Three Essays In Economic Theory Collusion Delegation And Search
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Three Essays In Economic Theory Collusion Delegation And Search
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Author : Leonardo Felli
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1990
Three Essays In Economic Theory Collusion Delegation And Search written by Leonardo Felli and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1990 with categories.
Collusion Reputation And Communication Three Essays In Economic Theory
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Author : Alfredo Marcos Kofman
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1990
Collusion Reputation And Communication Three Essays In Economic Theory written by Alfredo Marcos Kofman and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1990 with categories.
The Evolution Of Collusion
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Author : Paolo Lupi
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2000
The Evolution Of Collusion written by Paolo Lupi and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2000 with categories.
Dissertation Abstracts International
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Dissertation Abstracts International written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with Dissertations, Academic categories.
Essays On The Economics Of Collusion
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Author : Chaohai Shen
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2017
Essays On The Economics Of Collusion written by Chaohai Shen and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017 with categories.
The present dissertation consists of three essays on the economics of collusion. The first essay examines bidding in U.S. Forest Service first price timber auctions in the Northern Region, where the potential for collusive bidding has been recognized. I modify the empirical methods in Porter and Zona (1993) and find a group of potentially cooperative (PC) bidders, who can submit complementary bids. Benefiting from a striking feature of data, where sealed bid auctions and ascending bid auctions were used side by side, I find further corroboration for my findings by analyzing PC bidders bids in ascending bid auctions.The second essay, joint with Shigeki Isogai, follows the empirical regularity noted by Marshall and Marx (2015). We present a reputation model in which a long-lived multi-product firm that is sequentially engaged in explicit collusion with short-lived single product firms can exploit the cartel leniency policy offered byantitrust enforcement authorities. The long-lived firm may have incentive to seek leniency to build and protect its reputation as a tough firm, who never tolerates any deviant conduct. This may help the long-lived firm deter deviations in the cartels. Our model provides a new insight on cartel firms incentive to report their own cartel, a potential counterproductive effect of the leniency policy, and important policy implications to the design of the amnesty program.The third essay analyzes the effect of an antitrust leniency program on the decision to merge or, alternatively, explicitly collude. Buyers use procurements but the procurement will be re-conducted when the buyer is dissatisfied with the bids of the incumbent sellers or a cartel is discovered. Additionally, production costs ofthe sellers may change in each round of the procurement. If the production cost states in the first round are unprofitable, the sellers may switch to the re-conducted procurement by reporting the existence of the cartel and committing to act noncollusively through leniency applications. Thus, sellers that were indifferent between merging and forming a cartel with no leniency program may prefer colluding in the first round procurement in the presence of a leniency program. So a leniency program may induce both more discovery of cartels as well as more cartel formation.
American Doctoral Dissertations
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2001
American Doctoral Dissertations written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2001 with Dissertation abstracts categories.
Allocation Information And Markets
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Author : John Eatwell
language : en
Publisher: Springer
Release Date : 1989-09-21
Allocation Information And Markets written by John Eatwell and has been published by Springer this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1989-09-21 with Business & Economics categories.
This is an extract from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This volume concentrates on the topic of allocation information and markets.
The Impact Of Incomplete Contracts On Economics
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Author : Philippe Aghion
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2015-12-22
The Impact Of Incomplete Contracts On Economics written by Philippe Aghion and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015-12-22 with Business & Economics categories.
The 1986 article by Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart titled "A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" has provided a framework for understanding how firm boundaries are defined and how they affect economic performance. The property rights approach has provided a formal way to introduce incomplete contracting ideas into economic modeling. The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics collects papers and opinion pieces on the impact that this property right approach to the firm has had on the economics profession.
Risk Uncertainty And Profit
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Author : Frank H. Knight
language : en
Publisher: Courier Corporation
Release Date : 2012-03-09
Risk Uncertainty And Profit written by Frank H. Knight and has been published by Courier Corporation this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-03-09 with Business & Economics categories.
DIVThis enduring economics text provided the theoretical basis of the entrepreneurial American economy during the post-industrial era. A revolutionary work, it taught the world how to systematically distinguish between risk and uncertainty. /div
Economics Rules
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Author : Dani Rodrik
language : en
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Release Date : 2015-10-08
Economics Rules written by Dani Rodrik and has been published by OUP Oxford this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015-10-08 with Business & Economics categories.
The economics profession has become a favourite punching bag in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Economists are widely reviled and their influence derided by the general public. Yet their services have never been in greater demand. To unravel the paradox, we need to understand both the strengths and weaknesses of economics. Dani Rodrik argues that the multiplicity of theoretical frameworks - what economists call 'models' that exist side by side is economics' great strength. Economists are trained to hold diverse, possibly contradictory models of the world in their minds. This is what allows them, when they do their job right, to comprehend the world, make useful suggestions for improving it, and to advance their stock of knowledge over time. In short, it is what makes economics a 'science' a different kind of science from physics or some other natural sciences, but a science nonetheless. But syncretism is not a comfortable state of mind, and economists often jettison it for misplaced confidence and arrogance, especially when they confront questions of public policy. Economists are prone to fads and fashions, and behave too often as if their discipline is about the search for the model that works always and everywhere, rather than a portfolio of models. Their training lets them down when it comes to navigating among diverse models and figuring out which one applies where. Ideology and political preferences frequently substitute for analysis in choosing among models. So the book offers both a defence and critique of economics. Economists' way of thinking about social phenomena has great advantages. But the flexible, contextual nature of economics is also its Achilles' heel in the hands of clumsy practitioners.