Efficient Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Communication
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Efficient Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Communication
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Author : Masaki Aoyagi
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2002
Efficient Collusion In Repeated Auctions With Communication written by Masaki Aoyagi and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002 with categories.
This paper studies collusion in repeated auctions when bidders communicate prior to each stage auction. The paper presents a folk theorem for independent and correlated private signals and general interdependent values. Specifically, it identifies conditions under which an equilibrium collusion scheme is fully efficient in the sense that the bidders' payoff is close to what they get when the object is allocated to the highest valuation bidder at the reserve price in every period.
Collusion In Repeated Auctions And The Role Of Communication
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Author : Christian Fischer
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Collusion In Repeated Auctions And The Role Of Communication written by Christian Fischer and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.
The Oxford Handbook Of International Antitrust Economics Volume 2
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Author : Roger D. Blair
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2014-11-03
The Oxford Handbook Of International Antitrust Economics Volume 2 written by Roger D. Blair and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-11-03 with Business & Economics categories.
More than any other area of regulation, antitrust economics shapes law and policy in the United States, the Americas, Europe, and Asia. In a number of different areas of antitrust, advances in theory and empirical work have caused a fundamental reevaluation and shift of some of the assumptions behind antitrust policy. This reevaluation has profound implications for the future of the field. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics has collected chapters from many of the leading figures in antitrust. In doing so, this two volume Handbook provides an important reference guide for scholars, teachers, and practitioners. However, it is more than a merely reference guide. Rather, it has a number of different goals. First, it takes stock of the current state of scholarship across a number of different antitrust topics. In doing so, it relies primarily upon the economics scholarship. In some situations, though, there is also coverage of legal scholarship, case law developments, and legal policies. The second goal of the Handbook is to provide some ideas about future directions of antitrust scholarship and policy. Antitrust economics has evolved over the last 60 years. It has both shaped policy and been shaped by policy. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics will serve as a policy and research guide of next steps to consider when shaping the future of the field of antitrust.
The Oxford Handbook Of International Antitrust Economics
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Author : Roger D. Blair
language : en
Publisher: Oxford Handbooks
Release Date : 2015
The Oxford Handbook Of International Antitrust Economics written by Roger D. Blair and has been published by Oxford Handbooks this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with Business & Economics categories.
More than any other area of regulation, antitrust economics shapes law and policy in the United States, the Americas, Europe, and Asia. In a number of different areas of antitrust, advances in theory and empirical work have caused a fundamental reevaluation and shift of some of the assumptions behind antitrust policy. This reevaluation has profound implications for the future of the field. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics has collected chapters from many of the leading figures in antitrust. In doing so, this two volume Handbook provides an important reference guide for scholars, teachers, and practitioners. However, it is more than a merely reference guide. Rather, it has a number of different goals. First, it takes stock of the current state of scholarship across a number of different antitrust topics. In doing so, it relies primarily upon the economics scholarship. In some situations, though, there is also coverage of legal scholarship, case law developments, and legal policies. The second goal of the Handbook is to provide some ideas about future directions of antitrust scholarship and policy. Antitrust economics has evolved over the last 60 years. It has both shaped policy and been shaped by policy. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics will serve as a policy and research guide of next steps to consider when shaping the future of the field of antitrust.
The Economics Of Collusion
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Author : Robert C. Marshall
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date : 2014-01-10
The Economics Of Collusion written by Robert C. Marshall and has been published by MIT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-01-10 with Business & Economics categories.
An examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings function for years in a stable and peaceful manner despite the illegality of their agreements and incentives for deviation by their members. In The Economics of Collusion, Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx offer an examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Marshall and Marx, who have studied collusion extensively for two decades, begin with three narratives: the organization and implementation of a cartel, the organization and implementation of a bidding ring, and a parent company's efforts to detect collusion by its divisions. These accounts—fictitious, but rooted in the inner workings and details from actual cases—offer a novel and engaging way for the reader to understand the basics of collusive behavior. The narratives are followed by detailed economic analyses of cartels, bidding rings, and detection. The narratives offer an engaging entrée to the more rigorous economic discussion that follows. The book is accessible to any reader who understands basic economic reasoning. Mathematical material is flagged with asterisks.
