Essays On Strategy And Industrial Organization
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Essays On Strategy And Industrial Organization
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Author : Ioannis Ioannou
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009
Essays On Strategy And Industrial Organization written by Ioannis Ioannou and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.
This dissertation consists of three essays in the fields of Strategy (Essay One) and Industrial Organization (Essays Two and Three). The first essay investigates the impact that different types of spinoff activity - the exit of incumbent firm employees to intra-industry entrepreneurship - have on the survival probability of the incumbent organization. I propose a theoretical model based on corporate coherence, organizational learning and agency theory, for understanding the spinoff impact. I test the model empirically on a dataset from the US automobile industry and I identify specific types of spinoffs that may be beneficial for the parent by enhancing its survival probability. My results set the foundations for a strategic management theory of spinoff activity. The second essay, coauthored with Julie Holland Mortimer, and Richard Mortimer, investigates empirically the impact that retailer capacity choices have on realized sales in the US video rental industry. We provide estimates of this impact under alternative vertical contracts, and we show that, on average, an additional unit of capacity has a positive impact on sales, with titles taken on the contracts with the highest up-front cost typically having the strongest impact on sales from increased capacity. The third essay, written jointly with Christos Cabolis, Sofronis Clerides and Daniel Senft, addresses the issue of international price discrimination in the book industry. We use data from three countries, the US, the UK and Canada, and we find that general audience books are similarly priced internationally, but textbooks are substantially more expensive in the United States; a disparity that is much more pronounced for commercial publishers than for university presses. We argue that higher US textbook prices reflect the unique status of the textbook as a centerpiece of US college instruction.
Essays In Industrial Organization And Management Strategy
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Author : Paul W. de Bijl
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996
Essays In Industrial Organization And Management Strategy written by Paul W. de Bijl and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with categories.
Three Essays In Industrial Organization
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Author : Raymond J. Deneckere
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1983
Three Essays In Industrial Organization written by Raymond J. Deneckere and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1983 with Industrial organization (Economic theory) categories.
Industrial Organization Trade And Social Interaction
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Author : Gregory K. Dow
language : en
Publisher: University of Toronto Press
Release Date : 2010-01-01
Industrial Organization Trade And Social Interaction written by Gregory K. Dow and has been published by University of Toronto Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010-01-01 with Social Science categories.
B. Curtis Eaton is one of Canada's leading microeconomists. As an applied economic theorist, Eaton has contributed greatly to industrial organization literature and has also worked in labour economics, economic geography, and organizational theory. The essays in this volume, by former students and present and former colleagues, call attention to the path-breaking work of Professor Eaton. The first two chapters provide a short overview of Eaton's research contributions and argue that his work laid the foundation for important research programs across the country. The remaining chapters, including an unpublished paper by Eaton himself, consist of original work that can be divided into the three broad categories of industrial organization and spatial competition, trade and productivity, and social interaction. Not only a collection of laudatory essays, Industrial Organization, Trade, and Social Interaction presents cutting edge research by leading scholars.
Essays In Theoretical Industrial Organization
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Author : Robert Henry Gertner
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1986
Essays In Theoretical Industrial Organization written by Robert Henry Gertner and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1986 with Industrial organization (Economic theory) categories.
Essays On Industrial Organization
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Author : Menesh S. Patel
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2002
Essays On Industrial Organization written by Menesh S. Patel and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002 with categories.
Essays In Industrial Organization
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Author : Samuel Isaac Grondahl
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2020
Essays In Industrial Organization written by Samuel Isaac Grondahl and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2020 with categories.
This thesis is a collection of three chapters that investigate burgeoning empirical issues in industrial organization. In the first chapter, I study platform fee policy with a specific focus on two-sided online marketplaces. The main contributions of the paper are threefold. First, I study a setting with coordinated price experimentation along the three different fee dimensions that are common to such marketplaces. Second, I describe the empirical impact of incomplete fee salience on equilibrium outcomes. Finally, I quantify the network externalities that must be present in order for observed fees to constitute an equilibrium. In the paper, I begin by developing a tractable model of the platform’s problem that generates testable predictions and yields equilibrium conditions in terms of estimable quantities. Then, using estimates from experimental data obtained from a large online marketplace, I quantify the salience and network effects. To conclude, I consider the counterfactual level and composition of equilibrium platform fees under when these effects are muted or absent. In the second chapter, using data from the same source as in chapter one, I study small sellers competing on the supply side of online marketplaces. As these platforms grow and markets become increasingly disintermediated, an important concern is whether small sellers, who may have limited experience or attention, can individually compete effectively with larger, often professional sellers operating on the same marketplaces. To answer this question, I develop and estimate a structural model that incorporates essential features of the empirical setting, including large and rapidly changing choice sets and buyer heterogeneity. Using the estimated model, I compute optimal pricing policies under various informational and computational restrictions. I find that small sellers adhering to a simple strategy can obtain nearly optimal expected revenue and that this strategy’s information requirements are easily satisfied in the online setting. Additionally, I present suggestive evidence that sellers learn to approximate such a strategy through repeated market interactions. In the third and final chapter, I investigate the industrial impacts of firm control rights, which confer discretion over firm policy and are usually shared between debt and equity holders. Control rights operate along a continuum and are difficult to measure. As a proxy, I consider the discontinuous shift in control from equity holders to creditors due to loan covenant violations, a common form of technical default. This paper contributes to the growing covenants literature in two ways. First, I consider the impact of and response to covenant violations at the industry level, inclusive of firms never in technical default. Second, I empirically document the effects of violations on contemporary product markets. I find that control rights transfers to creditors make firms tough in product markets, consistent with the predictions of a stylized model, and that markups decline at the industry level, though the declines are sharpest for firms directly affected.
