Designing Economic Mechanisms
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Designing Economic Mechanisms
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Author : Leonid Hurwicz
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006-05-22
Designing Economic Mechanisms written by Leonid Hurwicz and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006-05-22 with Business & Economics categories.
A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in orders to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism, i.e., informationally efficient mechanisms. Our systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.
Designing Economic Mechanisms
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Author : Leonid Hurwicz
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2006-05-22
Designing Economic Mechanisms written by Leonid Hurwicz and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006-05-22 with Business & Economics categories.
A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.
Mechanism Design
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Author : Rakesh V. Vohra
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2011-05-09
Mechanism Design written by Rakesh V. Vohra and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011-05-09 with Business & Economics categories.
Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design.
An Introduction To The Theory Of Mechanism Design
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Author : Tilman Borgers
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2015-05-01
An Introduction To The Theory Of Mechanism Design written by Tilman Borgers and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015-05-01 with Business & Economics categories.
What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
Market Design
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Author : Guillaume Haeringer
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date : 2018-03-02
Market Design written by Guillaume Haeringer and has been published by MIT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018-03-02 with Business & Economics categories.
A broad overview of market mechanisms, with an emphasis on the interplay between theory and real-life applications; examples range from eBay auctions to school choice. This book offers an introduction to market design, providing students with a broad overview of issues related to the design and analysis of market mechanisms. It defines a market as a demand and a supply, without specifying a price system or mechanism. This allows the text to analyze a broad set of situations—including such unconventional markets as college admissions and organ donation—and forces readers to pay attention to details that might otherwise be overlooked. Students often complain that microeconomics is too abstract and disconnected from reality; the study of market design shows how theory can help solve existing, real-life problems. The book focuses on the interplay between theory and applications. To keep the text as accessible as possible, special effort has been made to minimize formal description of the models while emphasizing the intuitive, with detailed explanations and resolution of examples. Appendixes offer general reviews of elements of game theory and mechanism design that are related to the themes explored in the book, presenting the basic concepts with as many explanations and illustrations as possible. The book covers topics including the basics of simple auctions; eBay auctions; Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auctions; keyword auctions, with examples from Google and Facebook; spectrum auctions; financial markets, with discussions of treasury auctions and IPOs; trading on the stock market; the basic matching model; medical match; assignment problems; probabilistic assignments; school choice; course allocation, with examples from Harvard and Wharton; and kidney exchange.
An Introduction To The Theory Of Mechanism Design
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Author : Tilman Börgers
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Release Date : 2015
An Introduction To The Theory Of Mechanism Design written by Tilman Börgers and has been published by Oxford University Press, USA this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with Business & Economics categories.
This book is meant for advanced undergraduate and graduate students of economics who have a good understanding of game theory.
Discrete Convex Analysis
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Author : Kazuo Murota
language : en
Publisher: SIAM
Release Date : 2003-01-01
Discrete Convex Analysis written by Kazuo Murota and has been published by SIAM this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003-01-01 with Mathematics categories.
Discrete Convex Analysis is a novel paradigm for discrete optimization that combines the ideas in continuous optimization (convex analysis) and combinatorial optimization (matroid/submodular function theory) to establish a unified theoretical framework for nonlinear discrete optimization. The study of this theory is expanding with the development of efficient algorithms and applications to a number of diverse disciplines like matrix theory, operations research, and economics. This self-contained book is designed to provide a novel insight into optimization on discrete structures and should reveal unexpected links among different disciplines. It is the first and only English-language monograph on the theory and applications of discrete convex analysis.
The Law And Economics Of Framework Agreements
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Author : Gian Luigi Albano
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2016-04-28
The Law And Economics Of Framework Agreements written by Gian Luigi Albano and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016-04-28 with Law categories.
This book addresses the increasing demand for a logical understanding of how framework agreement should be used and implemented.
Communication In Mechanism Design
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Author : Steven R. Williams
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2008-06-02
Communication In Mechanism Design written by Steven R. Williams and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008-06-02 with Business & Economics categories.
Mechanism design is the field of economics that treats institutions and procedures as variables that can be selected in order to achieve desired objectives. An important aspect of a mechanism is the communication among its participants that it requires, which complements other design features such as incentives and complexity. A calculus-based theory of communication in mechanisms is developed in this book. The value of a calculus-based approach lies in its familiarity as well as the insight into mechanisms that it provides. Results are developed concerning (i) a first order approach to the construction of mechanisms, (ii) the range of mechanisms that can be used to achieve a given objective, as well as (iii) lower bounds on the required communication.
Advances In Economic Design
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Author : Murat R. Sertel
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2013-04-17
Advances In Economic Design written by Murat R. Sertel and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013-04-17 with Business & Economics categories.
This book, Advances in Economic Design, celebrates the birth of SED, the Society for Economic Design. It grew out of SED 2000, the first International Conference of the Society for Economic Design, which took place in istanbul during 23-27 lune, 2000. While it is not a proceedings or even a selected proceedings volume, it nevertheless contains many chapters which derive from papers presented at SED 2000, although they have typically been substantially reworked, extended and deepened. Of course, all the papers published in this book were anonymously refe reed. As a collection of selected essays, the book displays the state of the art across a broad spectrum of theoretical questions and topics and areas of application which economic designers are investigating. This characteristic of the book is reflected in its organization into seven parts: (A) Social Choice and Electoral Systems, (B) Buyers and SeIlers, (C) Bargaining, (D) Coalitional Stability and Efficiency, (E) Regulating and Organizing Markets, (F) Designing Rights, (G) Information. Most of the chapters of this book were edited for their English. Ms. ludith Tucker edited Chapters A2, A3, BI, B3, Cl, C4, DI, D2, D3, E2, E3, F2, F3 and F4, while Dr. Noah Hardy linguistically edited Chapters B2, B4 and C3. We thank Ms. Tucker and Dr. Hardy for their diligent support in this regard.