the shock is totally absorbed by a non myopic trade union which has no lobbying costs. This is independent of any finite degree of conservativeness of the central banker, who has to accept an extreme increase in price instability. It is shown that monetary policy delegation is therefore sub-optimal in achieving price-stability compared to labor-market reforms meant to remove monopsonistic elements. However, the same structural policies will induce greater output instability by strengthening the power of conservative central bankers.
Public Debt Indexation And Denomination With An Independent Central Bank
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Author : Elisabetta Falcetti
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2000
Public Debt Indexation And Denomination With An Independent Central Bank written by Elisabetta Falcetti and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2000 with categories.
Measuring Central Bank Independence And Its Effect On Policy Outcomes
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Author : Alex Cukierman
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1994
Measuring Central Bank Independence And Its Effect On Policy Outcomes written by Alex Cukierman and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1994 with Business & Economics categories.
Central Bank Independence
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Author : Maximilian Schosser
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Central Bank Independence written by Maximilian Schosser and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
Central bank independence refers to the personal, functional, institutional and financial independence of monetary policymakers from political institutions. The idea to make monetary policymaking independent from political influence originates from an implication of the time inconsistency concept, which motivates the assumption that politicians will make monetary decisions that lead to a worse economic outcome than decisions of independent policymakers. This holds, if independent policymakers are more inflation-averse than politicians are. Several measurements have been developed to describe either the degree of legal independence of central banks and the degree of actual independence. Actual independence differs from legal independence as soon as decisions are made without legal foundation, for example if a central bank official is removed from office without reason while the central bank legislation requires valid grounds for this action. Empirical evidence shows that both the inflation rate and the variability of inflation are negatively correlated to central bank independence with the majority of existing measurements of central bank independence. There is no statistical proof of a correlation between the degree of central bank independence and the level of output growth. Empirical evidence shows a significant positive correlation between the Sacrifice Ratio and central bank independence although a theoretical explication for this phenomenon lacks. Central bank independence has increased worldwide during the last decades. Most of the central banks of industrial countries show a high degree of independence and more and more developing countries have passed new central bank legislations granting more independence to its central banks.
The Political Economy Of Central Bank Independence
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Author : Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger
language : en
Publisher: International Finance Section Department of Econ Ton Univers
Release Date : 1996
The Political Economy Of Central Bank Independence written by Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger and has been published by International Finance Section Department of Econ Ton Univers this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with Business & Economics categories.