Designing Economic Mechanisms
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Designing Economic Mechanisms
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Author : Leonid Hurwicz
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2006-05-22
Designing Economic Mechanisms written by Leonid Hurwicz and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006-05-22 with Business & Economics categories.
A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.
Essays On Designing Economic Mechanisms
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Author : Quiang Cheng
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1998
Essays On Designing Economic Mechanisms written by Quiang Cheng and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1998 with categories.
An Introduction To The Theory Of Mechanism Design
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Author : Tilman Börgers
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Release Date : 2015
An Introduction To The Theory Of Mechanism Design written by Tilman Börgers and has been published by Oxford University Press, USA this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with Business & Economics categories.
This book is meant for advanced undergraduate and graduate students of economics who have a good understanding of game theory.
An Introduction To The Theory Of Mechanism Design
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Author : Tilman Börgers
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
An Introduction To The Theory Of Mechanism Design written by Tilman Börgers and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with Game theory categories.
What is the best auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organise themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organised? These questions are the subject of the economic theory of mechanism design. Tilman Börgers' book presents this theory carefully and rigorously. Advanced undergraduate and graduate students of economics will find an exposition of the classic theory of mechanism design, followed by chapters that take the reader to the frontiers of current research in the area.
Introduction To The Theory Of Mechanism Design
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Author : Tilman Borgers
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Release Date : 2015-01-01
Introduction To The Theory Of Mechanism Design written by Tilman Borgers and has been published by Oxford University Press, USA this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015-01-01 with Game theory categories.
What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Borgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Borgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
Models Of Bounded Rationality And Mechanism Design
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Author : Jacob Glazer
language : en
Publisher: World Scientific Publishing Company
Release Date : 2016-08-22
Models Of Bounded Rationality And Mechanism Design written by Jacob Glazer and has been published by World Scientific Publishing Company this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016-08-22 with Business & Economics categories.
This book brings together the authors' joint papers from over a period of more than twenty years. The collection includes seven papers, each of which presents a novel and rigorous model in Economic Theory. All of the models are within the domain of implementation and mechanism design theories. These theories attempt to explain how incentive schemes and organizations can be designed with the goal of inducing agents to behave according to the designer's (principal's) objectives. Most of the literature assumes that agents are fully rational. In contrast, the authors inject into each model an element which conflicts with the standard notion of full rationality, demonstrating how such elements can dramatically change the mechanism design problem. Although all of the models presented in this volume touch on mechanism design issues, it is the formal modeling of bounded rationality that the authors are most interested in. A model of bounded rationality signifies a model that contains a procedural element of reasoning that is not consistent with full rationality. Rather than looking for a canonical model of bounded rationality, the articles introduce a variety of modeling devices that will capture procedural elements not previously considered, and which alter the analysis of the model. The book is a journey into the modeling of bounded rationality. It is a collection of modeling ideas rather than a general alternative theory of implementation.
Robust Mechanism Design The Role Of Private Information And Higher Order Beliefs
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Author : Dirk Bergemann
language : en
Publisher: World Scientific
Release Date : 2012-03-22
Robust Mechanism Design The Role Of Private Information And Higher Order Beliefs written by Dirk Bergemann and has been published by World Scientific this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-03-22 with Business & Economics categories.
Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
Communication In Mechanism Design
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Author : Steven R. Williams
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2008-06-02
Communication In Mechanism Design written by Steven R. Williams and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008-06-02 with Business & Economics categories.
Mechanism design is the field of economics that treats institutions and procedures as variables that can be selected in order to achieve desired objectives. An important aspect of a mechanism is the communication among its participants that it requires, which complements other design features such as incentives and complexity. A calculus-based theory of communication in mechanisms is developed in this book. The value of a calculus-based approach lies in its familiarity as well as the insight into mechanisms that it provides. Results are developed concerning (i) a first order approach to the construction of mechanisms, (ii) the range of mechanisms that can be used to achieve a given objective, as well as (iii) lower bounds on the required communication.
Topics In The Design Of Political And Economic Mechanisms
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Author : Mauricio Siares Bugarin
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1997
Topics In The Design Of Political And Economic Mechanisms written by Mauricio Siares Bugarin and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1997 with categories.
Game Theory And Mechanism Design
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Author : Y Narahari
language : en
Publisher: World Scientific
Release Date : 2014-03-13
Game Theory And Mechanism Design written by Y Narahari and has been published by World Scientific this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-03-13 with Computers categories.
This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book provide a sound foundation of game theory and mechanism design theory which clearly represent the “science” behind traditional as well as emerging economic applications for the society.The importance of the discipline of game theory has been recognized through numerous Nobel prizes in economic sciences being awarded to game theorists, including the 2005, 2007, and 2012 prizes. The book distills the marvelous contributions of these and other celebrated game theorists and presents it in a way that can be easily understood even by senior undergraduate students.A unique feature of the book is its detailed coverage of mechanism design which is the art of designing a game among strategic agents so that a social goal is realized in an equilibrium of the induced game. Another feature is a large number of illustrative examples that are representative of both classical and modern applications of game theory and mechanism design. The book also includes informative biographical sketches of game theory legends, and is specially customized to a general engineering audience.After a thorough reading of this book, readers would be able to apply game theory and mechanism design in a principled and mature way to solve relevant problems in computer science (esp, artificial intelligence/machine learning), computer engineering, operations research, industrial engineering and microeconomics.