Home eBooks Download › essays in executive compensation

Essays In Executive Compensation

Download Essays In Executive Compensation PDF/ePub or read online books in Mobi eBooks. Click Download or Read Online button to get Essays In Executive Compensation book now. This website allows unlimited access to, at the time of writing, more than 1.5 million titles, including hundreds of thousands of titles in various foreign languages. If the content not found or just blank you must refresh this page

Essays In Executive Compensation

DOWNLOAD
Author : Dan Zhang
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012

Essays In Executive Compensation written by Dan Zhang and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.

Three Essays On Executive Compensation

DOWNLOAD
Author : Moritz Heimes
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014

Three Essays On Executive Compensation written by Moritz Heimes and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.

Essays On Executive Compensation

DOWNLOAD
Author : Shuo Wu
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009

Essays On Executive Compensation written by Shuo Wu and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.

Three Essays On Executive Compensation

DOWNLOAD
Author : Vaibhav Sharma
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009

Three Essays On Executive Compensation written by Vaibhav Sharma and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.

Executive compensation and its potential importance in aligning shareholder and management interests has been an extensively researched area within corporate finance. This thesis studys executive compensation while addressing several unresolved issues in the literature. Essay one examines CEO compensation following spin-offs. The second essay studys changes in CEO salaries and their relation to firm performance. Essay three examines managerial decision horizons for target and acquirer firms in mergers and acquisitions.

Essays On Executive Compensation And The Firm Performance

DOWNLOAD
Author : Scott D. Tracy
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1999

Essays On Executive Compensation And The Firm Performance written by Scott D. Tracy and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with categories.

Three Essays In Executive Compensation

DOWNLOAD
Author : Randy Beavers
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015

Three Essays In Executive Compensation written by Randy Beavers and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with Electronic dissertations categories.

In essay one, we examine overconfident CEO-directors and find they attend more board meetings, are more active in nominating committees, and have more independent directorships. Attendance is higher when multiple overconfident directors are present on the board. When an overconfident board selects a new CEO after a CEO turnover, they are more likely to appoint a better prepared and more reputable CEO. Overconfident boards are also more likely to select an overconfident CEO. We also find overconfident boards exacerbate the restrained use of debt when an overconfident CEO is present, and we find evidence that the association between CEO-directors and greater CEO pay is driven solely by overconfident CEO-directors on the board. This evidence indicates overconfident CEO-directors exhibit significant influence on the board and over the firm's CEO. In essay two, I analyze the CEO incentives of inside debt in the form of deferred equity compensation in the context of M & A decisions. CEO inside debt holdings are negatively associated with the likelihood of the firm engaging in an M & A. When firms with higher levels of CEO inside debt decide to engage in an acquisition, those acquisitions are non-diversifying, relatively smaller deals, and are paid using a greater portion of stock. The evidence indicates that inside debt incentivizes CEOs to make less risky decisions for the benefit of debt holders and at the expense of shareholders. In essay three, I analyze both CEO inside debt and firm debt jointly to further investigate compensation incentives of risky decision-making and the resulting financial policy decisions concerning the debt structure of the firm. I find larger firms with high CEO inside debt tend to diversify, as calculated by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of debt type usage. These types of firms use a higher percentage of term loans and other debt but a lower percentage of drawn credit lines and commercial loans. Larger firms with high CEO inside debt have lower interest rates on these debt instruments and shorter maturities, suggesting a more conservative financing policy with regards to debt.