Essays On Information Disclosure And Auction Theory
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Essays On Information Disclosure And Auction Theory
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Author : Shota Ichihashi
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2018
Essays On Information Disclosure And Auction Theory written by Shota Ichihashi and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018 with categories.
This dissertation consists of three essays on information economics and auction theory. The first chapter studies the question of what information consumers should disclose to firms. A consumer discloses information to a multi-product firm, which learns about his preferences, sets prices, and makes product recommendations. While the consumer benefits from disclosure as it enables the firm to make accurate recommendations, the firm may use the information to price discriminate. I show that the firm prefers to commit to not price discriminate, which encourages the consumer to provide information that is useful for product recommendations. However, nondiscriminatory pricing hurts the consumer, who would be better off by precommitting to withhold some information. In contrast to single-product models, equilibrium is typically inefficient even if the consumer can disclose any information about his preferences. The second chapter studies the problem of restricting the information available to the sender in a game of strategic communication. Assuming that the receiver has a binary choice, I characterize the "optimal information restriction, " which maximizes the equilibrium payoff of the receiver among all the information restrictions for the sender. The final chapter studies the optimal timing of an auction in a setting where bidders arrive and depart stochastically over time. First, we compare the revenue-maximizing timing and welfare-maximizing timing. We show that sellers hold auctions too late or too early whenever (censored at 0) virtual values are more or less right-skewed than values. In particular, we show that sellers typically hold auctions inefficiently late. Second, we prove that the use of simple timing rules (i.e., a fixed deadline chosen in advance) can lose an arbitrarily large fraction of the revenue from the optimal stopping rule.
Essays On Information Disclosure In Auctions And Monopoly Pricing
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Author : Zhiyun Li
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Essays On Information Disclosure In Auctions And Monopoly Pricing written by Zhiyun Li and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with Auctions categories.
Essays On Information Disclosure In Auctions And Contests
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Author : Thomas Rieck
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Essays On Information Disclosure In Auctions And Contests written by Thomas Rieck and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
Three Essays On Auction Theory
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Author : Xiaoshu Xu
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Three Essays On Auction Theory written by Xiaoshu Xu and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
Abstract: My dissertation consists of three chapters in theoretical auction analysis. The first chapter considers optimal sequential auctions with new bidders arriving in each period. The second chapter examines how resale affects bidding strategies and auction outcomes in an auction environment with costly entry. The third chapter investigates how resale affects bidding strategies and auction outcomes in a sequential auction setting where the values of items auctioned in different periods exhibit synergies. The first chapter gives a full characterization of the optimal sequential second-price (or ascending English) auctions with sequentially arriving bidders. There are n bidders in the first period and m new bidders arrive in the second period. Based on the auctioneer's commitment power, we study two cases: full commitment and noncommitment. In both cases, we establish the existence of a symmetric equilibrium characterized by a threshold strategy - -a bidder does not bid in the first auction when her valuation is below this threshold and bids according to an increasing function otherwise. In the noncommitment case, the auctioneer chooses an optimal reserve price to maximize the expected revenue from the second period; thus her decision of whether to include previous bidders as potential buyers is endogenously determined by the reserve price in the first auction. This might create multiple equilibria depending on the beliefs of the auctioneer and the bidders. We apply a fairly intuitive rule to establish the uniqueness. We also extend our analysis to allow for opportunities for resale, where the winner in the first auction can opt to resell the item to new bidders. The second chapter, joint with Dan Levin and Lixin Ye, studies how resale affects auctions with costly entry in a model where an arbitrary number of bidders possess two-dimensional private information signals: entry costs and valuations. We establish the existence of symmetric entry equilibrium and identify sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. Our analysis suggests that the opportunity of resale induces motivation for both speculative entry and bargain hunting abstentions. By following the uniform distribution for numerical analysis, our results suggest that while the entry probability and efficiency are always higher when resale is allowed, the auctioneer's expected revenue is lower when resale is allowed for almost all parameter values. We also compare this model to one where bidders may follow "strong" or "weak" distributions in terms of valuations. The third chapter, joint with Dan Levin and Lixin Ye, studies a sequential second-price auction of two objects with two bidders, where the winner of the package obtains a synergy from the second object. If reselling after the two auctions occurs, it proceeds as either monopoly or monopsony take-it-or-leave-it offer. I find that a post-auction resale has a significant impact on bidding strategies in the auctions. When seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer in resale, there is no equilibrium where at least one bidder reveals her type with positive probability. When buyer makes the offer instead, there exist symmetric increasing equilibrium strategies for both items. While allowing resale always improves efficiency, I demonstrate that the effect of resale is ambiguous on expected revenue as Ill as the probability of exposure. I also extend this model to allow for three bidders and provide the equilibrium analysis.