Empirical Studies In Industrial Organization
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Author : David B. Audretsch
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2012-12-06
Empirical Studies In Industrial Organization written by David B. Audretsch and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-12-06 with Business & Economics categories.
Empirical Studies in Industrial Organization brings together leading scholars who present state-of-the-art research in the spirit of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm embodied in the work of Leonard W. Weiss. The individual chapters are generally empirically or public policy oriented. A number of them introduce new sources of data that, combined with the application of appropriate econometric techniques, enable new breakthroughs and insights on issues hotly debated in the industrial organization literature. For example, five of the chapters are devoted towards uncovering the link between market concentration and pricing behavior. While theoretical models have produced ambiguous predictions concerning the relationship between concentration and price these chapters, which span a number of different markets and situations, provide unequivocal evidence that a high level of market concentration tends to result in a higher level of prices. Three of the chapters explore the impact of market structure on production efficiency, and three other chapters focus on the role of industrial organization on public policy. Contributors include David B. Audretsch, Richard E. Caves, Mark J. Roberts, F.M. Scherer, John J. Siegfried and Hideki Yamawaki.
Essays On Theoretical Industrial Organization
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Author : Sangwoo Choi
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2021
Essays On Theoretical Industrial Organization written by Sangwoo Choi and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021 with categories.
This dissertation consists of three chapters in theoretical industrial organization with focus on consumer search and strategic firm behavior. More precisely, we study strategic firm behavior in an environment where an imperfectly informed consumer searches for sellers to buy a product from. Each chapter considers a distinct strategy for firms: implementing a product return policy, disclosing information about the product, and choosing product design. In the first chapter, we study how the presence of a monopoly platform affects the return fee in online retail markets. Specifically, we ask whether a monopoly platform has an incentive to set the return fee below the cost of processing returns. A seller on the platform can reduce their cost of returns by outsourcing some of the return process to the platform itself. By absorbing some of the expense of the return process, the platform requires sellers to set the return fee at a level determined by the platform. The platform charges each member seller a lump sum fee which makes them indifferent between joining the platform and selling directly to consumers. The main result compares equilibrium return fees in two different market settings: with a monopoly platform, and without a monopoly platform. Sellers without the platform compete with each other on return fees as well as on product prices, and thus lower their return fees to attract consumers. However, the sellers' incentive to recoup the cost of returns dominates the effect of competition. As a result, the competitive return fee without the platform is higher than the marginal cost of processing returns, which would be the socially optimal return fee. The platform internalizes the competition on return fee between the sellers, and imposes an even higher return fee on the sellers than the competitive one. There are two main takeaways from this result: first, the current trend of ``easy returns" is inconsistent with a monopoly platform maximizing profits in the short-run. Second, by setting a higher return fee, a monopoly platform decreases both consumer and social welfare compared to the market without a monopoly platform. The second chapter examines how a seller's ability to reveal product match information affects equilibrium price and welfare in a duopoly market. Without any product information provided, a consumer must search for and check a product before buying it. Revealing pre-search information allows a seller to segment a market into two parts: consumers who are matched to the revealing seller, and those who are not. We characterize conditions when the equilibrium prices feature an inverted U-shape in search cost for both sellers who reveal and sellers who don't. We also discuss the welfare consequences of three different information disclosure rules: voluntary disclosure, mandatory disclosure, and mandatory concealment. Under a mandatory disclosure rule, social waste from excessive search and mismatch is minimized, but the inefficiency caused by under-provision through an increased equilibrium price is maximized. In contrast, under a mandatory concealment rule, social waste from excessive search and mismatch is maximized. However, a consumer may be better off under a mandatory concealment rule due to a lower equilibrium price. The third chapter studies the effect of ``prominence" on sellers' optimal product design decisions when a consumer must visit each seller in order to learn the cost and matching value of their product, while incurring search costs in the process. Consumers first search for prominent sellers with no recall, and then search for infinitely many “non-prominent” sellers. When the quality distribution of a prominent seller is identical to that of a non-prominent seller, the optimal product design and the optimal price of a seller is unaffected by whether the seller is prominent or not. In other words, all of the sellers share a common quality threshold, above which a seller chooses broad product design, and below which a seller chooses niche product design. We show that the quality threshold of a prominent seller increases when a prominent seller is from a ``better" quality distribution. Improved quality distribution makes a consumer pickier when searching for a prominent seller, which in turn makes the competition more intense in the market. With a higher level competition, only a seller with a higher quality can survive in a market of broad design products
Essays On Industrial Organization
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Author : Thomas G. Wollmann
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Essays On Industrial Organization written by Thomas G. Wollmann and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
This dissertation comprises three essays on industrial organization. The first essay studies how product-level entry and exit decisions impact business and public policy analysis. It provides an empirical model that incorporates these decisions and then estimates it in the context of the commercial vehicle segment of the US automotive industry. Finally, it demonstrates the importance of accounting for product-level changes using the $85 billion decision to rescue two US automakers in 2009. The second essay studies how two period strategies perform relative to Markov perfect strategies in discrete dynamic games. In particular, it considers a simple entry/exit game and shows that agents sacrifice very little in terms of expected discounted payoffs when they employ these simpler strategies. It also shows this result is robust to varying the underlying market characteristics. The third essay estimates the causal impact of research expenditures on scientific output. Unexpected college football outcomes provide exogenous variation to university funds, and in turn, research expenditures in the subsequent year. Using this variation, it estimates the dollar elasticity of scholarly articles, new patent applications, and the citations that accrue to each.