Essays In Theoretical Industrial Organization
DOWNLOAD
Download Essays In Theoretical Industrial Organization PDF/ePub or read online books in Mobi eBooks. Click Download or Read Online button to get Essays In Theoretical Industrial Organization book now. This website allows unlimited access to, at the time of writing, more than 1.5 million titles, including hundreds of thousands of titles in various foreign languages. If the content not found or just blank you must refresh this page
Essays In Theoretical Industrial Organization
DOWNLOAD
Author : Robert Henry Gertner
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1986
Essays In Theoretical Industrial Organization written by Robert Henry Gertner and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1986 with categories.
Essays In Theoretical Industrial Organization
DOWNLOAD
Author : Yosuke Yasuda
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Essays In Theoretical Industrial Organization written by Yosuke Yasuda and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
In the second chapter, we analyze how financial constraints affect equilibrium payoffs and behaviors in repeated Cournot games. Modifying minmax and feasible payoffs, we derive the folk theorem under financial constraints. Our theorem illustrates that introducing financial constraints shrinks the set of equilibrium payoffs in favor of a firm that has a larger financial budget. We also show that financial constraints can substantially restrict possible equilibrium behaviors. For instance, collusion in which firms equally divide a monopoly profit in each period, which is often assumed in applications in industrial organization, may not be sustained in any equilibrium.
Essays On Theoretical Industrial Organization
DOWNLOAD
Author : Jihwan Do
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2021
Essays On Theoretical Industrial Organization written by Jihwan Do and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021 with Industrial organization (Economic theory) categories.
"This dissertation is a collection of four papers theoretically studying industrial organization. In Chapter 1, I provide a theoretical explanation of "cheating and compensation on-path of play" using a canonical model of price-fixing collusion. The novel mechanism relies on firms playing mixed strategies allowing for coordination on monopoly price and price-cutting to happen with positive probability, together with a compensation scheme that punishes price-cutters. The mechanism is optimal in a restricted class of equilibria, and such price-cutting and compensation are necessary parts for any symmetric collusive equilibrium. In Chapter 2, I study an infinite-horizon oligopoly model in a network good market with segmented demands. In each period, three firms make compatibility decisions before engaging in price competition. The firm that made a sale in the last period provides a better quality of the product in terms of installed base customers, which can be shared with its competitors through compatibility. I show that compatibility can be used as an exclusionary device even though it intensifies short-run price competition when the firms are sufficiently patient. Under certain conditions, this is the only stable prediction with respect to a dynamic analogue of strong stability in network formation games (Dutta, 1997). In Chapter 3, which is jointly written with Jeanine Mikls̤-Thal, we propose a dynamic approach to modeling opportunism in bilateral vertical contracting between an upstream monopolist and competing downstream firms. Unlike previous literature on opportunism which has focused on games in which the upstream firm makes simultaneous secret offers to the downstream firms, we model opportunism as a consequence of asynchronous recontracting in an infinite-horizon continuous-time model. We find that the extent of opportunism depends on the absolute and relative reaction speeds of the different bilateral upstream-downstream firm pairs and on the firms' discount rate. Patience, fast reaction speeds, and asymmetries in reaction speeds across upstream-downstream pairs are shown to alleviate the opportunism problem. In Chapter 4, which is jointly written with Yu Awaya, we study a moral hazard problem when an employer evaluates employees' performances only through peers - subjective peer evaluation - and cannot discriminate employees' wages ex-post. More precisely, each employee privately chooses effort level, which generates private signals received by his peers. The employer solicits peer evaluations, which are not verifiable. The wage must be equal across workers. We show that the employer can still provide incentives to put effort if signals are correlated, and higher efforts lead to higher correlation."--Pages viii-ix.
Essays In Theoretical Industrial Organization
DOWNLOAD
Author : Fabian Griem
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2021
Essays In Theoretical Industrial Organization written by Fabian Griem and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021 with categories.
Empirical Studies In Industrial Organization
DOWNLOAD
Author : David B. Audretsch
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2012-12-06
Empirical Studies In Industrial Organization written by David B. Audretsch and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-12-06 with Business & Economics categories.
Empirical Studies in Industrial Organization brings together leading scholars who present state-of-the-art research in the spirit of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm embodied in the work of Leonard W. Weiss. The individual chapters are generally empirically or public policy oriented. A number of them introduce new sources of data that, combined with the application of appropriate econometric techniques, enable new breakthroughs and insights on issues hotly debated in the industrial organization literature. For example, five of the chapters are devoted towards uncovering the link between market concentration and pricing behavior. While theoretical models have produced ambiguous predictions concerning the relationship between concentration and price these chapters, which span a number of different markets and situations, provide unequivocal evidence that a high level of market concentration tends to result in a higher level of prices. Three of the chapters explore the impact of market structure on production efficiency, and three other chapters focus on the role of industrial organization on public policy. Contributors include David B. Audretsch, Richard E. Caves, Mark J. Roberts, F.M. Scherer, John J. Siegfried and Hideki Yamawaki.
