Essays On The Economics Of Social Networks
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Essays On The Economics Of Social Networks
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Author : Won Hee Park
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Essays On The Economics Of Social Networks written by Won Hee Park and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.
This dissertation consists of two projects, both concerned with how social networks form and how they affect economic decisions. In the first project, entitled Identifying Influential Agents in a Social Network, I define influence centrality, a new measure of influence which combines information on node and neighbor characteristics as well as information on the network structure, by building a model of friendship formation and peer effects and calculating the change in the equilibrium behavior of the network when one node changes its behavior. I apply the model to the context of smoking among middle and high school students and show that a targeted anti-smoking intervention in which a small number of influential smoking students are treated may be more efficient than a uniform program where every student in the school receives the same anti-smoking treatment. The second project, entitled Quantifying Spillovers in Network Formation Over Time, is a joint work with Sean Chu and Shankar Kalyanaraman at Facebook. The goal of the project is to separately identify and understand the relative importance of network effects and unobserved heterogeneity in a multi-period network formation model. Here, we define network effects to be the effect of the number of mutual friends on the probability of friendship and assume that unobserved heterogeneity is time-consistent. We estimate the model on a de-identified panel data set from a small group of users on Facebook and find that both network effects and unobserved heterogeneity are statistically and economically significant predictors of friendship formation on Facebook. We further re-estimate the model first, without network effects and next, without unobserved heterogeneity. Comparing the results from these specifications, we find that network effects play a more important role than unobserved heterogeneity in network formation models on Facebook.
Essays On The Economics Of Social Networks
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Author : Wei Cheng (Ph. D. in economics)
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2017
Essays On The Economics Of Social Networks written by Wei Cheng (Ph. D. in economics) and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017 with Economics categories.
The third essay studies the productivity spillovers from colleagues and coauthors simultaneously for scientific workers. I use department fixed effects and individual fixed effects to control for departmental common shocks and individual selection. In addition, I model scientists’ mobility choices and use citation breakout as the exclusion variable to address the potential endogenous year-to-year change in colleague networks. Having solved the endogeneity issue of colleague networks, I construct instruments for coauthor quality by exploiting the characteristics of the (estimated staying) colleagues of a scientist’s noncolleague coauthors. Our results provide strong evidence coauthors generate significant spillover effects while colleagues do not. Increasing the number of a scientist’s coauthors by one on average increases his productivity by 2%. Our findings highlight the important of being exposed to a wider spectrum of ideas and knowledge in the production of science. Additionally, spillovers from colleagues remain insignificant across departments of different sizes or quality, and the estimated magnitude of coauthor spillovers is robust to different specifications and subsamples.
Essays On Economic And Social Networks
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Author : Adrien Vigier
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Essays On Economic And Social Networks written by Adrien Vigier and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
Three Essays On Social Networks In Economics
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Author : Livia Shkoza
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2022
Three Essays On Social Networks In Economics written by Livia Shkoza and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2022 with categories.
Essays On Social Networks And Behavioral Economics
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Author : Isabel Melguizo López
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Essays On Social Networks And Behavioral Economics written by Isabel Melguizo López and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.
