A Political Agency Theory Of Central Bank Independence
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A Political Agency Theory Of Central Bank Independence
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Author : Mr.Eric Le Borgne
language : en
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Release Date : 2003-07-01
A Political Agency Theory Of Central Bank Independence written by Mr.Eric Le Borgne and has been published by International Monetary Fund this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003-07-01 with Business & Economics categories.
We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency. We apply this theory to monetary policy by extending a standard dynamic "New-Keynesian" stochastic general equilibrium model. This model gives a new theory of central bank independence that is unrelated to the standard inflation bias problem. We derive several new predictions and show that they are consistent with the data. Finally, we show that while instrument independence of the central bank is desirable, goal independence is not.
A Political Agency Theory Of Central Bank Independence
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Author : Gauti B. Eggertsson
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
A Political Agency Theory Of Central Bank Independence written by Gauti B. Eggertsson and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with categories.
We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency. We apply this theory to monetary policy by extending a standard dynamic New-Keynesian stochastic general equilibrium model. This model gives a new theory of central bank independence that is unrelated to the standard inflation bias problem. We derive several new predictions and show that they are consistent with the data. Finally, we show that while instrument independence of the central bank is desirable, goal independence is not.
A Political Agency Theory Of Central Bank Independence
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Author : Gauti ; Le Borgne Eggertsson (Eric)
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003
A Political Agency Theory Of Central Bank Independence written by Gauti ; Le Borgne Eggertsson (Eric) and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.
Central Bank Strategy Credibility And Independence
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Author : Alex Cukierman
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date : 1992
Central Bank Strategy Credibility And Independence written by Alex Cukierman and has been published by MIT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1992 with Business & Economics categories.
This book brings together a large body of Cukierman's research and integrates it with recent developments in the political economy of monetary policy.
Central Banking As A Political Principal Agent Problem
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Author : Michele U. Fratianni
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
Central Banking As A Political Principal Agent Problem written by Michele U. Fratianni and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
Due to their ties with elected leaders, central bankers may pursue policies that are not in society's best interests. Consequently, the relationship between the public and the central bank can be characterized as a principal-agent problem. An inflation and a stabilization bias arise as a result of this agency problem and the magnitudes of these biases depend on the political environment. Various institutional proposals for eliminating these biases are examined, and we find that central bank independence and performance contracts work best. However, we argue that central bank independence is preferable for resolving the agency problem.
Public Governance Of Central Banks
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Author : Yoshiharu Oritani
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010
Public Governance Of Central Banks written by Yoshiharu Oritani and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with Banks and banking, Central categories.
The governance of central banks has two dimensions: corporate governance and public governance. Public governance is an institutional framework whereby the general public governs a central bank by and through the legislative and executive bodies in a country. This paper argues that the literature of new institutional economics sheds new light on the public governance of central banks. First, Williamson's theory of 'governance as integrity' (probity) is applied to the internal management of central banks. Moe's theory of 'public bureaucracy' is applied to the concept of central bank independence. Second, we apply agency theory to the issues associated with central bank independence and accountability. Third, public choice theory is applied to central bank independence.
Central Bank Independence Targets And Credibility
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Author : Francesco Lippi
language : en
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Release Date : 1999-01-27
Central Bank Independence Targets And Credibility written by Francesco Lippi and has been published by Edward Elgar Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999-01-27 with Business & Economics categories.
This book integrates new political and economic elements into the analysis of monetary policy credibility and central bank independence. The author considers imperfect monetary control, rational voters, distributional issues and uncertainty about future policy objectives in his welfare analysis of central banking. The role played by the different institutional elements that contribute to the making of an independent central bank is also assessed. A distinction is made between central bank independence and targets offering new insights into how a more inflation averse monetary policy may actually be achieved. Finally, explanations for the variation of central bank independence and conservatism across different countries are provided. This book will appeal to researchers, academics and policy makers in the fields of monetary policy, financial economics, money and banking and political economy.
Central Banking As A Political Principal Agent Problem
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Author : Michele Fratianni
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1993
Central Banking As A Political Principal Agent Problem written by Michele Fratianni and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1993 with Banks and banking, Central categories.
The Japanese Central Banking System Compared With Its European And American Counterparts
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Author : Yoshiharu Oritani
language : en
Publisher: Springer
Release Date : 2019-07-09
The Japanese Central Banking System Compared With Its European And American Counterparts written by Yoshiharu Oritani and has been published by Springer this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019-07-09 with Business & Economics categories.
This book uniquely explores the role and governance mechanism of central banks by applying new institutional economics (NIE). Simultaneously, the book tests the analytical viability of NIE when applied to an organization that has both public and private characteristics. Special attention is paid to the Bank of Japan (BOJ) based on the author’s 30 years of work experience and “participant observation” there, touching upon discussion of central bank independence. The book argues that central bank independence cannot be defended solely by law, and a mechanism to eliminate requests from politicians needs to be embedded within the governance structure. The book also provides a comparative analysis between the BOJ and central banks in Europe and the USA. In reviewing the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, it suggests possible measures based on behavioral economics and public choice theory. These theory-based analyses provide useful insights when considering matters such as whether a central bank should issue electronic money or the European system of central banks could be established in Asia.
The Politics Of Central Bank Independence
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005
The Politics Of Central Bank Independence written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with Banks and banking, Central categories.
"We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician endogenously gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency. Applied to monetary policy, this theory (i) formalizes the rationale for delegation highlighted by Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, and by Alan S. Blinder, former Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and (ii) does not rely on the inflation bias that underlies most existing theories of central bank independence. Delegation trades off the cost of having a possibly incompetent technocrat with a long-term job contract against the benefit of having a technocrat who (i) invests more effort into the specialized policy task and (ii) has less incentive to pander to public opinion than a politician. Our key theoretical predictions are broadly consistent with the data"--Federal Reserve Bank of New York web site.