Epistemic Value


Epistemic Value
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Epistemic Value


Epistemic Value
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Author : Adrian Haddock
language : en
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Release Date : 2009-09-03

Epistemic Value written by Adrian Haddock and has been published by OUP Oxford this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009-09-03 with Philosophy categories.


Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in issues about the value of knowledge and the values informing epistemic appraisal. Is knowledge more valuable that merely true belief or even justified true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal or do other values enter the picture? Epistemic Value is a collection of previously unpublished articles on such issues by leading philosophers in the field. It will stimulate discussion of the nature of knowledge and of directions that might be taken by the theory of knowledge. The contributors are Jason Baehr, Michael Brady, Berit Brogaard, Michael DePaul, Pascal Engel, Catherine Elgin, Alvin Goldman, John Greco, Stephen Grimm, Ward Jones, Martin Kusch, Jonathan Kvanvig, Michael Lynch, Erik Olsson, Wayne Riggs and Matthew Weiner.



Epistemic Value


Epistemic Value
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Author : Adrian Haddock
language : en
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Release Date : 2009-09-03

Epistemic Value written by Adrian Haddock and has been published by OUP Oxford this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009-09-03 with Philosophy categories.


Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in issues about the value of knowledge and the values informing epistemic appraisal. Is knowledge more valuable that merely true belief or even justified true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal or do other values enter the picture? Epistemic Value is a collection of previously unpublished articles on such issues by leading philosophers in the field. It will stimulate discussion of the nature of knowledge and of directions that might be taken by the theory of knowledge. The contributors are Jason Baehr, Michael Brady, Berit Brogaard, Michael DePaul, Pascal Engel, Catherine Elgin, Alvin Goldman, John Greco, Stephen Grimm, Ward Jones, Martin Kusch, Jonathan Kvanvig, Michael Lynch, Erik Olsson, Wayne Riggs and Matthew Weiner.



Epistemic Values


Epistemic Values
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Author : Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Release Date : 2020-10-15

Epistemic Values written by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski and has been published by Oxford University Press, USA this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2020-10-15 with Philosophy categories.


"This book collects 20 papers in epistemology by Linda Zagzebski, covering her entire career of more than 25 years. She is one of the founders of contemporary epistemology and is well-known for broadening the field and re-focusing it on epistemic virtue and epistemic value. The subject areas of most of epistemology are included in these papers: (1) knowledge and understanding, (2) intellectual virtue, (3) epistemic value, (4) virtue in religious epistemology, (5) intellectual autonomy and authority, and (6) skepticism and the Gettier problem"--



Is Truth The Primary Epistemic Goal


Is Truth The Primary Epistemic Goal
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Author : Markus Patrick Hess
language : en
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter
Release Date : 2013-05-02

Is Truth The Primary Epistemic Goal written by Markus Patrick Hess and has been published by Walter de Gruyter this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013-05-02 with Philosophy categories.


This book is focused on a problem that has aroused the most controversy in recent epistemological debate, which is whether the truth can or cannot be the fundamental epistemic goal. Traditional epistemology has presupposed the centrality of truth without giving a deeper analysis. To epistemic value pluralists, the claim that truth is the fundamental value seems unjustified. Their central judgement is that we can be in a situation where we do not attain truth but something else that is also epistemically valuable. In contrast, epistemic value monists are committed to the view that one can only attain something of epistemic value by attaining truth. It was necessary to rethink the long-accepted platitude that truth is our primary epistemic goal, once several objections about epistemic value were formulated. The whole debate is instructive for understanding how the epistemic value domain is structured.



A Luxury Of The Understanding


A Luxury Of The Understanding
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Author : Allan Hazlett
language : en
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Release Date : 2013-10-03

A Luxury Of The Understanding written by Allan Hazlett and has been published by OUP Oxford this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013-10-03 with Philosophy categories.


The value of true belief has played a central role in history of philosophy—consider Socrates' slogan that the unexamined life is not worth living, and Aristotle's claim that everyone naturally wants knowledge—as well as in contemporary epistemology, where questions about the value of knowledge have recently taken center stage. It has usually been assumed that accurate representation—true belief—is valuable, either instrumentally or for its own sake. In A Luxury of the Understanding, Allan Hazlett offers a critical study of that assumption, and of the main ways in which it can be defended. Hazlett defends the conclusion that true belief is at most sometimes valuable. In the first part of the book, he targets the view that true belief is normally better for us than false belief, and argues that false beliefs about ourselves—for example, unrealistic optimism about our futures and about other people, such as overly positive views of our friends—are often valuable vis-à-vis our wellbeing. In the second part, he targets the view that truth is "the aim of belief," and argues for anti-realism about the epistemic value of true belief. Together, these arguments comprise a challenge to the philosophical assumption of the value of true belief, and suggest an alternative picture, on which the fact that some people love truth is all there is to "the value of true belief".



Knowledge Truth And Duty


Knowledge Truth And Duty
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Author : Matthias Steup
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Release Date : 2001

Knowledge Truth And Duty written by Matthias Steup and has been published by Oxford University Press, USA this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2001 with Duty categories.


This text examines epistemic duty, doxastic voluntarism, the normativity of justification, internalism versus externalism, truth as the epistemic goal, and scepticism and the search for justification.



A Platonic Theory Of Epistemic Value


A Platonic Theory Of Epistemic Value
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Author : Joseph Andrew Barnes
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012

A Platonic Theory Of Epistemic Value written by Joseph Andrew Barnes and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.