Advances In Systems Science
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Author : Jerzy Swiątek
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2013-08-13
Advances In Systems Science written by Jerzy Swiątek and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013-08-13 with Technology & Engineering categories.
The International Conference on Systems Science 2013 (ICSS 2013) was the 18th event of the series of international scientific conferences for researchers and practitioners in the fields of systems science and systems engineering. The conference took place in Wroclaw, Poland during September 10-12, 2013 and was organized by Wroclaw University of Technology and co-organized by: Committee of Automatics and Robotics of Polish Academy of Sciences, Committee of Computer Science of Polish Academy of Sciences and Polish Section of IEEE. The papers included in the proceedings cover the following topics: Control Theory, Databases and Data Mining, Image and Signal Processing, Machine Learning, Modeling and Simulation, Operational Research, Service Science, Time series and System Identification. The accepted and presented papers highlight new trends and challenges in systems science and systems engineering.
Emerging Issues In Competition Collusion And Regulation Of Network Industries
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Author : Antonio Estache
language : en
Publisher: CEPR
Release Date : 2011
Emerging Issues In Competition Collusion And Regulation Of Network Industries written by Antonio Estache and has been published by CEPR this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with Business & Economics categories.
This book presents a comprehensive review of the vast economic literature covering the governance issues of network industries and suggests paths to improve their efficiences.
Collusive Communication Schemes In A First Price Auction
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Author : Helmuts Āzacis
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012
Collusive Communication Schemes In A First Price Auction written by Helmuts Āzacis and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.
We study optimal bidder collusion at first-price auctions when the collusive mechanism only relies on signals about bidders' valuations. We build on Fang and Morris (2006) when two bidders have low or high private valuation of a single object and additionally each receives a private noisy signal from an incentiveless center about the opponent's valuation. We derive the unique symmetric equilibrium of the first price auction for any symmetric, possibly correlated, distribution of signals, when these can only take two values. Next, we find the distribution of 2-valued signals, which maximizes the joint payoffs of bidders. We prove that allowing signals to take more than two values will not increase bidders' payoffs if the signals are restricted to be public. We also investigate the case when the signals are chosen conditionally independently and identically out of n = 2 possible values. We demonstrate that bidders are strictly better off as signals can take on more and more possible values. Finally, we look at another special case of the correlated signals, namely, when these are independent of the bidders' valuations. We show that in any symmetric 2-valued strategy correlated equilibrium, the bidders bid as if there were no signals at all and, hence, are not able to collude. -- Bidder-optimal signal structure ; Collusion ; (Bayes) correlated equilibrium ; First price auction ; Public and private signals
Economics Of Grids Clouds Systems And Services
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Author : Massimo Coppola
language : en
Publisher: Springer
Release Date : 2019-03-05
Economics Of Grids Clouds Systems And Services written by Massimo Coppola and has been published by Springer this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019-03-05 with Computers categories.
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Economics of Grids, Clouds, Systems, and Services, GECON 2018, held in Pisa, Italy, in September 2018. The 21 full papers and 9 short papers presented together with 1 invited talk were carefully reviewed and selected from 40 submissions.This GECON 2018 proceedings was structured in three special sessions on selected topics, namely: IT service ecosystems enabled through emerging digital technologies; machine learning, cognitive systems and data science for system management; and blockchain technologies and economics.
Endogenous Bid Rotation In Repeated Auctions
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Author : Shiran Rachmilevitch
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009
Endogenous Bid Rotation In Repeated Auctions written by Shiran Rachmilevitch and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.
This paper studies collusion between two bidders in a general symmetric IPV repeated auction, without communication, transfers, or public randomization. I construct a collusive scheme, called endogenous bid-rotation, which gives a payoff larger than the bid-rotation payoff, when valuations are drawn from a continuous distribution. In the special case where the stage game is a second-price auction, the scheme has the following additional properties: (1) it is supported in equilibrium independently of the discount factor, and (2) it is supported in equilibrium even when each player's participation decision is not known to his opponent. Finally, when the distribution of valuations is Bernoulli, the scheme delivers the first-best.