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Essays On Relational Contracts

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Essays On Relational Contracts

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Author : Akifumi Ishihara
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011

Essays On Relational Contracts written by Akifumi Ishihara and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.

This dissertation contains three essays on self-enforcing implicit contracts in economic transactions and politics. Chapter 2 studies a repeated agency model with two tasks where the agent has private information on the first task and there is no verifiable performance signal for the second task. The equilibrium level of the first task is determined so as to guarantee the credibility of the relational contracts to provide incentives for the second task. It implies interesting economic results including non-monotonic relation between the discount factor and the total surplus, social desirability of unverifiability, and implications for organization design. Chapter 3 studies a model of political contribution of dynamic common agency where state-contingent agreements must be self-enforced. First, we investigate the punishment strategy for supporting the self-enforcing mechanism. The most severe punishment strategy on the principals takes the form of a two-phase scheme in general. Second, we characterize the payoff set of the equilibria on which the same decision is chosen by the agent through implicit agreements and examine whether it can achieve the same payoff as in the standard static menu auction model. It implies that there could be an equilibrium outcome in a static menu auction that cannot be supported in our model for any discount factor. Chapter 4 studies repeated political competition with policy-motivated citizen candidates. The dynamic relationship could cause strategic candidacy in two-candidate competition, such as in circumstances where two candidates stand for election and one of them has no chance to win. The candidate can choose her implementing policy depending on the set of the rival candidates in the election and the rival candidate actually has an incentive to stand even with no chance to win since it can induce policy compromises from the winning candidate.

Essays In Contract Design Under Incomplete Enforcement

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Author : Paula Cordero-Salas
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011

Essays In Contract Design Under Incomplete Enforcement written by Paula Cordero-Salas and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.

Abstract: This dissertation applies relational contract theory to study the optimal incentive provision in situations when formal enforcement is too costly. Essay one considers a theoretical redistribution of bargaining power among business partners who trade repeatedly and that traditionally hold asymmetric power to negotiate contract terms. I included a bargaining process in a relational contracts model to analyze the economic consequences of shifting bargaining power under different enforcement regimes. The model predicts that as the agent's bargaining power increases, her incentive payments decrease even though her total compensation increases. Thus, efficiency wage contracts are more likely to be observed than contingent performance contracts in markets where agents have bargaining power. In contexts where enforcement is weak, a transfer of bargaining power can erode market efficiency in a dynamic relational contracting environment. If principals lose power coupled with the absence of enforcement, they may find the short-term gains of reneging on contractual promises more attractive than long-term benefits of faithfully executing a contract where they hold less power. As a consequence trade is more likely to break down. In this case, the agent is better off exercising less bargaining power than she has. Nonetheless, the model also predicts that such a collapse in good-faith execution of contracts in the light of such a power shift may not occur if some minimum payment for contract participation is enforced. Essay two provides experimental evidence on the theoretical predictions from essay one. I implement an experimental design that adjusts the bargaining power of sellers (agents) and the enforceability of the contract. I find that the vast majority of contracts take the form of efficiency wage contracts instead of contingent performance contracts when enforcement is partially incomplete and sellers have more bargaining power than buyers. The total contracted and actual compensation increase with the bargaining power of the sellers. However, sellers' profits are found to increase only if a part of the total payment is third-party enforceable. In this case, observed surplus and efficiency are lower than predictions. When no part of a contract is third-party enforceable, more cooperative relationships emerge, exhibiting higher quality provision resulting in higher surplus and efficiency while rent sharing is lower. The result is explained by the stronger buyer's deviation, confirming predictions from essay one. Essay three considers the application of relational contracts as a mechanism for the reduction of carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD). I compared the structure of the optimal relational contract in the presence of purely self-interested participants to the optimal structure when participants are motivated by other preferences including altruism, spite, inequality aversion or warm-glow concerns. I find that the optimal contract structure only differs from the benchmark case of self-interested agents when seller preferences are different than only profit-maximizing preferences or if either party is inequality averse. Moreover, I also show that the presence of other regarding preferences increases or decreases the likelihood of cooperation in the long-term relationship relative to the case of self-interested participants.

Essays On Relational Contracts

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Author : Marina Cynthia Halac
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009

Essays On Relational Contracts written by Marina Cynthia Halac and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.

Essays In Honour Of Aj Kerr

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Author :
language : en
Publisher: Butterworth-Heinemann
Release Date : 2006

Essays In Honour Of Aj Kerr written by and has been published by Butterworth-Heinemann this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with Contracts categories.

Changing Concepts Of Contract

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Author : David Campbell
language : en
Publisher: Springer
Release Date : 2017-02-28

Changing Concepts Of Contract written by David Campbell and has been published by Springer this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017-02-28 with Law categories.

Changing Concepts of Contract is a prestigious collection of essays that re-examines the remarkable contributions of Ian Macneil to the study of contract law and contracting behaviour. Ian Macneil, who taught at Cornell University, the University of Virginia and, latterly, at Northwestern University, was the principal architect of relational contract theory, an approach that sought to direct attention to the context in which contracts are made. In this collection, nine leading UK contract law scholars re-consider Macneil's work and examine his theories in light of new social and technological circumstances. In doing so, they reveal relational contract theory to be a pertinent and insightful framework for the study and practice of the subject, one that presents a powerful challenge to the limits of orthodox contract law scholarship. In tandem with his academic life, Ian Macneil was also the 46th Chief of the Clan Macneil. Included in this volume is a Preface by his son Rory Macneil, the 47th Chief, who reflects on the influences on his father's thinking of those experiences outside academia. The collection also includes a Foreword by Stewart Macaulay, Malcolm Pitman Sharp Hilldale Professor Emeritus at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and an Introduction by Jay M Feinman, Distinguished Professor of Law at Rutgers School of Law.

From Promise To Contract

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Author : Dori Kimel
language : en
Publisher: Hart Publishing
Release Date : 2003-03-14

From Promise To Contract written by Dori Kimel and has been published by Hart Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003-03-14 with Law categories.

The book offers a careful philosophical investigation of the similarities and the much-overlooked differences between contract and promise.

The Legal Essays Of Michael Bayles

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Author : W.L. Robison
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2002-06-30

The Legal Essays Of Michael Bayles written by W.L. Robison and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002-06-30 with Law categories.

The legal essays by Michael Bayles in this collection display his commitment to utilitarianism both as a moral theory and an analytical device. A utilitarian must choose between the best of all possible alternatives and so must lay out the alternatives and thus their consequences carefully and completely. As it happens, there is no better way of understanding why something is as it is in the law, and no better way to lay the foundations for criticism and improvement, than to lay out what the alternatives are, carefully distinguishing them, their justifications, and their implications for changing other areas of the law and for changing our relation to the law. Bayles was a master at such work, and each essay thus repays careful study for anyone concerned about the law. The essays cover a wide variety of topics, from contract law to the criminal law, from torts to theory, and form a natural set. Laying out the alternatives in one area makes it much clearer how and why alternatives in other areas are acceptable or required. Interconnections within the legal system as a whole not readily visible when studying one area of the law become obvious when several are laid out side-by-side using the analytical skill required by a good utilitarian.