Essays On Mechanism Design And Implementation
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Essays On Mechanism Design And Implementation
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Author : Maria Goltsman
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
Essays On Mechanism Design And Implementation written by Maria Goltsman and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with categories.
Essays In Mechanism Design And Implementation Theory
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Author : Ritesh Jain (Ph. D. in economics)
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2018
Essays In Mechanism Design And Implementation Theory written by Ritesh Jain (Ph. D. in economics) and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018 with Economics categories.
In Chapter 2 titled "Symmetric Mechanism Design," (Jointly with Yaron Azrieli) we study the extent to which regulators can guarantee fair outcomes by a policy requiring mechanisms to treat agents symmetrically. This is an exercise in mechanism design. Our main result is a characterization of the class of social choice functions that can be implemented under this constraint. In many environments, extremely discriminatory social choice functions can be implemented by symmetric mechanisms, but there are also cases in which symmetry is binding. Our characterization is based on a `revelation principle' type of result, where we show that a social choice function can be symmetrically implemented if and only if a particular kind of (indirect) symmetric mechanism implements it. We illustrate the result in environments of voting with private values, voting with a common value, and assignment of indivisible goods.
Essays In Mechanism Design
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Author : Levent Ulku
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2008
Essays In Mechanism Design written by Levent Ulku and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with Econometrics categories.
This dissertation consists of three essays in the theory of mechanism design under incomplete information. In the first essay, we analyze an implementation problem in which monetary transfers are feasible, valuations are interdependent and the set of available choices lies in a product space of lattices. This framework is general enough to subsume many interesting examples, including allocation problems with multiple objects. We identify a class of social choice rules which can be implemented in ex post equilibrium. We identify conditions under which ex post efficient social choice rules are implementable using monotone selection theory. The key conditions are extensions of the single crossing property and supermodularity. These conditions can be replaced with more tractable conditions in multiobject allocation problems with either two objects or two agents. I also show that the payments which implement monotone social decision rules coincide with the payments of (1) the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism with private values, and (2) the generalized Vickrey auction introduced by Ausubel [1999] in multiunit allocation problems. The second essay generalizes the analysis of optimal (revenue maximizing) mechanism design for the seller of a single object introduced by Myerson [1981]. We consider a problem in which the seller has several heterogeneous objects and buyers' valuations depend on each other's private information. We analyze two nonnested environments in which incentive constraints can be replaced with more tractable monotonicity conditions. We establish conditions under which these monotonicity conditions can be ignored, and show that several earlier analyses of the optimal mechanism design problem can be unified and generalized. In particular, problems with two complementary goods in Levin [1997] and multiunit auction problems in Maskin and Riley [1989] and Branco [1996] are special cases. The third essay considers the problem of selling internet advertising slots to advertisers. Under suitable conditions, we solve for the payments imposed by an optimal mechanism and show that it can be decentralized via prices using a linear assignment approach. At every configuration of private information, optimal mechanism can be interpreted as a menu consisting of a price for every slot.
Essays On Mechanism Design Safety And Crime
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Author : George Fouad Nabih Shoukry
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
Essays On Mechanism Design Safety And Crime written by George Fouad Nabih Shoukry and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
This dissertation uses theoretical and empirical tools to answer applied questions of design with an emphasis on issues relating to safety and crime. The first essay incorporates safety in implementation theory and studies when and how safe mechanisms can be designed to obtain socially desirable outcomes. I provide general conditions under which a social choice rule can be implemented using safe mechanisms. The second essay is an empirical study of how criminals respond to changing profitability of crime, a question that informs the policy debate on the most effective crime fighting methods. I find that the price elasticity of theft is about 1 in the short term and increases to about 1.2 over a seven-month horizon, suggesting that policies that directly affect crime profitability, such as policies that shut down black markets or those that reduce demand for illegal goods, can be relatively effective. The third essay shows that any standard implementation problem can be formulated as a question about the existence of a graph that solves a graph coloring problem, establishing a connection between implementation theory and graph theory. More generally, an implementation problem can be viewed as a constraint satisfaction problem, and I propose an algorithm to design simple mechanisms to solve arbitrary implementation problems.
Essays In Mechanism Design
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Author : Yunan Li
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2017
Essays In Mechanism Design written by Yunan Li and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017 with categories.
