Collusion In Auctions With Externalities
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Collusion In Auctions With Externalities
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Author : Bernard Caillaud
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1998
Collusion In Auctions With Externalities written by Bernard Caillaud and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1998 with categories.
In standard auctions, collusion among buyers eliminates bidding competition despite informational asymmetries. Collusion can, however, be imperfect when the situation involves "externalities" among buyers, that is, when a buyer is worse off if one rival wins the good rather than if nobody gets it. For intermediate values of the externality and under various objective functions, the seller finds it optimal to design an auction that leads, in equilibrium, to a collusive outcome that is ex post inefficient for the group of buyers; an ex ante incentive-efficient collusion mechanism for the buyers is characterized in this situation.
Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Externalities
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Author : Ki-eun Rhee
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004
Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Externalities written by Ki-eun Rhee and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with categories.
Collusion In The Presence Of Externalities
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Author : Ki-Eun Rhee
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2008
Collusion In The Presence Of Externalities written by Ki-Eun Rhee and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with categories.
I examine collusive bidder behavior in auctions with negative externalities and show that the optimal bidding scheme exhibits only partial rigidity. Because of externalities, a cartel not only has incentive to maximize gains from trade but also to minimize the probability of sales. I identify the tension between the two incentives and show that the more rigid the bidding scheme, the higher the possibility of sales. As the extent of externalities increases, the cartel finds it more important to keep a low probability of sales than to minimize payment to the seller. This results in a partially-rigid optimal collusive bidding scheme.
An Externality Robust Auction
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Author : Björn Bartling
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
An Externality Robust Auction written by Björn Bartling and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
The Economics Of Collusion
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Author : Robert C. Marshall
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date : 2014-01-10
The Economics Of Collusion written by Robert C. Marshall and has been published by MIT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-01-10 with Business & Economics categories.
An examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings function for years in a stable and peaceful manner despite the illegality of their agreements and incentives for deviation by their members. In The Economics of Collusion, Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx offer an examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Marshall and Marx, who have studied collusion extensively for two decades, begin with three narratives: the organization and implementation of a cartel, the organization and implementation of a bidding ring, and a parent company's efforts to detect collusion by its divisions. These accounts—fictitious, but rooted in the inner workings and details from actual cases—offer a novel and engaging way for the reader to understand the basics of collusive behavior. The narratives are followed by detailed economic analyses of cartels, bidding rings, and detection. The narratives offer an engaging entrée to the more rigorous economic discussion that follows. The book is accessible to any reader who understands basic economic reasoning. Mathematical material is flagged with asterisks.
An Externality Robust Auction
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Author : Björn Bartling
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
An Externality Robust Auction written by Björn Bartling and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.
Behavioral robustness is essential in mechanism design. Existing papers focus on robustness as captured by dominant strategies. This paper studies the novel concept of externality-robustness, which addresses players' motives to affect other players' monetary payoffs. One example is externalities due to spite, which has been used to explain overbidding in second-price auctions. We show theoretically and experimentally that a trade-off exists between dominant-strategy implementation and externality-robust implementation. In particular, we derive the externality-robust counterpart of the second-price auction. Our experiments replicate the earlier finding of overbidding in the second-price auction, but we find that average bids equal value in the externality-robust auction. Our data also reveal that both auctions produce the same level of efficiency, suggesting that both dimensions of robustness are equally important. Our results are relevant for mechanism design in general, because the concept of externality-robustness is applicable to arbitrary mechanism design problems.
Collusion In Auctions For Emissions Permits
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009
Collusion In Auctions For Emissions Permits written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.
Multidimensional Mechanism Design For Auctions With Externalities
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Author : Philippe Jehiel
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1994
Multidimensional Mechanism Design For Auctions With Externalities written by Philippe Jehiel and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1994 with Auctions categories.
Collusion And Information Revelation In Auctions
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Author : Aniol Llorente-Saguer
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2017
Collusion And Information Revelation In Auctions written by Aniol Llorente-Saguer and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017 with Auctions categories.
The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings. However, such analyses neglect to consider the effects of failed collusion attempts, wherein information revealed in the negotiation process may affect bidding behavior. We experimentally test a setup in which theory predicts no collusion and no information revelation in first-price auctions. The results reveal a hitherto overlooked failing of the first-price mechanism: failed collusion attempts distort bidding behavior, resulting in a loss of seller revenue and efficiency. Moreover, the first-price mechanism does not result in less collusion than the second-price mechanism. We conclude that, while the features of the first-price mechanism may have the potential to deter bidder collusion, the role of beliefs in guiding bidding behavior make it highly susceptible to distortions arising from the informational properties of collusive negotiation. Auction designers should take this phenomenon into account when choosing the auction mechanism.
Myerson Auctions With Externalities
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Author : Carl G. J. E. Gordon
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Myerson Auctions With Externalities written by Carl G. J. E. Gordon and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with Auctions categories.