Essays On Market Design And Auction Theory
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Author : Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Essays On Market Design And Auction Theory written by Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
This dissertation consists of three essays on market design and auction theory. In Chapter 1, I introduce new multidimensional auction mechanisms. In many auctions, because of externalities, each bidder has a different maximum willingness to pay in order to beat each specific competitor, which causes the following new problem. When there are three bidders, two bidders might compete against each other unnecessarily and have worse payoffs than if they had lost to the third bidder, i.e., the two bidders have "group winner regret, " which can also lead to inefficiency. While no one-dimensional-bid mechanism is efficient, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) may require losers to pay. This paper introduces a novel mechanism, the "multidimensional second-price" (MSP) auction (and its open ascending version), and characterizes it. MSP is free of a loser's payment, pairwise stable, and has good incentive properties, including no group winner regret. Moreover, the winner cannot win at any different price by any misreport, and a loser cannot be better off winning by any misreport. MSP is strategyproof for a bidder without externalities imposed by others, and it reduces to the second-price auction when there are no externalities. Simulations suggest that MSP outperforms the second-price auction in terms of both revenue and efficiency. In Chapter 2, I study properties of VCG when externalities exist, and introduce shill bidding strategies that weakly dominate truthful bidding. When externalities exist, VCG is efficient, incentive compatible, and individually rational. However, as occurs in package auctions without externalities, VCG outcomes may not be in the core. Moreover, VCG is not pairwise stable. Due to externalities, several additional problems occur. VCG may require losing bidders to pay, which might be undesirable. Also, it might be budget infeasible, and the auctioneer might need to pay the winner a subsidy. The subsidy problem can occur even when all bids are positive. Furthermore, unlike package auctions without externalities, there exists a shill bidding strategy that weakly dominates truthful bidding. In addition, when this shill bidding is used, there is no Nash equilibrium. Each bidder is better off using an infinite number of shills, which eventually makes VCG undefined. In Chapter 3, I study properties of VCG in the advertising auction setting. Even though VCG is incentive compatible (IC) in the advertising auction setting, the actual implementation of VCG in practice is not VCG per se. The main reason is that the price needs to be determined when the billing event happens at the same time as the estimation of click-through rate (CTR) or position discount (PD) is occurring. After all, advertising auctions charge the estimate of externalities. However, even in this "estimated" VCG (eVCG), CTR miscalibration does not ruin IC. Even when PD miscalibration exists, IC still holds with "perfect competition." Regarding efficiency and revenue, both CTR and PD miscalibrations matter. Interestingly, however, the revenue of the auctioneer does not necessarily decrease by underbidding.
Partnerships Signaling And Contests
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Author : Cédric Wasser
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010
Partnerships Signaling And Contests written by Cédric Wasser and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with categories.
Essays On The Theory And Estimation Of Auction Models
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Author : Leonardo Rezende
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003
Essays On The Theory And Estimation Of Auction Models written by Leonardo Rezende and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.
Essays On Auction Theory
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003
Essays On Auction Theory written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.
Auction Theory
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Author : Vijay Krishna
language : en
Publisher: Elsevier
Release Date : 2002-04-25
Auction Theory written by Vijay Krishna and has been published by Elsevier this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002-04-25 with Business & Economics categories.
Auction Theory is the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. The book develops the main concepts of auction theory from scratch in a self-contained and theoretically rigorous manner. It explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information through detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory. This book complements its superb presentation of auction theory with clear and concise proofs of all results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization. It provides discussions on auction-related subjects, including private value auctions; the Revenue Equivalence Principle; auctions with interdependent values; the Revenue Ranking (Linkage) Principle; mechanism design with interdependent values; bidding rings; multiple object auctions; equilibrium and efficiency with private values; and nonidentical objects. This book is essential reading for graduate students taking courses on auction theory, the economics of information, or the economics of incentives, as well as for any serious student of auctions. It will also appeal to professional economists or business analysts working in contract theory, experimental economics, industrial organization, and microeconomic theory. *The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions*Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information*Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory
Essays On Market Design And Auction Theory
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Author : BYEONGHYEON JEONG
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Essays On Market Design And Auction Theory written by BYEONGHYEON JEONG and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.
This dissertation studies market design and auction theory. Chapter 1 studies the impact of school choice on segregation. It shows that the popular school choice mechanisms lead to substantially different school and residential segregation, an important and overlooked aspect of choosing among school choice mechanisms. We show that open enrollment policy in public school choice program can decrease diversity of individual schools and increase segregation depending on which student allocation mechanism is used. Without open enrollment, we study the model of location choice and show that segregation is mainly associated with income. In comparing mechanisms, we show that Boston mechanism fosters segregation more than the deferred acceptance. With open enrollment, the difference between BM and DA becomes more drastic. We show that BM can actually intensify segregation when open enrollment policy is adopted, while DA is more resilient to segregation. The deferred acceptance with multi tie breaking creates maximally diverse schools. Chapter 2 considers conventional auctions when the seller can design bid spaces. Any symmetric equilibrium in a second price auction with bid spaces can be replicated with an equilibrium in a first price auction with bid spaces, but the converse doesn't hold. First price auctions with designed bid spaces revenue dominates second price auction with designed bid spaces, and well-designed first price auction is an optimal selling mechanism. Chapter 3 studies one-to-one matching environment without transfer in the presence of incomplete information on one-side. The existing notions of stability under incomplete information are studied and two alternatives are proposed. Weak Bayesian stability requires that the beliefs of the agents are dervided from a common prior via Bayes' rule and are internally consistent with the presumption that the given matching is stable. Strong Bayesian stability refines weak Bayesian stability by requiring the beliefs of agents are also externally consistent in the sense that the beliefs are narrowed down only when there is a valid reason.