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Do Managerial Incentives Affect Mergers And Acquisitions


Do Managerial Incentives Affect Mergers And Acquisitions
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Do Managerial Incentives Affect Mergers And Acquisitions


Do Managerial Incentives Affect Mergers And Acquisitions
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Author : Lianzheng Li
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015

Do Managerial Incentives Affect Mergers And Acquisitions written by Lianzheng Li and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.




The Effect Of Mergers And Acquisitions On Managerial Incentives And Performance


The Effect Of Mergers And Acquisitions On Managerial Incentives And Performance
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Author : Bryant B. Plavsic
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996

The Effect Of Mergers And Acquisitions On Managerial Incentives And Performance written by Bryant B. Plavsic and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with Consolidation and merger of corporations categories.




Managerial Incentives And Corporate Acquisitions


Managerial Incentives And Corporate Acquisitions
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Author : Athanasios Tsekeris
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015

Managerial Incentives And Corporate Acquisitions written by Athanasios Tsekeris and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.


This thesis examines the impact of executive compensation on the quality of corporate acquisition decisions. A number of different issues are empirically investigated. The analysis begins with the examination of the relation between the incentives managers are provided with via their compensation contracts and the riskiness of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) investigating whether this relation is affected by the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. The study then focuses on the performance of acquiring firms exploring how and whether managerial incentives can induce value-increasing acquisitions conditional on the intensity of M&A activity. The final part of the empirical analysis examines whether the legal status of the target firm has any implications for the effectiveness of incentive compensation to mitigate managerial risk-aversion and increase shareholder value. The thesis contributes both to academic literature and to practice by identifying areas of inefficiencies of equity-based compensation contracts to mitigate agency costs. More specifically, new evidence is provided on the effectiveness of incentive compensation to induce risk-taking activity under the impact of stricter regulation. While compensation-related incentives are positively associated with the riskiness of acquisition decisions before 2002, managers have become considerably less responsive to such incentives after the enactment of SOX. Moreover, although incentive compensation can improve deal performance and overcome adverse selection concerns by inducing managers to acquire when it is optimal to do, it is not related to value-increasing decisions when acquisitions are initiated during periods of merger waves. It is further found that equity-based compensation can be rendered ineffective to mitigate agency costs when a publicly listed firm is acquired. Given these inefficiencies, a number of recommendations are made for the improvement of the design of executive compensation contracts that could provide valuable guidelines to remuneration committees to reduce excessive compensation costs and benefit shareholders.



Impact Of Managerial Incentives On Shareholder Value Creation In Mergers And Acquisitions


Impact Of Managerial Incentives On Shareholder Value Creation In Mergers And Acquisitions
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Author : J. Huang
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004

Impact Of Managerial Incentives On Shareholder Value Creation In Mergers And Acquisitions written by J. Huang and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with categories.




The Role Of Managerial Incentives In Corporate Acquisitions And Corporate Mergers And Top Management Turnover


The Role Of Managerial Incentives In Corporate Acquisitions And Corporate Mergers And Top Management Turnover
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Author : David Scott North
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2000

The Role Of Managerial Incentives In Corporate Acquisitions And Corporate Mergers And Top Management Turnover written by David Scott North and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2000 with Consolidation and merger of corporations categories.




Managerial Risk Taking Incentives And Merger Decisions


Managerial Risk Taking Incentives And Merger Decisions
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Author : Chen Lin
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2017

Managerial Risk Taking Incentives And Merger Decisions written by Chen Lin and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017 with categories.


We provide evidence concerning the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions and outcomes for different types of mergers: vertical, horizontal, and diversifying. Using chief executive officer (CEO) relative inside leverage to proxy for the incentives of risk-averse managers, we find that CEOs with higher inside leverage are more likely to engage in vertical mergers, and those mergers generate lower announcement returns for shareholders. This effect of CEO relative inside leverage on returns for shareholders in vertical acquisitions is more pronounced when the acquirer has a higher degree of informational opacity, weak governance, and excess cash.



Managerial Incentives For Mergers


Managerial Incentives For Mergers
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Author : Ramon Faulí-Oller
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996

Managerial Incentives For Mergers written by Ramon Faulí-Oller and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with Consolidation and merger of corporations categories.




Managerial Incentives And The Price Effects Of Mergers


Managerial Incentives And The Price Effects Of Mergers
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Author : Abraham L. Wickelgren
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005

Managerial Incentives And The Price Effects Of Mergers written by Abraham L. Wickelgren and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with categories.


Most analysis of market power assumes that managers are perfect agents for shareholders. This paper relaxes that assumption. When managers of a multi-product firm exert unobservable effort to improve product quality, there is a trade-off between providing adequate effort incentives and ensuring sufficient price-coordination between the product divisions. This makes some intra-firm price competition optimal, explaining why many multi-product firms allow for competition between divisions. When there are effort spillovers, the optimal amount of price competition can be as great as when the products are under separate ownership. Even with some profit-sharing, intra-firm price competition can reduce quality-adjusted price, which has important implications for antitrust policy.



Mergers And Acquisitions And Executive Compensation


Mergers And Acquisitions And Executive Compensation
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Author : Virginia Bodolica
language : en
Publisher: Routledge
Release Date : 2015-06-26

Mergers And Acquisitions And Executive Compensation written by Virginia Bodolica and has been published by Routledge this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015-06-26 with Business & Economics categories.


Over the past decades, the total value of executive compensation packages has been rising dramatically, contributing to a wider pay gap between the chief executive officer and the average worker. In the midst of the financial turmoil that brought about a massive wave of corporate failures, the lavish executive compensation package has come under an intense spotlight. Public pressure has mounted to revise the levels and the structure of executive pay in a way that will tie more closely the executive wealth to that of shareholders. Merger and acquisition (M&A) activities represent an opportune setting for gauging whether shareholder value creation or managerial opportunism guides executive compensation. M&As constitute major examples of high-profile events prompted by managers who typically conceive them as a means for achieving higher levels of pay, even though they are frequently associated with disappointing returns to acquiring shareholders. Mergers and Acquisitions and Executive Compensation reviews the existing empirical evidence and provides an integrative framework for the growing body of literature that is situated at the intersection of two highly debated topics: M&A activities and executive compensation. The proposed framework structures the literature along two dimensions, such as M&A phases and firm’s role in a M&A deal, allowing readers to identify three main streams of research and five different conceptualizations of causal relationships between M&A transactions and executive compensation. The book makes a comprehensive review of empirical studies conducted to date, aiming to shed more light on the current and emerging knowledge in this field of investigation, discuss the inconsistencies encountered within each stream of research, and suggest promising directions for further exploration. This book will appeal to researchers and students alike in the fields of organizational behavior and governance as well as accounting and accountability.



Corporate Takeovers


Corporate Takeovers
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Author : Alan J. Auerbach
language : en
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Release Date : 2013-12-30

Corporate Takeovers written by Alan J. Auerbach and has been published by University of Chicago Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013-12-30 with Business & Economics categories.


The takeover boom that began in the mid-1980s has exhibited many phenomena not previously observed, such as hostile takeovers and takeover defenses, a widespread use of cash as a means of payment for targeted firms, and the acquisitions of companies ranking among the largest in the country. With the aim of more fully understanding the implications of such occurances, contributors to this volume consider a broad range of issues as they analyze mergers and acquisitions and study the takeoveer process itself.