Collusion Reputation And Communication Three Essays In Economic Theory

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Collusion Reputation And Communication

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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1995

Collusion Reputation And Communication written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1995 with categories.

Collusion Reputation And Communication Three Essays In Economic Theory

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Author : Alfredo Marcos Kofman
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1990

Collusion Reputation And Communication Three Essays In Economic Theory written by Alfredo Marcos Kofman and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1990 with categories.

Three Essays In Economic Theory Collusion Delegation And Search

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Author : Leonardo Felli
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1990

Three Essays In Economic Theory Collusion Delegation And Search written by Leonardo Felli and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1990 with categories.

Essays On Economic Theory

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Author : Yu Awaya
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015

Essays On Economic Theory written by Yu Awaya and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.

This thesis consists of four chapters. The first two chapters examine a role ofcommunication to sustain cooperation/collusion. The first chapter, written jointlywith Vijay Krishna, studies a role of communication in cartels. Our analysis iscarried out in Stigler's (1964) model of oligopoly with secret price cuts. This is arepeated game with private monitoring since in the model, firms observe neither theprices nor the sales of their rivals. For a fixed discount factor, we identify conditionsunder which there are equilibria with "cheap talk" communication that result innear-perfect collusion--profits are close to those of a monopolist's--whereas allequilibria without such communication are bounded away from this outcome. Thus,in our model, communication leads to higher prices and profits.The second chapter is a precursor of the first chapter. In this chapter, I examine aa model of a repeated prisoner's dilemma, and show that cheap-talk communicationis necessary in order to achieve cooperative outcomes in a long-term relationship.Unlike the first chapter, I study a continuous time model à la Abreu, Milgrom andPearce (1991). Actions have to be held fixed for a certain period, but signals arrivecontinuously over time. Monitoring is private and players communicate regardingtheir private signals. Through communication players can aggregate private signals,and this helps them detect defections. It is shown that under certain conditions,there exists an equilibrium with communication that strictly Pareto- dominates allequilibria without communication.The third chapter constructs and analyzes a model of reputation in whichreputation of a player affects not only terms but also chances of trade, and hencereputation plays an allocational role. It is shown that reputational concern can beharmful to the society once the allocational role of reputation is taken into account.More precisely, over-provision of quality may occur, even when the net value ofproducing a high-quality good is larger than that of low-quality a goodsThe last chapter, written jointly with Hiroki Fukai, is a contribution to monetaryeconomics. There, a counter-example to the notion that money is memoryis provided--one that relies on incomplete information. For it, there exists an implementable allocation with money which is not implementable with memory.The result arises because money conveys only a limited amount of informationabout past actions which can be beneficial in settings with incomplete information.

Dissertation Abstracts International

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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2008

Dissertation Abstracts International written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with Dissertations, Academic categories.

Journal Of Economic Literature

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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1990

Journal Of Economic Literature written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1990 with Economics categories.

The Evolution Of Collusion

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Author : Paolo Lupi
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2000

The Evolution Of Collusion written by Paolo Lupi and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2000 with categories.

Essays On The Economics Of Collusion

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Author : Chaohai Shen
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2017

Essays On The Economics Of Collusion written by Chaohai Shen and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017 with categories.

The present dissertation consists of three essays on the economics of collusion. The first essay examines bidding in U.S. Forest Service first price timber auctions in the Northern Region, where the potential for collusive bidding has been recognized. I modify the empirical methods in Porter and Zona (1993) and find a group of potentially cooperative (PC) bidders, who can submit complementary bids. Benefiting from a striking feature of data, where sealed bid auctions and ascending bid auctions were used side by side, I find further corroboration for my findings by analyzing PC bidders bids in ascending bid auctions.The second essay, joint with Shigeki Isogai, follows the empirical regularity noted by Marshall and Marx (2015). We present a reputation model in which a long-lived multi-product firm that is sequentially engaged in explicit collusion with short-lived single product firms can exploit the cartel leniency policy offered byantitrust enforcement authorities. The long-lived firm may have incentive to seek leniency to build and protect its reputation as a tough firm, who never tolerates any deviant conduct. This may help the long-lived firm deter deviations in the cartels. Our model provides a new insight on cartel firms incentive to report their own cartel, a potential counterproductive effect of the leniency policy, and important policy implications to the design of the amnesty program.The third essay analyzes the effect of an antitrust leniency program on the decision to merge or, alternatively, explicitly collude. Buyers use procurements but the procurement will be re-conducted when the buyer is dissatisfied with the bids of the incumbent sellers or a cartel is discovered. Additionally, production costs ofthe sellers may change in each round of the procurement. If the production cost states in the first round are unprofitable, the sellers may switch to the re-conducted procurement by reporting the existence of the cartel and committing to act noncollusively through leniency applications. Thus, sellers that were indifferent between merging and forming a cartel with no leniency program may prefer colluding in the first round procurement in the presence of a leniency program. So a leniency program may induce both more discovery of cartels as well as more cartel formation.

Handbook Of Behavioral Industrial Organization

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Author : Victor J. Tremblay
language : en
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Release Date : 2018

Handbook Of Behavioral Industrial Organization written by Victor J. Tremblay and has been published by Edward Elgar Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018 with categories.

The Handbook of Behavioral Industrial Organization integrates behavioral economics into industrial organization. Chapters cover concepts such as relative thinking, salience, shrouded attributes, cognitive dissonance, motivated reasoning, confirmation bias, overconfidence, status quo bias, social cooperation and identity. Additional chapters consider industry issues, such as sports and gambling industries, neuroeconomic studies of brands and advertising, and behavioral antitrust law. The Handbook features a wide array of methods (literature surveys, experimental and econometric research, and theoretical modelling), facilitating accessibility to a wide audience.

Three Essays On Strategic Aspects Of International Trade

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Author : Jee-Hyeong Park
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996

Three Essays On Strategic Aspects Of International Trade written by Jee-Hyeong Park and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with categories.