In this thesis, I study mechanism design problems in environments where the information necessary to make decisions is affected by the actions of principal or agents.The first chapter considers the problem of a principal who must allocate a good among a finite number of agents, each of whom values the good. Each agent has private information about the principal's payoff if he receives the good. There are no monetary transfers. The principal can inspect agents' reports at a cost and punish them, but punishments are limited because verification is imperfect or information arrives only after the good has been allocated for a while. I characterize an optimal mechanism featuring two thresholds. Agents whose values are below the lower threshold and above the upper threshold are pooled, respectively. If the number of agents is small, then the pooling area at the top of value distribution disappears. If the number of agents is large, then the two pooling areas meet and the optimal mechanism can be implemented via a shortlisting procedure. The fact that the optimal mechanism depends on the number of agents implies that small and large organizations should behave differently. The second chapter considers the problem of a principal who wishes to distribute an indivisible good to a population of budget-constrained agents. Both valuation and budget are an agent's private information. The principal can inspect an agent's budget through a costly verification process and punish an agent who makes a false statement. I characterize the direct surplus-maximizing mechanism. This direct mechanism can be implemented by a two-stage mechanism in which agents only report their budgets. Specifically, all agents report their budgets in the first stage. The principal then provides budget-dependent cash subsidies to agents and assigns the goods randomly (with uniform probability) at budget-dependent prices. In the second stage, a resale market opens, but is regulated with budget-dependent sales taxes. Agents who report low budgets receive more subsidies in their initial purchases (the first stage), face higher taxes in the resale market (the second stage) and are inspected randomly. This implementation exhibits some of the features of some welfare programs, such as Singapore's housing and development board.The third chapter studies the design of ex-ante efficient mechanisms in situations where a single item is for sale, and agents have positively interdependent values and can covertly acquire information at a cost before participating in a mechanism. I find that when interdependency is low or the number of agents is large, the ex-post efficient mechanism is also ex-ante efficient. In cases of high interdependency or a small number of agents, ex-ante efficient mechanisms discourage agents from acquiring excessive information by introducing randomization to the ex-post efficient allocation rule in areas where the information's precision increases most rapidly.
Essays In Mechanism Design
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Author : Abhishek Bapna
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
Essays In Mechanism Design written by Abhishek Bapna and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with categories.
This thesis is about two contributions to the theory of mechanism design and one application of this theory to the banking industry.
Essays In Mechanism Design And Market Design
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
Essays In Mechanism Design And Market Design written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
Full Implementation and Belief Restrictions' considers how information about agents' beliefs might be used to achieve full implementation, which aims to resolve the problem of multiplicity in mechanism design. We find that minimal knowledge about beliefs (described by moment conditions) can be used to reduce strategic externalities induced by the incentive compatible transfers by adding belief-based adjustments to the transfers. When strategic externalities are reduced to the extent that the best reply map becomes contractive, then uniqueness is achieved for a Delta-Rationalizability. We further show that (1) this result often obtains by very little information about agents' beliefs, therefore the uniqueness result holds for a large class of beliefs and (2) suitable moment conditions can be found in many economically interesting information structures, for example in quadratic smooth environments with independent or affiliated types. `Shared Information Sources in Exchanges' explores implications of heterogeneous information sources available to market participants -- due to regulation, choice or comes as a constraint. Traders in financial markets recognize that shared forecast services, differential access to information technology, targeted advertisement induce correlation in inference errors. We show that common information sources, seen as a departure from the private information acquisition assumption, qualitatively affect information aggregation and efficiency properties of markets. Even when traders' values are independent, inference from prices can be useful for learning about valuations. From a market design perspective, we show that imposing differential access to sources can improve informativeness, restricting participation to certain trading venues can be optimal. `Privacy-Preserving Market Design' is motivated by the increasing concern about revealing information on past trades, income, liquidity needs. With improved data collection, preserving privacy has become a de facto participation constraint in exchanges. We suggest an incentive-based approach by formulating a mechanism design problem to study the joint design of the allocation rule, bidding language, observable outcomes (prices, quantities at various levels of aggregation, and other statistics). We show that privacy-preserving market design is feasible, in that the publicly observable outcome is minimally informative about private information. In contrast to the view in the literature, there need not be a trade-off between privacy preservation and efficiency.
Essays On Information In Dynamic Games And Mechanism Design
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Author : Daehyun Kim
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Essays On Information In Dynamic Games And Mechanism Design written by Daehyun Kim and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.
