Essays On Information Disclosure In Auctions And Monopoly Pricing
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Essays On Information Disclosure In Auctions And Monopoly Pricing
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Author : Zhiyun Li
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Essays On Information Disclosure In Auctions And Monopoly Pricing written by Zhiyun Li and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with Auctions categories.
Essays On Information Disclosure In Auctions And Contests
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Author : Thomas Rieck
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Essays On Information Disclosure In Auctions And Contests written by Thomas Rieck and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
Optimal Information Disclosure In Auctions
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Author : Dirk Bergemann
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2022
Optimal Information Disclosure In Auctions written by Dirk Bergemann and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2022 with Auctions categories.
We characterize the revenue-maximizing information structure in the second price auction. The seller faces a classic economic trade-off: providing more information improves the efficiency of the allocation but also creates higher information rents for bidders. The information disclosure policy that maximizes the revenue of the seller is to fully reveal low values (where competition will be high) but to pool high values (where competition will be low). The size of the pool is determined by a critical quantile that is independent of the distribution of values and only dependent on the number of bidders. We discuss how this policy provides a rationale for conflation in digital advertising.
Essays On The Economics Of Information In Auctions
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Author : Helen C. Knudsen
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009
Essays On The Economics Of Information In Auctions written by Helen C. Knudsen and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.
Essays On Value Distributions In All Pay Auctions
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Author : Suat Akbulut
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2021
Essays On Value Distributions In All Pay Auctions written by Suat Akbulut and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021 with categories.
This dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter studies the value distribution adoption choice of a player when she competes against an incumbent in an all-pay auction setting. The second chapter analyzes how much would a player like to learn about her own valuation in a similar setting. Lastly, the third chapter analyzes the best information disclosure policy that an auctioneer can adopt according to different performance measures in a two-player two-stage all-pay auction setting, where the players choose their value distributions in the first stage. The first chapter considers a two-player all-pay auction setting and modifies it by adding a technology-adoption stage at the beginning of the game. In a discrete valuations environment, assuming one player's valuation is common knowledge, we allow the other player (informed) to pick a distribution over the valuation space. Her opponent (uninformed) observes her choice of distribution. However, her valuation is privately drawn according to this distribution. The two players then play an asymmetric all-pay auction. We show that in such a setting, the informed player adopts a distribution that assigns positive probabilities to at most two elements; that will always contain the supremum, and sometimes, the infimum of the set of available values. She pools the extreme values in order to create an information asymmetry, which then would make the uninformed player bid less aggressively. We later impose a mean condition on the distribution that the informed player could pick and observe that she still prefers to split the probability mass on in-between values to the extreme ones. As a result, she picks the same support but arranges the probability mass on these values to meet the mean condition. In other words, the informed player is first interested in including only the extreme values in the support of her value distribution, and then the probabilities assigned to those values. The second chapter assumes that the informed player's value distribution is common knowledge and that she cannot observe her realized value. However, she can acquire additional information about her realized value by adopting a learning experiment. She picks such an experiment in the first stage. Even though her choice of experiment is observed by the uninformed player, she privately learns the realization of the experiment. Then, they play an all-pay auction in the second stage of the game. Every learning experiment induces a posterior probability distribution over the convex hull of the set of available values. The informed player bids as if her value is drawn from this posterior distribution, where she privately observes her value. Therefore, her problem boils down to choosing a posterior distribution that stochastically dominates the prior in the second-order sense. We show that the informed player's motivation to split the probability mass on in-between types to the extreme types is still present. However, due to the distributional constraints, she will pick a fully informative experiment to learn her value as long as it does not result in her two lowest values bidding zero with a positive probability in the equilibrium of the all-pay auction stage. If that is the case, she would try to mimic the prior distribution for the high types, who will never bid zero, and allocate the remaining probability to only one type to meet the constraint. One natural extension of our analysis is studying the equilibrium value distribution profiles when both players are choosing their own value distribution. When the possible values are only high and low, we show that the profile in which one player picks the high value with probability one while the other player assigns probability half to each values is the unique (up to symmetry) value distribution profile. Moreover, when we consider any set of values, we show that the profile in which one player picks the highest value with probability one, while the other player assigns probability half to the highest and the lowest values each is an equilibrium value distribution profile. Due to the lack of an analytical approach to the equilibrium bidding distributions of the all-pay auctions in an asymmetric information environment, checking whether this equilibrium is unique is left as future work. The last chapter analyzes the best information disclosure policy that an auctioneer can adopt according to different performance measures, namely players' payoff, prize allocation efficiency, and aggregate effort. The significant contribution of the analysis is that players have the ability to choose the distribution from which their own types are drawn. Using a two-player all-pay auction with the two-type setting, we show that the optimal disclosure policy depends on the ratio of the value of winning for a low type to the value of winning for a high type.
On Monopoly Pricing
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Author : Marco A. Haan
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1998
On Monopoly Pricing written by Marco A. Haan and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1998 with categories.
