Managerial Incentives And The Price Effects Of Mergers
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Managerial Incentives And The Price Effects Of Mergers
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Author : Abraham L. Wickelgren
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005
Managerial Incentives And The Price Effects Of Mergers written by Abraham L. Wickelgren and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with categories.
Most analysis of market power assumes that managers are perfect agents for shareholders. This paper relaxes that assumption. When managers of a multi-product firm exert unobservable effort to improve product quality, there is a trade-off between providing adequate effort incentives and ensuring sufficient price-coordination between the product divisions. This makes some intra-firm price competition optimal, explaining why many multi-product firms allow for competition between divisions. When there are effort spillovers, the optimal amount of price competition can be as great as when the products are under separate ownership. Even with some profit-sharing, intra-firm price competition can reduce quality-adjusted price, which has important implications for antitrust policy.
The Effect Of Mergers And Acquisitions On Managerial Incentives And Performance
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Author : Bryant B. Plavsic
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996
The Effect Of Mergers And Acquisitions On Managerial Incentives And Performance written by Bryant B. Plavsic and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with Consolidation and merger of corporations categories.
Impact Of Managerial Incentives On Shareholder Value Creation In Mergers And Acquisitions
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Author : J. Huang
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004
Impact Of Managerial Incentives On Shareholder Value Creation In Mergers And Acquisitions written by J. Huang and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with categories.
Managerial Incentives For Mergers
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Author : Ramon Faulí-Oller
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996
Managerial Incentives For Mergers written by Ramon Faulí-Oller and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with Consolidation and merger of corporations categories.
The Role Of Managerial Incentives In Corporate Acquisitions And Corporate Mergers And Top Management Turnover
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Author : David Scott North
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2000
The Role Of Managerial Incentives In Corporate Acquisitions And Corporate Mergers And Top Management Turnover written by David Scott North and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2000 with Consolidation and merger of corporations categories.
Mergers Managerial Incentives And Efficiencies
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Author : Dragan Jovanovic
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Mergers Managerial Incentives And Efficiencies written by Dragan Jovanovic and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.
Managerial Incentives And Corporate Acquisitions
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Author : Athanasios Tsekeris
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Managerial Incentives And Corporate Acquisitions written by Athanasios Tsekeris and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
This thesis examines the impact of executive compensation on the quality of corporate acquisition decisions. A number of different issues are empirically investigated. The analysis begins with the examination of the relation between the incentives managers are provided with via their compensation contracts and the riskiness of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) investigating whether this relation is affected by the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. The study then focuses on the performance of acquiring firms exploring how and whether managerial incentives can induce value-increasing acquisitions conditional on the intensity of M&A activity. The final part of the empirical analysis examines whether the legal status of the target firm has any implications for the effectiveness of incentive compensation to mitigate managerial risk-aversion and increase shareholder value. The thesis contributes both to academic literature and to practice by identifying areas of inefficiencies of equity-based compensation contracts to mitigate agency costs. More specifically, new evidence is provided on the effectiveness of incentive compensation to induce risk-taking activity under the impact of stricter regulation. While compensation-related incentives are positively associated with the riskiness of acquisition decisions before 2002, managers have become considerably less responsive to such incentives after the enactment of SOX. Moreover, although incentive compensation can improve deal performance and overcome adverse selection concerns by inducing managers to acquire when it is optimal to do, it is not related to value-increasing decisions when acquisitions are initiated during periods of merger waves. It is further found that equity-based compensation can be rendered ineffective to mitigate agency costs when a publicly listed firm is acquired. Given these inefficiencies, a number of recommendations are made for the improvement of the design of executive compensation contracts that could provide valuable guidelines to remuneration committees to reduce excessive compensation costs and benefit shareholders.
Do Managerial Incentives Affect Mergers And Acquisitions
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Author : Lianzheng Li
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Do Managerial Incentives Affect Mergers And Acquisitions written by Lianzheng Li and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
Mergers Corporate Financing And Managerial Incentives In R D Intensive Industries
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Author : James H. Cardon
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1999
Mergers Corporate Financing And Managerial Incentives In R D Intensive Industries written by James H. Cardon and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with Consolidation and merger of corporations categories.
Managerial Incentives And Takeover Wealth Gains
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
Managerial Incentives And Takeover Wealth Gains written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with Consolidation and merger of corporations categories.
This study examines the relationship between managerial equity incentives and takeover wealth gains both for target and acquirer firms. Although there is some research about the effect of acquirer managers' incentives on acquirer wealth gains, this paper is one of the first to investigate the effect of target managers' incentives on the wealth effects of target firms in corporate takeovers. In addition, prior research has focused on the alignment effect of equity incentives in takeovers. However, takeovers provide an opportunity to liquidate personal equity portfolio for managers who hold an undiversified portfolio of their firms' stock. In this study, I identify two hypotheses that potentially explain the effect of target managers' incentives on wealth gains. While incentive alignment hypothesis predicts a positive relationship, diversification driven-liquidity hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between target managerial incentives and target wealth gains. I use a sample of 656 successful and 104 failed acquisitions over the period 1994-2003 to test these competing hypotheses. I find that for targets that are less (more) diversified, equity incentives are negatively (positively) related to wealth effects. I also find that the target managerial incentives increase the success probability of a takeover bid and this positive effect is less pronounced for diversified target managers. Based on these results, I conclude that incentive alignment argument is dominated by liquidity argument in less diversified target firms, however, holds in diversified firms. For acquirer managers, I do not find any evidence that supports incentive alignment or diversification arguments.