Essays On Auction Theory
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Essays On Auction Theory
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003
Essays On Auction Theory written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.
Partnerships Signaling And Contests
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Author : Cédric Wasser
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010
Partnerships Signaling And Contests written by Cédric Wasser and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with categories.
Essays On Auction Theory
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Author : Hongjun Zhong
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005
Essays On Auction Theory written by Hongjun Zhong and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with Auctions categories.
Essays On Auction Theory
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Author : Justin Ellis Burkett
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012
Essays On Auction Theory written by Justin Ellis Burkett and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.
Three Essays On Auction Theory
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Author : Xiaoshu Xu
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Three Essays On Auction Theory written by Xiaoshu Xu and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
Abstract: My dissertation consists of three chapters in theoretical auction analysis. The first chapter considers optimal sequential auctions with new bidders arriving in each period. The second chapter examines how resale affects bidding strategies and auction outcomes in an auction environment with costly entry. The third chapter investigates how resale affects bidding strategies and auction outcomes in a sequential auction setting where the values of items auctioned in different periods exhibit synergies. The first chapter gives a full characterization of the optimal sequential second-price (or ascending English) auctions with sequentially arriving bidders. There are n bidders in the first period and m new bidders arrive in the second period. Based on the auctioneer's commitment power, we study two cases: full commitment and noncommitment. In both cases, we establish the existence of a symmetric equilibrium characterized by a threshold strategy - -a bidder does not bid in the first auction when her valuation is below this threshold and bids according to an increasing function otherwise. In the noncommitment case, the auctioneer chooses an optimal reserve price to maximize the expected revenue from the second period; thus her decision of whether to include previous bidders as potential buyers is endogenously determined by the reserve price in the first auction. This might create multiple equilibria depending on the beliefs of the auctioneer and the bidders. We apply a fairly intuitive rule to establish the uniqueness. We also extend our analysis to allow for opportunities for resale, where the winner in the first auction can opt to resell the item to new bidders. The second chapter, joint with Dan Levin and Lixin Ye, studies how resale affects auctions with costly entry in a model where an arbitrary number of bidders possess two-dimensional private information signals: entry costs and valuations. We establish the existence of symmetric entry equilibrium and identify sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. Our analysis suggests that the opportunity of resale induces motivation for both speculative entry and bargain hunting abstentions. By following the uniform distribution for numerical analysis, our results suggest that while the entry probability and efficiency are always higher when resale is allowed, the auctioneer's expected revenue is lower when resale is allowed for almost all parameter values. We also compare this model to one where bidders may follow "strong" or "weak" distributions in terms of valuations. The third chapter, joint with Dan Levin and Lixin Ye, studies a sequential second-price auction of two objects with two bidders, where the winner of the package obtains a synergy from the second object. If reselling after the two auctions occurs, it proceeds as either monopoly or monopsony take-it-or-leave-it offer. I find that a post-auction resale has a significant impact on bidding strategies in the auctions. When seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer in resale, there is no equilibrium where at least one bidder reveals her type with positive probability. When buyer makes the offer instead, there exist symmetric increasing equilibrium strategies for both items. While allowing resale always improves efficiency, I demonstrate that the effect of resale is ambiguous on expected revenue as Ill as the probability of exposure. I also extend this model to allow for three bidders and provide the equilibrium analysis.
Sponsored Search And Sequential Auctions
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Author : Emmanuel Lorenzon
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Sponsored Search And Sequential Auctions written by Emmanuel Lorenzon and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.
This thesis is a collection of three essays in theoretical auction analysis. Chapter 1 considersbid delegation in the GSP auction mechanism. In a game involving side-contracts and a compensationpolicy set by an agency, the first-best collusive outcome is achieved. We offer a characterization of the implementablebid profiles for the two-position game with three players. Chapter 2 considers the sequentialsale of an object to two buyers: one knows his private information and the other buyer does not. Buyershave a multi-unit demand and private valuations for each unit are perfectly correlated. An asymmetricequilibrium exists when the uninformed player adopts an aggressive bidding strategy. Conversely, hisinformed opponent behaves more conservatively by using bid shading. The bidding behaviour of theuninformed bidder is driven by the opportunity to learn his private valuation for free. This dynamic is atthe root of the decline in the equilibrium price across both sales. In chapter 3, information is observableduring the first-stage auction in a sequential-move game in which the first-mover bidder is observed byhis opponent. A separating equilibrium exists in which the informed bidder bids aggressively when he isthe first-mover which entails a non-participation strategy from his uninformed competitor. Conversely,the latter adopts a conservative behaviour when he is the first-mover. A pooling equilibrium in which theinformed bidder blurs his valuation can only exist if his uninformed opponent adopts a non-participatingstrategy.
Essays In Auction Theory
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Author : Gustavo Eduardo Rodriguez
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1994
Essays In Auction Theory written by Gustavo Eduardo Rodriguez and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1994 with categories.
Essays On Auction Theory
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Essays On Auction Theory written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
Essays On Market Design And Auction Theory
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Author : Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Essays On Market Design And Auction Theory written by Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
This dissertation consists of three essays on market design and auction theory. In Chapter 1, I introduce new multidimensional auction mechanisms. In many auctions, because of externalities, each bidder has a different maximum willingness to pay in order to beat each specific competitor, which causes the following new problem. When there are three bidders, two bidders might compete against each other unnecessarily and have worse payoffs than if they had lost to the third bidder, i.e., the two bidders have "group winner regret, " which can also lead to inefficiency. While no one-dimensional-bid mechanism is efficient, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) may require losers to pay. This paper introduces a novel mechanism, the "multidimensional second-price" (MSP) auction (and its open ascending version), and characterizes it. MSP is free of a loser's payment, pairwise stable, and has good incentive properties, including no group winner regret. Moreover, the winner cannot win at any different price by any misreport, and a loser cannot be better off winning by any misreport. MSP is strategyproof for a bidder without externalities imposed by others, and it reduces to the second-price auction when there are no externalities. Simulations suggest that MSP outperforms the second-price auction in terms of both revenue and efficiency. In Chapter 2, I study properties of VCG when externalities exist, and introduce shill bidding strategies that weakly dominate truthful bidding. When externalities exist, VCG is efficient, incentive compatible, and individually rational. However, as occurs in package auctions without externalities, VCG outcomes may not be in the core. Moreover, VCG is not pairwise stable. Due to externalities, several additional problems occur. VCG may require losing bidders to pay, which might be undesirable. Also, it might be budget infeasible, and the auctioneer might need to pay the winner a subsidy. The subsidy problem can occur even when all bids are positive. Furthermore, unlike package auctions without externalities, there exists a shill bidding strategy that weakly dominates truthful bidding. In addition, when this shill bidding is used, there is no Nash equilibrium. Each bidder is better off using an infinite number of shills, which eventually makes VCG undefined. In Chapter 3, I study properties of VCG in the advertising auction setting. Even though VCG is incentive compatible (IC) in the advertising auction setting, the actual implementation of VCG in practice is not VCG per se. The main reason is that the price needs to be determined when the billing event happens at the same time as the estimation of click-through rate (CTR) or position discount (PD) is occurring. After all, advertising auctions charge the estimate of externalities. However, even in this "estimated" VCG (eVCG), CTR miscalibration does not ruin IC. Even when PD miscalibration exists, IC still holds with "perfect competition." Regarding efficiency and revenue, both CTR and PD miscalibrations matter. Interestingly, however, the revenue of the auctioneer does not necessarily decrease by underbidding.
Essays In Auction Theory
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Author : Emiel Maasland
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012
Essays In Auction Theory written by Emiel Maasland and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.