[PDF] Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Externalities - eBooks Review

Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Externalities


Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Externalities
DOWNLOAD

Download Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Externalities PDF/ePub or read online books in Mobi eBooks. Click Download or Read Online button to get Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Externalities book now. This website allows unlimited access to, at the time of writing, more than 1.5 million titles, including hundreds of thousands of titles in various foreign languages. If the content not found or just blank you must refresh this page



Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Externalities


Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Externalities
DOWNLOAD
Author : Ki-eun Rhee
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004

Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Externalities written by Ki-eun Rhee and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with categories.




Collusion In Auctions With Externalities


Collusion In Auctions With Externalities
DOWNLOAD
Author : Bernard Caillaud
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1998

Collusion In Auctions With Externalities written by Bernard Caillaud and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1998 with categories.


In standard auctions, collusion among buyers eliminates bidding competition despite informational asymmetries. Collusion can, however, be imperfect when the situation involves "externalities" among buyers, that is, when a buyer is worse off if one rival wins the good rather than if nobody gets it. For intermediate values of the externality and under various objective functions, the seller finds it optimal to design an auction that leads, in equilibrium, to a collusive outcome that is ex post inefficient for the group of buyers; an ex ante incentive-efficient collusion mechanism for the buyers is characterized in this situation.



Collusion In Repeated Auctions And The Role Of Communication


Collusion In Repeated Auctions And The Role Of Communication
DOWNLOAD
Author : Christian Fischer
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013

Collusion In Repeated Auctions And The Role Of Communication written by Christian Fischer and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.




Collusion In The Presence Of Externalities


Collusion In The Presence Of Externalities
DOWNLOAD
Author : Ki-Eun Rhee
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2008

Collusion In The Presence Of Externalities written by Ki-Eun Rhee and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with categories.


I examine collusive bidder behavior in auctions with negative externalities and show that the optimal bidding scheme exhibits only partial rigidity. Because of externalities, a cartel not only has incentive to maximize gains from trade but also to minimize the probability of sales. I identify the tension between the two incentives and show that the more rigid the bidding scheme, the higher the possibility of sales. As the extent of externalities increases, the cartel finds it more important to keep a low probability of sales than to minimize payment to the seller. This results in a partially-rigid optimal collusive bidding scheme.



Bid Rotation And Collusion In Repeated Auctions


Bid Rotation And Collusion In Repeated Auctions
DOWNLOAD
Author : Masaki Aoyagi
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2000

Bid Rotation And Collusion In Repeated Auctions written by Masaki Aoyagi and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2000 with Economics categories.




Efficient Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Communication


Efficient Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Communication
DOWNLOAD
Author : Masaki Aoyagi
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2002

Efficient Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Communication written by Masaki Aoyagi and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002 with categories.


This paper studies collusion in repeated auctions when bidders communicate prior to each stage auction. The paper presents a folk theorem for independent and correlated private signals and general interdependent values. Specifically, it identifies conditions under which an equilibrium collusion scheme is fully efficient in the sense that the bidders' payoff is close to what they get when the object is allocated to the highest valuation bidder at the reserve price in every period.



Tacit Collusion In Repeated Auctions


Tacit Collusion In Repeated Auctions
DOWNLOAD
Author : Andreas Blume
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2001

Tacit Collusion In Repeated Auctions written by Andreas Blume and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2001 with categories.




Tacit Collusion In Repeated Auctions


Tacit Collusion In Repeated Auctions
DOWNLOAD
Author : Andrzej Skrzypacz
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2001

Tacit Collusion In Repeated Auctions written by Andrzej Skrzypacz and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2001 with Auctions categories.




Tacit Collusion In Repeated Auctions


Tacit Collusion In Repeated Auctions
DOWNLOAD
Author : Natalia Fabra
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003

Tacit Collusion In Repeated Auctions written by Natalia Fabra and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.


Within an infinitely repeated game, I compare the level and conduct of collusion under uniform and discriminatory auctions. For this purpose, I characterize the optimal collusive schemes and sets of sustainable profits under these auction formats. I show that uniform auctions facilitate collusion more than discriminatory auctions: the optimal penal code is equally severe under the two formats; but bidders' deviation incentives are weaker in uniform auctions given that the pay-off irrelevant bids can be used to relax the enforcement problem. This discussion is particularly relevant after the recent reforms in the electricity industry in England & Wales, and elsewhere.



Collusion In A Model Of Repeated Auctions


Collusion In A Model Of Repeated Auctions
DOWNLOAD
Author : Jacques Robert
language : en
Publisher: Montréal : Université de Montréal, Dép. de sciences économiques
Release Date : 1999

Collusion In A Model Of Repeated Auctions written by Jacques Robert and has been published by Montréal : Université de Montréal, Dép. de sciences économiques this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with categories.