This dissertation studies how asymmetric information between economic agents interacts with their incentive in dynamic games and mechanism design. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 study this in mechanism design, especially focusing on robustness of mechanisms when a mechanism designer's knowledge on agents' belief and higher order beliefs is not perfect. In Chapter 1 we introduce a novel robustness notion into mechanism design, which we term confident implementation; and characterize confidently implementable social choice correspondences. In Chapter 2, we introduce another robust notion, p-dominant implementation where p [0, 1]N and N N is the number of agents, and fully characterize p-dominant implementable allocations in the quasilinear environment. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 are related in the following way: for some range of p, a p-dominant implementable social choice correspondence is confidently implementable. In Chapter 3, we study information disclosure problem to manage reputation. To study this, we consider a repeated game in which there are a long-run player and a stream of short-run players; and the long-run player has private information about her type, which is either commitment or normal. We assume that the shot-run player only can observe the past K N periods of information disclosed by the long-run player. In this environment, we characterize the information disclosure behavior of the long-run player and also equilibrium dynamics whose shape critically depends on the prior.
Social Design
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Author : Walter Trockel
language : en
Publisher: Springer
Release Date : 2019-05-30
Social Design written by Walter Trockel and has been published by Springer this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019-05-30 with Business & Economics categories.
This book contains invited essays in memory of Leonid Hurwicz spanning a large area of economic, social and other sciences where the implementation or enforcement of institutions and rules requires the design of effective mechanisms. The foundations of these articles are set by social choice concepts; game theory; Nash, Bayesian and Walrasian equilibria; complete and incomplete information. Besides in-depth treatments of well-established parts of mechanism and implementation theory, contributions on novel directions deal, for instance, with a quantum approach to game and decision making under uncertainty; digitalization; and the design of block chain for trading. The outstanding competence and reputation of the authors reflect the appreciation of the fundamental contributions and the lasting admiration of the personality and the work of Leonid Hurwicz.
Essays On Information And Mechanism Design
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Author : Ina Angelova Taneva
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
Essays On Information And Mechanism Design written by Ina Angelova Taneva and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
My dissertation studies the optimal design of institutions and information structures for different objectives of a designer or a social planner. The questions addressed are interesting both from a theoretical point of view, and in terms of their real-life applications. The first chapter of the dissertation focuses on supermodular mechanism design in environments with arbitrary finite type spaces and interdependent valuations. In these environments, the designer may have to use Bayesian equilibrium as a solution concept, because ex post implementation may not be possible. We propose direct Bayesian mechanisms that are robust to certain forms of bounded rationality while controlling for equilibrium multiplicity. In quasi-linear environments with informational and allocative externalities, we show that any Bayesian mechanism that implements a social choice function can be converted into a supermodular mechanism that also implements the original decision rule. The proposed supermodular mechanism can be chosen in a way that minimizes the size of the equilibrium set, and we provide two sets of sufficient conditions to this effect: for general decision rules and for decision rules that satisfy a certain requirement. This is followed by conditions for supermodular implementation in unique equilibrium. The second chapter looks at the incentives of a revenue-maximizing seller (designer) who discloses information to a number of interacting bidders (agents). In particular, the designer chooses the level of precision with which agents can infer the quality of a common-value object from their privately observed signals. We restrict attention to the second-price sealed-bid auction format. If the seller has perfect commitment power and can choose the precision level before observing the quality of the object, in the presence of any small cost to precision it is ex ante optimal for her to choose completely uninformative signals. For the case when the seller chooses the precision level after observing the quality of the object, we characterize pooling, partial pooling, and separating equilibria. We show that in this setting the cost associated with precision can be viewed as a form of commitment device: if costs are too low, the best pooling equilibrium ceases to exist as the high type seller is too tempted to separate. Thus, the seller ends up with a lower ex ante expected payoff than in the case when cost parameters are above a certain threshold. The third chapter of this dissertation studies the optimal choice of information structure from the perspective of a designer maximizing a certain objective function. Generally speaking, there are two ways of creating incentives for interacting agents to behave in a desired way. One is by providing appropriate payoff incentives, which is the subject of mechanism design. The other is by choosing the information that agents observe, which we refer to as information design. We consider a model of symmetric information where a designer chooses and announces the information structure about a payoff relevant state. The interacting agents observe the signal realizations, update their beliefs, and take actions which affect the welfare of both the designer and the agents. We characterize the general finite approach to deriving the optimal information structure --- the one that maximizes the designer's ex ante expected utility subject to agents playing a Bayes Nash equilibrium. We then apply the general approach to a symmetric two state, two agent, and two actions environment in a parameterized underlying game and fully characterize the optimal information structure. It is never strictly optimal for the designer to use conditionally independent private signals. The optimal information structure may be a public signal, or may consist of correlated private signals. Finally, we examine how changes in the underlying game affect the designer's maximum payoff. This exercise provides a joint mechanism/information design perspective.