Why is knowledge better than mere true belief ? To make progress in answering that question, we need to distinguish two ways to understand it. It might mean: why is knowledge epistemically better than mere true belief ? Or it might mean: why do we have reason to prefer epistemically better beliefs to epistemically worse beliefs? In the same way, the question "why is a Ferrari better than a lemon?" might mean "why are good cars better as cars than worse cars?" It might be, that is, a request for a general theory of car-wise goodness. Or it might instead be asking why car-wise goodness matters: "why prefer a good car to a bad one?" Why is knowledge epistemically better than true belief ? According to plausible accounts, the epistemic value of a belief is a matter either of the likelihood that it is true or its degree of support by one's total evidence. These accounts, however, can't make sense of some comparative epistemic evaluations. They must treat the Churchlands' philosophically reasoned belief that there are no beliefs as epistemically just as bad as a wikipedia reader's rash belief in the same proposition, although intuitively it is epistemically better. And the plausible accounts must treat some beliefs in "commissive" versions of Moore's paradox, such as "it's raining, but I believe it's not raining," as epistemically ideal, though intuitively they are not. What these plausible accounts overlook is that the epistemic value of a belief is in part a matter of how influential the evidence for it is: how it might affect what the total evidence of other believers supports. This "discursive epistemic value" is what the Churchlands' beliefs have, and what all commissive Moorean beliefs lack. The Churchlands' evidence is more influential than the freshman's, whereas the commissive Moorean believer's evidence can never be maximally influential. Discursive epistemic value also helps answer the second question, by solving "the Meno Problem." Roughly, the Meno problem is to explain why we have reason to prefer knowledge to mere true belief, given that they are in some sense practically equivalent. The standard explanation is that knowers are more likely to retain their true beliefs in the future. But this explanation is unsatisfying, since it seems to make the epistemic status of the knowledge otiose. After all, if knowledge were preferable only as a means to further true beliefs, then the epistemic status of knowledge would be dispensable. In contrast, on my account, it is precisely the epistemic status of knowledge - and in particular its discursive epistemic value - which makes knowers more persuasive and qualifies them to teach. Of course, knowers are not always more persuasive. So discursive epistemic value does not always give us reason to prefer knowledge to mere true belief. But that is, I argue, as it should be. We do not always have reason to prefer knowledge to true belief. Epistemic goodness amplifies reasons for or against having a true belief. So, in general, only when we have reason to prefer having a true belief to lacking it do we have reason to prefer an epistemically good true belief to a mere true belief. By contrast, when we don't have reason to prefer a true belief in the first place, we often actually have reason to prefer that it be epistemically bad. For instance, the depressive's self-destructive belief about his own mediocrity is all the worse for being supported by influential evidence. In addition to other applications, discursive epistemic value affords an satisfying internalist response to an externalist demand. How, externalists may demand, are internalist requirements conducive to anything of epistemic value? If I am right, the internalist may reply: they are conducive to discursive epistemic value.



Epistemic Consequentialism


Epistemic Consequentialism
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Author : H. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2018-05-03

Epistemic Consequentialism written by H. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018-05-03 with Philosophy categories.


An important issue in epistemology concerns the source of epistemic normativity. Epistemic consequentialism maintains that epistemic norms are genuine norms in virtue of the way in which they are conducive to epistemic value, whatever epistemic value may be. So, for example, the epistemic consequentialist might say that it is a norm that beliefs should be consistent, in that holding consistent beliefs is the best way to achieve the epistemic value of accuracy. Thus epistemic consequentialism is structurally similar to the family of consequentialist views in ethics. Recently, philosophers from both formal epistemology and traditional epistemology have shown interest in such a view. In formal epistemology, there has been particular interest in thinking of epistemology as a kind of decision theory where instead of maximizing expected utility one maximizes expected epistemic utility. In traditional epistemology, there has been particular interest in various forms of reliabilism about justification and whether such views are analogous to—and so face similar problems to—versions of consequentialism in ethics. This volume presents some of the most recent work on these topics as well as others related to epistemic consequentialism, by authors that are sympathetic to the view and those who are critical of it.



Epistemology


Epistemology
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Author : D. Pritchard
language : en
Publisher: Springer
Release Date : 2016-12-14

Epistemology written by D. Pritchard and has been published by Springer this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016-12-14 with Philosophy categories.


This advanced textbook, now in its second edition, provides an accessible overview of some of the main issues in contemporary epistemology. Written by an expert in the field, it covers such key topics as virtue epistemology, anti-luck epistemology, epistemological disjunctivism, epistemic value, understanding, radical scepticism, and contextualism. This book is ideal as a set text for an advanced undergraduate or postgraduate course in epistemology, and will also be of general interest to researchers in philosophy.



The Nature And Value Of Knowledge


The Nature And Value Of Knowledge
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Author : Duncan Pritchard
language : en
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Release Date : 2010-05-20

The Nature And Value Of Knowledge written by Duncan Pritchard and has been published by OUP Oxford this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010-05-20 with Philosophy categories.


This volume comprises three distinct investigations into the relationship between the nature and the value of knowledge. Each is written by one of the authors in consultation with the other two. 'Knowledge and Understanding' (by Duncan Pritchard) critically examines virtue-theoretic responses to the problem of the value of knowledge, and argues that the finally valuable cognitive state is not knowledge but understanding. 'Knowledge and Recognition' (by Alan Millar) develops an account of knowledge in which the idea of a recognitional ability plays a prominent role, and argues that this account enables us better to understand knowledge and its value. 'Knowledge and Action' (by Adrian Haddock) argues for an account of knowledge and justification which explains why knowledge is valuable, and enables us to make sense of the knowledge we have of our intentional actions.