Essays On Information Disclosure In Auctions And Contests
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Essays On Information Disclosure In Auctions And Contests
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Author : Thomas Rieck
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Essays On Information Disclosure In Auctions And Contests written by Thomas Rieck and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
Essays On Information Disclosure And Auction Theory
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Author : Shota Ichihashi
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2018
Essays On Information Disclosure And Auction Theory written by Shota Ichihashi and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018 with categories.
This dissertation consists of three essays on information economics and auction theory. The first chapter studies the question of what information consumers should disclose to firms. A consumer discloses information to a multi-product firm, which learns about his preferences, sets prices, and makes product recommendations. While the consumer benefits from disclosure as it enables the firm to make accurate recommendations, the firm may use the information to price discriminate. I show that the firm prefers to commit to not price discriminate, which encourages the consumer to provide information that is useful for product recommendations. However, nondiscriminatory pricing hurts the consumer, who would be better off by precommitting to withhold some information. In contrast to single-product models, equilibrium is typically inefficient even if the consumer can disclose any information about his preferences. The second chapter studies the problem of restricting the information available to the sender in a game of strategic communication. Assuming that the receiver has a binary choice, I characterize the "optimal information restriction, " which maximizes the equilibrium payoff of the receiver among all the information restrictions for the sender. The final chapter studies the optimal timing of an auction in a setting where bidders arrive and depart stochastically over time. First, we compare the revenue-maximizing timing and welfare-maximizing timing. We show that sellers hold auctions too late or too early whenever (censored at 0) virtual values are more or less right-skewed than values. In particular, we show that sellers typically hold auctions inefficiently late. Second, we prove that the use of simple timing rules (i.e., a fixed deadline chosen in advance) can lose an arbitrarily large fraction of the revenue from the optimal stopping rule.
Essays On Information Disclosure In Auctions And Monopoly Pricing
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Author : Zhiyun Li
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Essays On Information Disclosure In Auctions And Monopoly Pricing written by Zhiyun Li and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with Auctions categories.
Three Essays In Auctions And Contests
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Author : Jun Zhang
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010
Three Essays In Auctions And Contests written by Jun Zhang and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with categories.
This thesis studies issues in auctions and contests. The seller of an object and the organizer of a contest have many instruments to improve the revenue of the auction or the efficiency of the contest. The three essays in this dissertation shed light on these issues. Chapter 2 investigates how a refund policy affects a buyer's strategic behavior by characterizing the equilibria of a second-price auction with a linear refund policy. I find that a generous refund policy induces buyers to bid aggressively. I also examine the optimal mechanism design problem when buyers only have private initial estimates of their valuations and may privately learn of shocks that affect their valuations later. When all buyers are \emph{ex-ante} symmetric, this optimal selling mechanism can be implemented by a first-price or second-price auction with a refund policy. Chapter 3 investigates how information revelation rules affect the existence and the efficiency of equilibria in two-round elimination contests. I establish that there exists no symmetric separating equilibrium under the full revelation rule and find that the non-existence result is very robust. I then characterize a partially efficient separating equilibrium under the partial revelation rule when players' valuations are uniformly distributed. I finally investigate the no revelation rule and find that it is both most efficient and optimal in maximizing the total efforts from the contestants. Within my framework, more information revelation leads to less efficient outcomes. Chapter 4 analyzes the signaling effect of bidding in a two-round elimination contest. Before the final round, bids in the preliminary round are revealed and act as signals of the contestants' private valuations. Compared to the benchmark model, in which private valuations are revealed automatically before the final round and thus no signaling of bids takes place, I find that strong contestants bluff and weak contestants sandbag. In a separating equilibrium, bids in the preliminary round fully reveal the contestants' private valuations. However, this signaling effect makes the equilibrium bidding strategy in the preliminary round steeper for high valuations and flatter for low valuations compared to the benchmark model.
Optimal Information Disclosure In Auctions
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Author : Dirk Bergemann
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2022
Optimal Information Disclosure In Auctions written by Dirk Bergemann and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2022 with Auctions categories.
We characterize the revenue-maximizing information structure in the second price auction. The seller faces a classic economic trade-off: providing more information improves the efficiency of the allocation but also creates higher information rents for bidders. The information disclosure policy that maximizes the revenue of the seller is to fully reveal low values (where competition will be high) but to pool high values (where competition will be low). The size of the pool is determined by a critical quantile that is independent of the distribution of values and only dependent on the number of bidders. We discuss how this policy provides a rationale for conflation in digital advertising.
Essays On The Structural Analysis Of Auctions
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Author : Ying Zheng
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2018
Essays On The Structural Analysis Of Auctions written by Ying Zheng and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018 with Electronic dissertations categories.