Essays On Theoretical Industrial Organization
DOWNLOAD
Author : Sangwoo Choi
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2021
Essays On Theoretical Industrial Organization written by Sangwoo Choi and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021 with categories.
This dissertation consists of three chapters in theoretical industrial organization with focus on consumer search and strategic firm behavior. More precisely, we study strategic firm behavior in an environment where an imperfectly informed consumer searches for sellers to buy a product from. Each chapter considers a distinct strategy for firms: implementing a product return policy, disclosing information about the product, and choosing product design. In the first chapter, we study how the presence of a monopoly platform affects the return fee in online retail markets. Specifically, we ask whether a monopoly platform has an incentive to set the return fee below the cost of processing returns. A seller on the platform can reduce their cost of returns by outsourcing some of the return process to the platform itself. By absorbing some of the expense of the return process, the platform requires sellers to set the return fee at a level determined by the platform. The platform charges each member seller a lump sum fee which makes them indifferent between joining the platform and selling directly to consumers. The main result compares equilibrium return fees in two different market settings: with a monopoly platform, and without a monopoly platform. Sellers without the platform compete with each other on return fees as well as on product prices, and thus lower their return fees to attract consumers. However, the sellers' incentive to recoup the cost of returns dominates the effect of competition. As a result, the competitive return fee without the platform is higher than the marginal cost of processing returns, which would be the socially optimal return fee. The platform internalizes the competition on return fee between the sellers, and imposes an even higher return fee on the sellers than the competitive one. There are two main takeaways from this result: first, the current trend of ``easy returns" is inconsistent with a monopoly platform maximizing profits in the short-run. Second, by setting a higher return fee, a monopoly platform decreases both consumer and social welfare compared to the market without a monopoly platform. The second chapter examines how a seller's ability to reveal product match information affects equilibrium price and welfare in a duopoly market. Without any product information provided, a consumer must search for and check a product before buying it. Revealing pre-search information allows a seller to segment a market into two parts: consumers who are matched to the revealing seller, and those who are not. We characterize conditions when the equilibrium prices feature an inverted U-shape in search cost for both sellers who reveal and sellers who don't. We also discuss the welfare consequences of three different information disclosure rules: voluntary disclosure, mandatory disclosure, and mandatory concealment. Under a mandatory disclosure rule, social waste from excessive search and mismatch is minimized, but the inefficiency caused by under-provision through an increased equilibrium price is maximized. In contrast, under a mandatory concealment rule, social waste from excessive search and mismatch is maximized. However, a consumer may be better off under a mandatory concealment rule due to a lower equilibrium price. The third chapter studies the effect of ``prominence" on sellers' optimal product design decisions when a consumer must visit each seller in order to learn the cost and matching value of their product, while incurring search costs in the process. Consumers first search for prominent sellers with no recall, and then search for infinitely many “non-prominent” sellers. When the quality distribution of a prominent seller is identical to that of a non-prominent seller, the optimal product design and the optimal price of a seller is unaffected by whether the seller is prominent or not. In other words, all of the sellers share a common quality threshold, above which a seller chooses broad product design, and below which a seller chooses niche product design. We show that the quality threshold of a prominent seller increases when a prominent seller is from a ``better" quality distribution. Improved quality distribution makes a consumer pickier when searching for a prominent seller, which in turn makes the competition more intense in the market. With a higher level competition, only a seller with a higher quality can survive in a market of broad design products
Essays In Industrial Organization
DOWNLOAD
Author : Claudio Antonio Giuseppe Piga
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2000
Essays In Industrial Organization written by Claudio Antonio Giuseppe Piga and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2000 with categories.
Three Essays On Theoretical Industrial Organization
DOWNLOAD
Author : Fang Liu
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2023
Three Essays On Theoretical Industrial Organization written by Fang Liu and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2023 with categories.
Two Essays In Industrial Organization Theory
DOWNLOAD
Author : Yuet-Chang Joseph Lin
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1986
Two Essays In Industrial Organization Theory written by Yuet-Chang Joseph Lin and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1986 with categories.
Three Essays In The Theory Of Industrial Organization
DOWNLOAD
Author : Philippe M. Aghion
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1987
Three Essays In The Theory Of Industrial Organization written by Philippe M. Aghion and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1987 with Industrial organization (Economic theory) categories.