Sequential Information Disclosure In Auctions
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Author : Dirk Bergemann
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Sequential Information Disclosure In Auctions written by Dirk Bergemann and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.
We consider the design of an optimal auction in which the seller can determine the allocation and the disclosure rule of the mechanism. Thus, in contrast to the standard analysis of a optimal auctions, the seller can explicitly design the disclosure of the information received by each bidder as his private information.We show that the optimal disclosure rule is a sequential disclosure rule, implemented in an ascending price auction. In the optimal disclosure mechanism, each losing bidder learns his true valuation, but the winning bidder only learns that his valuation is sufficiently high to win the auction. We show that in the optimal auction, the posterior incentive and participation constraints of all the bidders are satisfied. In the special case in which the bidders have no private information initially, the seller can extract the entire surplus.
A Primer On Auction Design Management And Strategy
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Author : David J. Salant
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date : 2014-12-19
A Primer On Auction Design Management And Strategy written by David J. Salant and has been published by MIT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-12-19 with Business & Economics categories.
A guide to modeling and analyzing auctions, with the applications of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction decision making. Auctions are highly structured market transactions primarily used in thin markets (markets with few participants and infrequent transactions). In auctions, unlike most other markets, offers and counteroffers are typically made within a structure defined by a set of rigid and comprehensive rules. Because auctions are essentially complex negotiations that occur within a fully defined and rigid set of rules, they can be analyzed by game theoretic models more accurately and completely than can most other types of market transactions. This book offers a guide for modeling, analyzing, and predicting the outcomes of auctions, focusing on the application of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction design and decision making. After a brief introduction to fundamental concepts from game theory, the book explains some of the more significant results from the auction theory literature, including the revenue (or payoff) equivalence theorem, the winner's curse, and optimal auction design. Chapters on auction practice follow, addressing collusion, competition, information disclosure, and other basic principles of auction management, with some discussion of auction experiments and simulations. Finally, the book covers auction experience, with most of the discussion centered on energy and telecommunications auctions, which have become the proving ground for many new auction designs. A clear and concise introduction to auctions, auction design, and auction strategy, this Primer will be an essential resource for students, researchers, and practitioners.
Economic Analysis Of Information And Contracts
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Author : Gerald A. Feltham
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2012-12-06
Economic Analysis Of Information And Contracts written by Gerald A. Feltham and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-12-06 with Business & Economics categories.
The three coeditors knew John Butterworth for many years and had worked closely with him on a number of research projects. We respected him as a valuable colleague and friend. We were greatly saddened by his untimely death. This book is an attempt to remember him. We dedicate the volume to John with thanks for the contributions he made to our research, to the Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration at the University of British Columbia, and to the accounting profession. This volume contains twelve invited papers on the general topic of the economic theory of information and contracts. We asked leading scholars who had known John to contribute papers. The response was very gratifying. The authors provided us with new strong research papers that should make a lasting contribution to the accounting and information economics research literature, and make us all proud to have put this volume together. The research papers in the volume are in three sections: information evaluation in multi person conte)l:ts; contracting in agencies under moral hazard; and contracting in agencies with private information. We begin part I with Jerry Feltham's review of John Butterworth's pioneering contributions to the accounting and information economics literature. This is followed by an introduction to the papers in the volume and the papers themselves.
The Theory Of Corporate Finance
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Author : Jean Tirole
language : en
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Release Date : 2010-08-26
The Theory Of Corporate Finance written by Jean Tirole and has been published by Princeton University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010-08-26 with Business & Economics categories.
"Magnificent."—The Economist From the Nobel Prize–winning economist, a groundbreaking and comprehensive account of corporate finance Recent decades have seen great theoretical and empirical advances in the field of corporate finance. Whereas once the subject addressed mainly the financing of corporations—equity, debt, and valuation—today it also embraces crucial issues of governance, liquidity, risk management, relationships between banks and corporations, and the macroeconomic impact of corporations. However, this progress has left in its wake a jumbled array of concepts and models that students are often hard put to make sense of. Here, one of the world's leading economists offers a lucid, unified, and comprehensive introduction to modern corporate finance theory. Jean Tirole builds his landmark book around a single model, using an incentive or contract theory approach. Filling a major gap in the field, The Theory of Corporate Finance is an indispensable resource for graduate and advanced undergraduate students as well as researchers of corporate finance, industrial organization, political economy, development, and macroeconomics. Tirole conveys the organizing principles that structure the analysis of today's key management and public policy issues, such as the reform of corporate governance and auditing; the role of private equity, financial markets, and takeovers; the efficient determination of leverage, dividends, liquidity, and risk management; and the design of managerial incentive packages. He weaves empirical studies into the book's theoretical analysis. And he places the corporation in its broader environment, both microeconomic and macroeconomic, and examines the two-way interaction between the corporate environment and institutions. Setting a new milestone in the field, The Theory of Corporate Finance will be the authoritative text for years to come.