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Collusion In Repeated Auctions And The Role Of Communication


Collusion In Repeated Auctions And The Role Of Communication
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Collusion In Repeated Auctions And The Role Of Communication


Collusion In Repeated Auctions And The Role Of Communication
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Author : Christian Fischer
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013

Collusion In Repeated Auctions And The Role Of Communication written by Christian Fischer and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.




Efficient Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Communication


Efficient Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Communication
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Author : Masaki Aoyagi
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2002

Efficient Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Communication written by Masaki Aoyagi and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002 with categories.


This paper studies collusion in repeated auctions when bidders communicate prior to each stage auction. The paper presents a folk theorem for independent and correlated private signals and general interdependent values. Specifically, it identifies conditions under which an equilibrium collusion scheme is fully efficient in the sense that the bidders' payoff is close to what they get when the object is allocated to the highest valuation bidder at the reserve price in every period.



Tacit Collusion In Repeated Auctions


Tacit Collusion In Repeated Auctions
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Author : Andreas Blume
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2001

Tacit Collusion In Repeated Auctions written by Andreas Blume and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2001 with categories.




Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Externalities


Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Externalities
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Author : Ki-eun Rhee
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004

Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Externalities written by Ki-eun Rhee and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with categories.




Tacit Collusion In Repeated Auctions


Tacit Collusion In Repeated Auctions
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Author : Andrzej Skrzypacz
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2001

Tacit Collusion In Repeated Auctions written by Andrzej Skrzypacz and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2001 with Auctions categories.




Tacit Collusion In Repeated Auctions


Tacit Collusion In Repeated Auctions
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Author : Natalia Fabra
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003

Tacit Collusion In Repeated Auctions written by Natalia Fabra and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.


Within an infinitely repeated game, I compare the level and conduct of collusion under uniform and discriminatory auctions. For this purpose, I characterize the optimal collusive schemes and sets of sustainable profits under these auction formats. I show that uniform auctions facilitate collusion more than discriminatory auctions: the optimal penal code is equally severe under the two formats; but bidders' deviation incentives are weaker in uniform auctions given that the pay-off irrelevant bids can be used to relax the enforcement problem. This discussion is particularly relevant after the recent reforms in the electricity industry in England & Wales, and elsewhere.



Collusive Communication Schemes In A First Price Auction


Collusive Communication Schemes In A First Price Auction
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Author : Helmuts Āzacis
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012

Collusive Communication Schemes In A First Price Auction written by Helmuts Āzacis and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.


We study optimal bidder collusion at first-price auctions when the collusive mechanism only relies on signals about bidders' valuations. We build on Fang and Morris (2006) when two bidders have low or high private valuation of a single object and additionally each receives a private noisy signal from an incentiveless center about the opponent's valuation. We derive the unique symmetric equilibrium of the first price auction for any symmetric, possibly correlated, distribution of signals, when these can only take two values. Next, we find the distribution of 2-valued signals, which maximizes the joint payoffs of bidders. We prove that allowing signals to take more than two values will not increase bidders' payoffs if the signals are restricted to be public. We also investigate the case when the signals are chosen conditionally independently and identically out of n = 2 possible values. We demonstrate that bidders are strictly better off as signals can take on more and more possible values. Finally, we look at another special case of the correlated signals, namely, when these are independent of the bidders' valuations. We show that in any symmetric 2-valued strategy correlated equilibrium, the bidders bid as if there were no signals at all and, hence, are not able to collude. -- Bidder-optimal signal structure ; Collusion ; (Bayes) correlated equilibrium ; First price auction ; Public and private signals



Bid Rotation And Collusion In Repeated Auctions


Bid Rotation And Collusion In Repeated Auctions
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Author : Masaki Aoyagi
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2000

Bid Rotation And Collusion In Repeated Auctions written by Masaki Aoyagi and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2000 with Economics categories.




Collusion In A Model Of Repeated Auctions


Collusion In A Model Of Repeated Auctions
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Author : Jacques Robert
language : en
Publisher: Montréal : Université de Montréal, Dép. de sciences économiques
Release Date : 1999

Collusion In A Model Of Repeated Auctions written by Jacques Robert and has been published by Montréal : Université de Montréal, Dép. de sciences économiques this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with categories.




Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Cheap Talk Messages


Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Cheap Talk Messages
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Author :
language : pt-BR
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003

Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Cheap Talk Messages written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.


Este trabalho apresenta um modelo de conluio em leilões repetidos de primeiro preço estático, ou seja, um esquema de conluio que usa a mesma regra de conluio em toda a fase de cooperação, independente da história do superjogo. Neste ambiente, introduzimos um mecanismo de comunicação sem custo, por meio do qual os jogadores transmitem sua ordenação de preferências sobre os bens a serem leiloados no jogo estágio. A partir deste modelo, obtemos um aumento da receita esperada agregada por parte dos participantes do leilão frente a um modelo de conluio estático tácito. Além disso, o resultado de dominância do conluio dinâmico com comunicação - esquema no qual a regra de conluio depende de toda a história pública do superjogo - apresentado por Aoyagi (2002), frente a qualquer conluio estático nãose verifica. Outro ponto a se destacar é que o refinamento do sistema de comunicação, por meio de um aumento do número de bens ordenados em cada mensagem, embora leve a um aumento da receita esperada, pode gerar uma elevação da taxa de paciência necessária para a manutenção do conluio.