Essays On Auctions Contests And Games
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Author : Vivek Bhattacharya
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2017
Essays On Auctions Contests And Games written by Vivek Bhattacharya and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017 with categories.
This thesis consists of three chapters broadly in industrial organization, with a focus on contests and auctions, and game theory. Chapter 1 develops a new model of multistage R&D procurement contests, in which firms conduct research over a number of stages to develop an innovative product and then supply it to a procurer. I show that the primitives of this model-the cost of research, the distributions of project values and delivery costs, and the share of the profits captured by the firms-are non parametrically identified given data on R&D expenditures and procurement contract amounts. I then develop a tractable estimation procedure and apply it to data from the Small Business Innovation Research program in the Department of Defense. I find that within a particular contests, there is low variation in the values of the proposed projects, which are drawn early in the process, but considerably larger variation in the delivery costs, which are drawn later. The DOD provides high-powered incentives, sharing about 75% of the surplus with the firms. I then suggest simple design changes to improve social surplus but find that many of these socially beneficial design changes would in fact reduce DOD profits. Chapter 2, which is joint with James Roberts and Andrew Sweeting, studies the benefits of regulating entry into procurement auctions, relative to standard auctions in which bidders are allowed to enter and bid freely. Specifically, we study the relationship between auction outcomes and the precision of information bidders have about their costs before entering the bidding stage of the contest. We show that the relative performance of a standard auction with free entry and an "entry rights auction," which restricts participation in the bidding phase, depends non monotonically on the information precision. We finally estimate the model on a dataset of auctions for bridge-building contracts let by the Oklahoma and Texas Departments of Transportation. Entry is estimated to be moderately selective, and the counterfactual implication is that an entry rights auction would significantly increase social efficiency and reduce procurement costs. Chapter 3, which is joint with Lucas Manuelli and Ludwig Straub, proposes a model of "signal distortion" in a game with imperfect public monitoring. We construct a framework in which each player has the chance to distort the true public signal, and each player is uncertain about the distortion technologies available to his opponent. Continuation payoffs are dependent on the distorted signal. Our main result is that when players evaluate strategies according to their worst case guarantees-i.e., are ambiguity-averse over certain distributions in the environment-players behave as if the continuation payoffs that incentivize them in the stage game are perfectly aligned with their opponents'. We then provide two examples showing counterintuitive implications of this result: (i) signal structures that allow players to identify deviators can be harmful in enforcing a strategy profile, and (ii) the presence of signal distortion can help sustain cooperation when it is impossible in standard settings. We then extend our equilibrium concept to a repeated game, show that it is a natural generalization of strongly symmetric equilibria, and then prove an anti-folk theorem that payoffs are in general bounded away from efficiency.
Essays On The Economics Of Information In Auctions
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Author : Helen C. Knudsen
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009
Essays On The Economics Of Information In Auctions written by Helen C. Knudsen and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.
Essays On Value Distributions In All Pay Auctions
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Author : Suat Akbulut
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2021
Essays On Value Distributions In All Pay Auctions written by Suat Akbulut and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021 with categories.
This dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter studies the value distribution adoption choice of a player when she competes against an incumbent in an all-pay auction setting. The second chapter analyzes how much would a player like to learn about her own valuation in a similar setting. Lastly, the third chapter analyzes the best information disclosure policy that an auctioneer can adopt according to different performance measures in a two-player two-stage all-pay auction setting, where the players choose their value distributions in the first stage. The first chapter considers a two-player all-pay auction setting and modifies it by adding a technology-adoption stage at the beginning of the game. In a discrete valuations environment, assuming one player's valuation is common knowledge, we allow the other player (informed) to pick a distribution over the valuation space. Her opponent (uninformed) observes her choice of distribution. However, her valuation is privately drawn according to this distribution. The two players then play an asymmetric all-pay auction. We show that in such a setting, the informed player adopts a distribution that assigns positive probabilities to at most two elements; that will always contain the supremum, and sometimes, the infimum of the set of available values. She pools the extreme values in order to create an information asymmetry, which then would make the uninformed player bid less aggressively. We later impose a mean condition on the distribution that the informed player could pick and observe that she still prefers to split the probability mass on in-between values to the extreme ones. As a result, she picks the same support but arranges the probability mass on these values to meet the mean condition. In other words, the informed player is first interested in including only the extreme values in the support of her value distribution, and then the probabilities assigned to those values. The second chapter assumes that the informed player's value distribution is common knowledge and that she cannot observe her realized value. However, she can acquire additional information about her realized value by