Bid Rotation And Collusion In Repeated Auctions

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Bid Rotation And Collusion In Repeated Auctions

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Author : Masaki Aoyagi
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2000

Bid Rotation And Collusion In Repeated Auctions written by Masaki Aoyagi and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2000 with Economics categories.

Endogenous Bid Rotation In Repeated Auctions

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Author : Shiran Rachmilevitch
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009

Endogenous Bid Rotation In Repeated Auctions written by Shiran Rachmilevitch and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.

This paper studies collusion between two bidders in a general symmetric IPV repeated auction, without communication, transfers, or public randomization. I construct a collusive scheme, called endogenous bid-rotation, which gives a payoff larger than the bid-rotation payoff, when valuations are drawn from a continuous distribution. In the special case where the stage game is a second-price auction, the scheme has the following additional properties: (1) it is supported in equilibrium independently of the discount factor, and (2) it is supported in equilibrium even when each player's participation decision is not known to his opponent. Finally, when the distribution of valuations is Bernoulli, the scheme delivers the first-best.

Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Cheap Talk Messages

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Author :
language : pt-BR
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003

Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Cheap Talk Messages written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.

Este trabalho apresenta um modelo de conluio em leilões repetidos de primeiro preço estático, ou seja, um esquema de conluio que usa a mesma regra de conluio em toda a fase de cooperação, independente da história do superjogo. Neste ambiente, introduzimos um mecanismo de comunicação sem custo, por meio do qual os jogadores transmitem sua ordenação de preferências sobre os bens a serem leiloados no jogo estágio. A partir deste modelo, obtemos um aumento da receita esperada agregada por parte dos participantes do leilão frente a um modelo de conluio estático tácito. Além disso, o resultado de dominância do conluio dinâmico com comunicação - esquema no qual a regra de conluio depende de toda a história pública do superjogo - apresentado por Aoyagi (2002), frente a qualquer conluio estático nãose verifica. Outro ponto a se destacar é que o refinamento do sistema de comunicação, por meio de um aumento do número de bens ordenados em cada mensagem, embora leve a um aumento da receita esperada, pode gerar uma elevação da taxa de paciência necessária para a manutenção do conluio.

Collusion In Repeated Auctions And The Role Of Communication

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Author : Christian Fischer
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013

Collusion In Repeated Auctions And The Role Of Communication written by Christian Fischer and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.

Efficient Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Communication

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Author : Masaki Aoyagi
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2002

Efficient Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Communication written by Masaki Aoyagi and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002 with categories.

This paper studies collusion in repeated auctions when bidders communicate prior to each stage auction. The paper presents a folk theorem for independent and correlated private signals and general interdependent values. Specifically, it identifies conditions under which an equilibrium collusion scheme is fully efficient in the sense that the bidders' payoff is close to what they get when the object is allocated to the highest valuation bidder at the reserve price in every period.

Tacit Collusion In Repeated Auctions

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Author : Natalia Fabra
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003

Tacit Collusion In Repeated Auctions written by Natalia Fabra and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.

Within an infinitely repeated game, I compare the level and conduct of collusion under uniform and discriminatory auctions. For this purpose, I characterize the optimal collusive schemes and sets of sustainable profits under these auction formats. I show that uniform auctions facilitate collusion more than discriminatory auctions: the optimal penal code is equally severe under the two formats; but bidders' deviation incentives are weaker in uniform auctions given that the pay-off irrelevant bids can be used to relax the enforcement problem. This discussion is particularly relevant after the recent reforms in the electricity industry in England & Wales, and elsewhere.

Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Externalities

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Author : Ki-eun Rhee
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004

Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Externalities written by Ki-eun Rhee and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with categories.

The Oxford Handbook Of International Antitrust Economics Volume 2

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Author : Roger D. Blair
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2014-11-03

The Oxford Handbook Of International Antitrust Economics Volume 2 written by Roger D. Blair and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-11-03 with Business & Economics categories.

More than any other area of regulation, antitrust economics shapes law and policy in the United States, the Americas, Europe, and Asia. In a number of different areas of antitrust, advances in theory and empirical work have caused a fundamental reevaluation and shift of some of the assumptions behind antitrust policy. This reevaluation has profound implications for the future of the field. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics has collected chapters from many of the leading figures in antitrust. In doing so, this two volume Handbook provides an important reference guide for scholars, teachers, and practitioners. However, it is more than a merely reference guide. Rather, it has a number of different goals. First, it takes stock of the current state of scholarship across a number of different antitrust topics. In doing so, it relies primarily upon the economics scholarship. In some situations, though, there is also coverage of legal scholarship, case law developments, and legal policies. The second goal of the Handbook is to provide some ideas about future directions of antitrust scholarship and policy. Antitrust economics has evolved over the last 60 years. It has both shaped policy and been shaped by policy. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics will serve as a policy and research guide of next steps to consider when shaping the future of the field of antitrust.

The Economics Of Collusion

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Author : Robert C. Marshall
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date : 2014-01-10

The Economics Of Collusion written by Robert C. Marshall and has been published by MIT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-01-10 with Business & Economics categories.

An examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings function for years in a stable and peaceful manner despite the illegality of their agreements and incentives for deviation by their members. In The Economics of Collusion, Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx offer an examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Marshall and Marx, who have studied collusion extensively for two decades, begin with three narratives: the organization and implementation of a cartel, the organization and implementation of a bidding ring, and a parent company's efforts to detect collusion by its divisions. These accounts—fictitious, but rooted in the inner workings and details from actual cases—offer a novel and engaging way for the reader to understand the basics of collusive behavior. The narratives are followed by detailed economic analyses of cartels, bidding rings, and detection. The narratives offer an engaging entrée to the more rigorous economic discussion that follows. The book is accessible to any reader who understands basic economic reasoning. Mathematical material is flagged with asterisks.

The Oxford Handbook Of International Antitrust Economics

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Author : Roger D. Blair
language : en
Publisher: Oxford Handbooks
Release Date : 2015

The Oxford Handbook Of International Antitrust Economics written by Roger D. Blair and has been published by Oxford Handbooks this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with Business & Economics categories.

More than any other area of regulation, antitrust economics shapes law and policy in the United States, the Americas, Europe, and Asia. In a number of different areas of antitrust, advances in theory and empirical work have caused a fundamental reevaluation and shift of some of the assumptions behind antitrust policy. This reevaluation has profound implications for the future of the field. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics has collected chapters from many of the leading figures in antitrust. In doing so, this two volume Handbook provides an important reference guide for scholars, teachers, and practitioners. However, it is more than a merely reference guide. Rather, it has a number of different goals. First, it takes stock of the current state of scholarship across a number of different antitrust topics. In doing so, it relies primarily upon the economics scholarship. In some situations, though, there is also coverage of legal scholarship, case law developments, and legal policies. The second goal of the Handbook is to provide some ideas about future directions of antitrust scholarship and policy. Antitrust economics has evolved over the last 60 years. It has both shaped policy and been shaped by policy. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics will serve as a policy and research guide of next steps to consider when shaping the future of the field of antitrust.