Contract Renegotiation In Models Of Asymmetric Information
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Contract Renegotiation In Models Of Asymmetric Information
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Author : Mathias Dewatripont
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1989
Contract Renegotiation In Models Of Asymmetric Information written by Mathias Dewatripont and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1989 with Contracts categories.
Contract Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Information
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Author : Sönje Reiche
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2001
Contract Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Information written by Sönje Reiche and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2001 with Academic theses categories.
Simple Contracts Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Information And The Hold Up Problem
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Author : Patrick W. Schmitz
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004
Simple Contracts Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Information And The Hold Up Problem written by Patrick W. Schmitz and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with categories.
In this article it is demonstrated that voluntary bargaining over a collective decision under asymmetric information may well lead to ex post efficiency if the default decision is non-trivial. It is argued that the default decision may be interpreted as a simple contract that the parties have written ex ante. This result is used in order to show that simple unconditional contracts which are renegotiated may allow the hold-up problem to be solved, even if the parties' valuations are private information.
The Economics Of Contracts Second Edition
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Author : Bernard Salanie
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date : 2005-03-11
The Economics Of Contracts Second Edition written by Bernard Salanie and has been published by MIT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005-03-11 with Business & Economics categories.
A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: chapter 7, on the theory of incomplete contracts, and chapter 8, on the empirical literature in the theory of contracts. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Praise for the previous edition: “The Economics of Contracts offers an excellent introduction to agency models. Written by one of the leading young researchers in contact theory, it is rigorous, clear, concise, and up-to-date. Researchers and students who want to learn about the economics of incentives will want to read this primer.”—Jean Tirole, Institut D'Économie Industrielle, Universite des Sciences Sociales, France “Students will find this a very useful introduction to the ideas of contract theory. Salanié has managed to summarize a large amount of material in a relatively short number of pages in a highly accessible and readable manner.”—Oliver Hart, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Renegotiation Before Contract Execution
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Author : Achim Wambach
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1999
Renegotiation Before Contract Execution written by Achim Wambach and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with Agency (Law) categories.
Renegotiation Proof Contracts With Moral Hazard And Persistent Private Information
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Author : Bruno Strulovici
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Renegotiation Proof Contracts With Moral Hazard And Persistent Private Information written by Bruno Strulovici and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
How does renegotiation affect contracts between a principal and an agent subject to persistent private information and moral hazard? This paper introduces a concept of renegotiationproofness, which adapts to stochastic games the concepts of weak renegotiation-proofness and internal consistency by exploiting natural comparisons across states. When the agent has exponential utility and cost of effort, each separating renegotiation-proof contract is characterized by a single "sensitivity" parameter, which determines how the agent's promised utility varies with reported cash flows. The optimal contract among those always causes immiserization. Reducing the agent's cost of effort can harm the principal by increasing the tension between moral hazard and reporting problems. Truthfulness of the constructed contracts is obtained by allowing jumps in cash flow reports and turning the agent's reporting problem into an impulse control problem. This approach shows that self-correcting reports are optimal of the equilibrium path. The paper also discusses the case of partially pooling contracts and of permanent outside options for the agent, illustrating the interaction between cash-flow persistence, renegotiation, moral hazard, and information revelation. -- Repeated Agency ; Asymmetric Information ; Persistent Information ; Contract Theory ; Principal Agent ; Limited Commitment ; Renegotiation ; Recursive Contracts
Microeconomic Models Of Credit Contracting
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Author : Karel Janda
language : en
Publisher: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing
Release Date : 2009-09
Microeconomic Models Of Credit Contracting written by Karel Janda and has been published by LAP Lambert Academic Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009-09 with categories.
This book deals with the problems of optimal financial contracting under asymmetric information. The chapters 2 and 3 are motivated by the problems faced by entrepreneurs and investors in the economics in transition. These two chapters take the debt form of the financial contract as given and analyze the problems of renegotiation and government credit support. The chapter 4 is devoted to the derivation and characterization of optimal financial contracts for financing investment projects with absolute priority violation. This chapter models the situation of ex post asymmetric information between entrepreneurs and lenders.
Handbook Of Insurance
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Author : Georges Dionne
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2013-12-02
Handbook Of Insurance written by Georges Dionne and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013-12-02 with Business & Economics categories.
This new edition of the Handbook of Insurance reviews the last forty years of research developments in insurance and its related fields. A single reference source for professors, researchers, graduate students, regulators, consultants and practitioners, the book starts with the history and foundations of risk and insurance theory, followed by a review of prevention and precaution, asymmetric information, risk management, insurance pricing, new financial innovations, reinsurance, corporate governance, capital allocation, securitization, systemic risk, insurance regulation, the industrial organization of insurance markets and other insurance market applications. It ends with health insurance, longevity risk, long-term care insurance, life insurance financial products and social insurance. This second version of the Handbook contains 15 new chapters. Each of the 37 chapters has been written by leading authorities in risk and insurance research, all contributions have been peer reviewed, and each chapter can be read independently of the others.
Advanced Microeconomics For Contract Institutional And Organizational Economics
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Author : W. Bentley MacLeod
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date : 2022-04-05
Advanced Microeconomics For Contract Institutional And Organizational Economics written by W. Bentley MacLeod and has been published by MIT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2022-04-05 with Business & Economics categories.
A graduate textbook on microeconomics, covering decision theory, game theory, and the foundations of contract theory, with a unique focus on the empirical. This graduate-level text on microeconomics, covering such topics as decision theory, game theory, bargaining theory, contract theory, trade under asymmetric information, and relational contract theory, is unique in its emphasis on the interplay between theory and evidence. It reviews the microeconomic theory of exchange “from the ground up,” aiming to produce a set of models and hypotheses amenable to empirical exploration, with particular focus on models that are useful for the study of contracts, institutions, and organizations. It explores research that extends price theory to the exchange of commodities when markets are incomplete, discussing recent developments in the field. Topics covered include the relationship between theory and evidence; decision theory as it is used in contract theory and institutional design; game theory; axiomatic and strategic bargaining theory; agency theory and the class of models that are considered to constitute contract theory, with discussions of moral hazard and trade with asymmetric information; and the theory of relational contracts. The final chapter offers a nontechnical review that provides a guide to which model is the most appropriate for a particular application. End-of-chapter exercises help students expand their understanding of the material, and an appendix provides brief introduction to optimization theory and the welfare theorem of general equilibrium theory. Students are assumed to be familiar with general equilibrium theory and basic constrained optimization theory.
Contract Theory
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Author : Patrick Bolton
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date : 2004-12-10
Contract Theory written by Patrick Bolton and has been published by MIT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004-12-10 with Business & Economics categories.
A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.