Essays On Dynamic Mechanism Design
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Essays On Dynamic Mechanism Design
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Author : Konrad Mierendorff
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010
Essays On Dynamic Mechanism Design written by Konrad Mierendorff and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with categories.
Essays On Dynamic Mechanism Design
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Author : Anqi Li
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012
Essays On Dynamic Mechanism Design written by Anqi Li and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.
This dissertation advocates dynamic mechanism design as a useful tool to tackle theoretical challenges in microeconomics and to solve real world institutional design problems. It is composed of two chapters. In the first chapter, I study durable goods sales with a dynamic population of buyers. My contribution is to devise a Multi-round Simultaneous Ascending Auction with Generalized Reserve Price (MSAAGR) to implement the efficient allocation, and to contrast MSAAGR with the standard uniform price auction to highlight the implication of population dynamics on the design of trading platforms. In the second chapter, I estalibsh the possibility of sustaining long-term cooperation in infinitely repeated private monitoring games with scarce signals. My contribution is to construct a novel Budget Mechanism with Cross-Checking (BMCC) which, by linking players' action choices over time, virtually implements the efficient outcome with a vanishing incentive cost as the horizon of the game grows and the players become increasingly patient.
Essays On Dynamic Mechanism Design
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Author : Heng Liu
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Essays On Dynamic Mechanism Design written by Heng Liu and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with Commercial treaties categories.
This dissertation is a collection of two papers studying both the theoretical and the applied aspects of dynamic mechanism design. In Chapter 1, we address the problem of implementing socially efficient allocations in dynamic environments with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. In the case where the agents' information is correlated across time, we construct efficient and incentive compatible direct dynamic mechanisms. Unlike the mechanisms with history-independent transfers in the existing literature, these mechanisms feature history-dependent transfers. Moreover, they are reminiscent of the classical VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism, even though the latter is not incentive compatible with interdependent valuations. In settings where agents' private information evolves independently, we construct the dynamic counterpart of the generalized VCG mechanism in one-dimensional environments. In Chapter 2, we study the problem of designing efficient trade agreements when countries involved in trade can use "disguised protections" in the form of domestic policies. We take a dynamic mechanism design approach to examine the interaction between trade and domestic policies. In particular, we show that allowing countries to make transfers can solve the incentive problems associated with private information. However, due to lack of commitment, these transfers may or may not be self-enforcing, depending on the persistence countries' private information. Our results indicate the possibility for WTO to improve the existing trade agreements through financial transfers.
Essays On Sequential Auctions And Dynamic Mechanism Design
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Author : Maher Riyad Said
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009
Essays On Sequential Auctions And Dynamic Mechanism Design written by Maher Riyad Said and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.
Essays On Dynamic Games And Mechanism Design
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Author : Ruitian Lang
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
Essays On Dynamic Games And Mechanism Design written by Ruitian Lang and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
The dissertation considers three topics in dynamic games and mechanism design. In both problems, asymmetric information causes inefficiency in production and allocation. The first chapter considers the inefficiency from the principal's inability to observes the agent's effort or cost of effort, and explores its implication to the principal's response to the combination of the output and the signal about the cost of effort. For example, the principal may punish the agent more harshly for low output when signals suggest that cost of effort is high when the effort is of high value for the principal. This chapter also classifies the long-run behavior of the relationship between the principal and the agent. Depending on whether the agent is strictly risk-averse and whether he is protected by limited liability, the state of the relationship may or may not converge to a stationary state and the stationary state may nor may not depend on the initial condition. The second chapter considers the re-allocation of assets among entrepreneurs with different matching qualities, which contributes to the growth of the whole economy. Due to reasons that are not explicitly modeled, assets are not automatically allocated to entrepreneurs who are best at operating them from the beginning, and this inefficiency is combined with inefficiency in the asset market and potential imperfection of labor contracting. When asset re-allocation can become a main source of economic growth, this chapter argues that imperfection in the labor contracting environment may boost the economic growth. The third chapter assumes that the agent's output is contractible but he can privately acquire more information about his cost of production prior to contracting. Compared to the optimal screening contract, the principal's contract in this case must not only induce the agent to "tell the truth", but also to give the agent the incentive to acquire appropriate amount of information. This may create distortion of allocation to the most efficient type and whether this happens is related to the marginal loss incurred by the principal from the cost of information acquisition.
