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Essays On Executive Compensation And Firm Scope


Essays On Executive Compensation And Firm Scope
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Essays On Executive Compensation And Firm Scope


Essays On Executive Compensation And Firm Scope
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Author : Yuri Khoroshilov
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005

Essays On Executive Compensation And Firm Scope written by Yuri Khoroshilov and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with categories.




Essays On Executive Compensation And The Firm Performance


Essays On Executive Compensation And The Firm Performance
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Author : Scott D. Tracy
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1999

Essays On Executive Compensation And The Firm Performance written by Scott D. Tracy and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with categories.




Executive Compensation Empirical Essays On The Antecedents And The Consequences And The Role Of Executive Personality


Executive Compensation Empirical Essays On The Antecedents And The Consequences And The Role Of Executive Personality
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Author : Steffen Florian Burkert
language : en
Publisher: BoD – Books on Demand
Release Date : 2023-03-10

Executive Compensation Empirical Essays On The Antecedents And The Consequences And The Role Of Executive Personality written by Steffen Florian Burkert and has been published by BoD – Books on Demand this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2023-03-10 with Business & Economics categories.


Top managers have a significant impact on organizations because they are responsible for the formulation and implementation of corporate strategies, have the visibility and influence to shape the opinions of internal and external stakeholders, and coin the culture of their organizations, affecting employees at every level of the organization. Research has focused on the drivers and consequences of top managers' actions, with a particular focus on executive compensation, but important questions remain unanswered. This dissertation contributes to the literature on top executives by examining the antecedents of executive compensation, the influence of executive compensation on executive behavior, and the interplay of executive compensation and top executive personality. The first study introduces the role of compensation benchmarking for determining executive compensation to the management literature. It finds that benchmarking leads to compensation convergence. The second study examines the impact of executive compensation complexity on firm performance. The results show that compensation complexity is negatively related to accounting-based, market-based, and ESG-based metric of firm performance. The third study explores the implications of relative performance evaluation (RPE) on the imitation behavior of firms. It finds that the introduction of RPE is positively related to the imitation of the strategic actions of peer firms. The fourth study contributes to the growing literature on the impact of corporate social performance (CSP) goals in CEO contracts. Specifically, it examines how and when CSP incentives influence the CEO's attention to corporate social responsibility topics. The final essay examines the role of CEO personality; it finds that differences in CEO personality explain differences in the level of strategic conformity. Taken together, the essays in this dissertation make a significant contribution to the scholarly discourse on the influence of top managers on their companies. The empirical evidence presented expands the current understanding of how top executives affect strategic firm behaviors, and it provides insights for policymakers, managers, and investors.



Essays In Executive Compensation


Essays In Executive Compensation
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Author : Dan Zhang
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012

Essays In Executive Compensation written by Dan Zhang and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.




Three Essays On Executive Compensation


Three Essays On Executive Compensation
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Author : Vaibhav Sharma
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009

Three Essays On Executive Compensation written by Vaibhav Sharma and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.


Executive compensation and its potential importance in aligning shareholder and management interests has been an extensively researched area within corporate finance. This thesis studys executive compensation while addressing several unresolved issues in the literature. Essay one examines CEO compensation following spin-offs. The second essay studys changes in CEO salaries and their relation to firm performance. Essay three examines managerial decision horizons for target and acquirer firms in mergers and acquisitions.



Executive Compensation


Executive Compensation
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Author : Friedrich Kley
language : en
Publisher: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft
Release Date : 2017

Executive Compensation written by Friedrich Kley and has been published by Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017 with Chief executive officers categories.


The empirical analyses of data from large German public companies that are presented in this book show that the introduction of long-term orientated remuneration components for corporate executives increases their willingness to invest in riskier investment portfolios, at least in the short term. The study furthermore demonstrates that a payment model which emphasises equity-based remuneration elements is not sufficient to increase executives' long-term orientation. The results of the study's final analysis show that payment of executives in large German public companies has become more consistent across the board in recent years.



Research Handbook On Executive Pay


Research Handbook On Executive Pay
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Author : John S. Beasley
language : en
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Release Date : 2012-01-01

Research Handbook On Executive Pay written by John S. Beasley and has been published by Edward Elgar Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-01-01 with Business & Economics categories.