adopting a learning experiment. She picks such an experiment in the first stage. Even though her choice of experiment is observed by the uninformed player, she privately learns the realization of the experiment. Then, they play an all-pay auction in the second stage of the game. Every learning experiment induces a posterior probability distribution over the convex hull of the set of available values. The informed player bids as if her value is drawn from this posterior distribution, where she privately observes her value. Therefore, her problem boils down to choosing a posterior distribution that stochastically dominates the prior in the second-order sense. We show that the informed player's motivation to split the probability mass on in-between types to the extreme types is still present. However, due to the distributional constraints, she will pick a fully informative experiment to learn her value as long as it does not result in her two lowest values bidding zero with a positive probability in the equilibrium of the all-pay auction stage. If that is the case, she would try to mimic the prior distribution for the high types, who will never bid zero, and allocate the remaining probability to only one type to meet the constraint. One natural extension of our analysis is studying the equilibrium value distribution profiles when both players are choosing their own value distribution. When the possible values are only high and low, we show that the profile in which one player picks the high value with probability one while the other player assigns probability half to each values is the unique (up to symmetry) value distribution profile. Moreover, when we consider any set of values, we show that the profile in which one player picks the highest value with probability one, while the other player assigns probability half to the highest and the lowest values each is an equilibrium value distribution profile. Due to the lack of an analytical approach to the equilibrium bidding distributions of the all-pay auctions in an asymmetric information environment, checking whether this equilibrium is unique is left as future work. The last chapter analyzes the best information disclosure policy that an auctioneer can adopt according to different performance measures, namely players' payoff, prize allocation efficiency, and aggregate effort. The significant contribution of the analysis is that players have the ability to choose the distribution from which their own types are drawn. Using a two-player all-pay auction with the two-type setting, we show that the optimal disclosure policy depends on the ratio of the value of winning for a low type to the value of winning for a high type.
Essays On Nonparametric Identification And Estimation Of All Pay Auctions And Contests
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Author : Ksenia Shakhgildyan
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Essays On Nonparametric Identification And Estimation Of All Pay Auctions And Contests written by Ksenia Shakhgildyan and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.
My dissertation contributes to the structural nonparametric econometrics of auctions and contests with incomplete information. It consists of three chapters. The first chapter investigates the identification and estimation of an all-pay auction where the object is allocated to the player with the highest bid, and every bidder pays his bid regardless of whether he wins or not. As a baseline model, I consider the setting, where one object is allocated among several risk-neutral participants with independent private values (IPV); however, I also show how the model can be extended to the multiunit case. Moreover, the model is not confined to the IPV paradigm, and I further consider the case where the bidders' private values are affiliated (APV). In both IPV and APV settings, I prove the identification and derive the consistent estimators of the distribution of the bidders' valuations using a structural approach similar to that of Guerre et al. (2000). Finally, I consider the model with risk-averse bidders. I prove that in general the model in this set-up is not identified even in the semi-parametric case where the utility function of the bidders is restricted to belong to the class of functions with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). The second chapter proves the identification and derives the asymptotically normal estimator of a nonparametric contest of incomplete information with uncertainty. By uncertainty, I mean that the contest success function is not only determined by the bids of the players, but also by the variable, which I call uncertainty, with a nonparametric distribution, unknown to the researcher, but known to the bidders. This work is the first to consider the incomplete information contest with a nonparametric contest success function. The limiting case of the model when there is no uncertainty is an all-pay auction considered in the first chapter. The model with two asymmetric players is examined. First, I recover the distribution of uncertainty using the information on win outcomes and bids. Next, I adopt the structural approach of Guerre et al. (2000) to obtain the distribution of the bidders' valuations (or types). As an empirical application, I study the U.S. House of Representatives elections. The model provides a method to disentangle two sources of incumbency advantage: a better reputation, and better campaign financing. The former is characterized by the distribution of uncertainty and the latter by the difference in the distributions of candidates' types. Besides, two counterfactual analyses are performed: I show that the limiting expenditure dominates public campaign financing in terms of lowering total campaign spending as well as the incumbent's winning probability. The third chapter is a semiparametric version of the second chapter. In the case when the data is sparse, some restrictions on the nonparametric structure need to be put. In this work, I prove the identification and derive the consistent estimator of a contest of incomplete information, in which an object is allocated according to the serial contest success function. As in previous chapters, I recover the distribution of the bidders' valuations from the data on observed bids using a structural approach similar to that of Guerre et al. (2000) and He and Huang (2018). As a baseline model, I consider the symmetric contest. Further, the model is extended to account for the bidders' asymmetry.