Essays On Information In Dynamic Games And Mechanism Design
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Author : Daehyun Kim
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Essays On Information In Dynamic Games And Mechanism Design written by Daehyun Kim and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.
This dissertation studies how asymmetric information between economic agents interacts with their incentive in dynamic games and mechanism design. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 study this in mechanism design, especially focusing on robustness of mechanisms when a mechanism designer's knowledge on agents' belief and higher order beliefs is not perfect. In Chapter 1 we introduce a novel robustness notion into mechanism design, which we term confident implementation; and characterize confidently implementable social choice correspondences. In Chapter 2, we introduce another robust notion, p-dominant implementation where p [0, 1]N and N N is the number of agents, and fully characterize p-dominant implementable allocations in the quasilinear environment. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 are related in the following way: for some range of p, a p-dominant implementable social choice correspondence is confidently implementable. In Chapter 3, we study information disclosure problem to manage reputation. To study this, we consider a repeated game in which there are a long-run player and a stream of short-run players; and the long-run player has private information about her type, which is either commitment or normal. We assume that the shot-run player only can observe the past K N periods of information disclosed by the long-run player. In this environment, we characterize the information disclosure behavior of the long-run player and also equilibrium dynamics whose shape critically depends on the prior.
Essays In Optimal Taxation And Dynamic Mechanism Design
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Author : Luigi Balletta
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010
Essays In Optimal Taxation And Dynamic Mechanism Design written by Luigi Balletta and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with categories.
Essays In Optimal Taxation And Dynamic Mechanism Design
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Author : Luigi Balletta
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010
Essays In Optimal Taxation And Dynamic Mechanism Design written by Luigi Balletta and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with categories.
Essays In Mechanism Design
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Author : Weixin Chen (Researcher in microeconomic theory)
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2020
Essays In Mechanism Design written by Weixin Chen (Researcher in microeconomic theory) and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2020 with categories.
This thesis consists of three papers in mechanism design. Chapter 1 is based on a paper of mine entitled "Quality Disclosure and Price Discrimination". Chapter 2 is based on "Penalty, Voting, and Collusion: a Common Agency Approach to Industrial Regulation and Political Power". Chapter 3 is based on "Partitional Information Revelation under Renegotiation". A key framework in mechanism design is screening: a principal who designs the contract induces agents with private information to select certain action(s) or bundle(s). Classical results are second-best distortion and Myerson ironing, which are derived when the agency involves a single task (or tasks independent across agents), an agent's information is privately known by himself, and there is full commitment. Chapter 1 considers incentivizing tasks that are related through a resource constraint. It studies the second-degree price discrimination when the supply quality follows some exogenous distribution, or more specifically, the design of information and pricing in a monopolistic market with product quality dispersion. The main message is that optimality requires a partial disclosure, and finer results on the allocation distortion depend on the heterogeneity of the buyers' preference. When such preference over assignment, i.e., quality distribution, has a uni-dimensional sufficient statistics in the quality space, the optimal distortion resembles Myerson's ironing and the optimal disclosure takes a partitional form. For more general preference, the optimal distortion departs from Myerson's result. Chapter 2 considers eliciting signals informative of the agent's private information from multiple sources. An interesting case is by considering a voting committee as the principal, where voting aggregates welfare-relevant information but faces corruptive incentives. The key insights are that the optimal rule is a binary verdict, resembling the principle of maximum deterrence, and the corruptive incentives typically push the optimal voting rule towards unanimity. Chapter 3 considers commitment with renegotiation: the counterparties can stick to the previously signed long-term contract or revise it with mutual consent. More specifically, it studies a long-term relationship between a seller and a buyer whose valuation (for a per-period service or a rental good) is private. In such a dynamic game, a new dimension of mechanism design, namely intertemporal type separation, arises as its induced belief-updating affects the rent extraction--efficiency tradeoff. The main message is that all PBE share the following property in the progressive screening process: at each history, the seller partitions the posterior support into countable intervals and offers a pooling contract to each of these intervals.
Essays In Mechanism Design
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Author : Frank Rosar
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Essays In Mechanism Design written by Frank Rosar and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.