Research on executive compensation has exploded in recent years, and this volume of specially commissioned essays brings the reader up-to-date on all of the latest developments in the field. Leading corporate governance scholars from a range of countries set out their views on four main areas of executive compensation: the history and theory of executive compensation, the structure of executive pay, corporate governance and executive compensation, and international perspectives on executive pay. The authors analyze the two dominant theoretical approaches – managerial power theory and optimal contracting theory – and examine their impact on executive pay levels and the practices of concentrated and dispersed share ownership in corporations. The effectiveness of government regulation of executive pay and international executive pay practices in Australia, the US, Europe, China, India and Japan are also discussed. A timely study of a controversial topic, the Handbook will be an essential resource for students, scholars and practitioners of law, finance, business and accounting.



Two Essays On Executive Pay And Firm Performance


Two Essays On Executive Pay And Firm Performance
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Author : Phyllis Yolanda Keys
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1998

Two Essays On Executive Pay And Firm Performance written by Phyllis Yolanda Keys and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1998 with Chief executive officers categories.




Two Essays On Executive Pay And Firm Performance


Two Essays On Executive Pay And Firm Performance
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Author : Thuong Quang Nguyen
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012

Two Essays On Executive Pay And Firm Performance written by Thuong Quang Nguyen and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with Business enterprises categories.




Essays On Executive Compensation


Essays On Executive Compensation
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Author : Timothy C. Carpenter
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015

Essays On Executive Compensation written by Timothy C. Carpenter and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with Chief executive officers categories.


This dissertation examines the effects resultant from compensation committees' decisions on the structure and magnitude of executive compensation packages. Executive compensation has long been a contentious topic, both in the U.S. and abroad. Specifically, equity-based pay (eg. options and stock grants) has been increasing in popularity and met with mixed reactions. This form of remuneration aims to properly align the goals of executives with those of their shareholders; however, the use of equity based-pay tends to result in larger pay packages. Thus, the potential reasons for its recent popularity range from a forthright belief in its optimality to more Machiavellian motives. Moreover, incentive compensation has a number of secondary effects which must be accounted for, including effects on executive retention and accounting quality among many others. This line of research aims to improve our understanding of executive pay so compensation committees can better serve their shareholders by crafting more appropriate pay packages and better understanding the potential benefits and consequences therefrom. In Chapter One, I analyze the effect of cumulative wealth and unvested equity compensation on voluntary CEO turnover. I find that wealthier CEOs are less likely to retire or resign. This suggests that the CEO vetting process is able to sort out those individuals who would substitute high wealth for additional leisure. Consistent with Balsam and Miharjo (2007), CEOs with more unvested equity are significantly less likely to leave their position. However, I find that unvested equity is less effective as a retention device if the CEO has high existing wealth. In contrast to prior results, my results show no significant relation between existing CEO wealth and incentive compensation. In Chapter Two, I analyze the structure of compensation packages awarded in the United Kingdom compared to their U.S. counterparts. I consider the asymmetric relationship between CEO pay and firm performance in the U.S. and test for similar relations in the U.K. My findings confirm that asymmetry exists in the U.S. in that pay is more strongly associated with upside risk than downside risk. In contrast, U.K. CEO pay is more symmetrically associated with risk. Therefore, while U.S. CEOs face greater risk as a result of compensation with more equity-based pay, their pay to performance is asymmetrical. This suggests an additional component that risk-based arguments must consider before concluding that higher pay in the U.S. is structural and, thus, rational. Finally, in Chapter Three, I examine the effect of executive wealth on accounting quality. Results indicate that firms with wealthier CEOs are significantly more likely to restate earnings. To some extent this effect may be mitigated by compensation committees through the use of unvested compensation components, but this reduction is minimal. Firms with wealthier CEOs also exhibit greater levels of earnings management. Consistent with SEC auditors being aware of this, firms with wealthier CEOs are more likely to face an enforcement action, suggesting that these firms are both targeted and, ultimately, found in violation of accounting requirements. Chief Financial Officers' wealth shows a similar (and even stronger) relationship, increasing the likelihood of an earnings restatement as well as the magnitude of earnings management, but SEC enforcement actions do not reflect this relationship. My results suggest that SEC auditors may be able to improve governance by targeting firms that employ wealthy CFOs, and particularly those with recent large gains.