Los individuos a menudo exhiben robustos patrones de comportamiento al relacionarse con otros y cuando toman decisiones económicas. Por ejemplo, tienden a interactuar de manera desproporcionada con otros similares a ellos. Además, las dimensiones no-cognitivas de la personalidad, como la confianza o la perseverancia afectan a la dilación de las tareas. Esta tesis incorpora estos patrones de comportamiento en modelos económicos de aprendizaje social y de decisiones sobre el momento en el que desarrollar tareas. En el primer capítulo argumentamos cómo los desacuerdos se pueden perpetuar en la sociedad cuando los individuos forman sus opiniones comunicándose de manera desproporcionada con sus similares. Para ello consideramos un modelo dinámico de formación de opinión en el que los individuos desarrollan sus opiniones mediante la incorporación de las de otros en su red social. Nuestros individuos exhiben homofilia, esto es, la atención que prestan a otros se basa en la posesión de atributos similares. La característica clave de este marco es que la atención co-evoluciona con las opiniones, regida por cuán sobresalientes son los atributos. Esta prominencia viene dada por la diferencia de opiniones entre los grupos que poseen y que carecen de estos atributos. Al asumir que los atributos con mayores diferencias en opiniones merecen más atención, mostramos si hay, inicialmente, un único atributo sobresaliente, éste recibe una atención creciente en el tiempo y la sociedad queda escindida en dos grupos de pensamiento. Esta situación se presenta porque los individuos reorientan sus interacciones con otros similares en el rasgo más saliente de tal manera que las opiniones no se mezclan. En el segundo capítulo complementamos el estudio del primero explorando cómo modificaciones en el comportamiento de los individuos afectan a la formación de opiniones. Incorporamos el caso en el cual las opiniones están sujetas a las perturbaciones y demostramos que el desacuerdo es robusto a la aleatoriedad. También discutimos el caso en que los individuos se influencian entre sí con diferentes intensidades, como McPherson et al. (2001) documenta, los jóvenes exhiben mayor homofilia de género que los mayores. Encontramos que cuando algunos individuos agravan la atención que prestan al rasgo más sobresaliente inicialmente, el desacuerdo persiste a través de él, siendo las diferencias en opiniones más mayores que en el caso simétrico. Finalmente exploramos condiciones generales sobre la evolución de la homofilia para que el desacuerdo persista. En el primer capítulo discutimos un proceso particular en el que la evolución de homofilia promueve el desacuerdo, por el contrario, la homofilia constante en Golub y Jackson (2012) afecta a la velocidad de convergencia al consenso, un resultado que siempre surgía. La conciliación de ambos resultado descansa en afirmar que el desacuerdo persiste siempre que que los individuos intensifiquen sus relaciones con otros similares, suficientemente rápido. Específicamente, hay dos fuerzas en juego: primero, las personas prestan cada vez más atención a los demás sobre la base de un atributo específico. Segundo, siempre prestan atención a todos los demás. El desacuerdo persiste cuando la primera domina. En el último capítulo, discutimos la relevancia de las habilidades no-cognitivas en la decisión de cuándo hacer frente a tareas difíciles, pero valiosas. Para ello consideramos un marco dinámico con un individuo caracterizado por el potencial con el que ejecuta sus habilidades. Mostramos que cuando este individuo presenta bajo potencial, se enfrenta siempre a tareas fáciles de bajo valor mientras que cuando presenta alto potencial, se enfrenta siempre a tareas difíciles. Cuando este potencial es sensible a la consecución de resultados, el individuo puede encontrar óptimo pasar de tareas fáciles a difíciles en algún momento. Intuitivamente, los éxitos en tareas fáciles lo motivan a enfrentarse a tareas difíciles.
Essays On Behavioral Economics And Social Networks
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Author : David Benjamin Zuckerman
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2022
Essays On Behavioral Economics And Social Networks written by David Benjamin Zuckerman and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2022 with categories.
This dissertation contains three essays relating to behavioral economics and social networks. In the first chapter, I experimentally investigate third-party preferences for compensation and punishment after one party financially harms another for their own benefit. I find that demand for both compensation and punishment extends beyond pure distributional concerns, reflecting preferences for (what I term) compensatory and retributive justice, respectively. In the second chapter, I develop a simple model of friendship formation that provides insight into three key empirical patterns regarding homophily, our tendency to form connections with those most similar to us. In the model, agents have homophilic preferences along two dimensions, but homophily is only measured along a single dimension. Via simulations, I show that introducing this second dimension (qualitatively) generates all three noted patterns. In the final chapter, I and co-authors develop a dynamic theory of endogenous preference formation in which people adopt worldviews that shape their judgments about their experiences. The theory generates rich behavioral dynamics, illuminating a wide range of applications and providing potential explanations for a variety of observed phenomena.
Essays On Social Networks In Development Economics
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Author : Arun Gautham Chandrasekhar
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012
Essays On Social Networks In Development Economics written by Arun Gautham Chandrasekhar and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.
(cont.) substitutes for commitment. On net, savings allows individuals to smooth risk that cannot be shared interpersonally, with the largest benefits for those who are weakly connected in the network. The final chapter (co-authored with my classmates Horacio Larreguy and Juan Pablo Xandri) attempts to determine which models of social learning on networks best describe empirical behavior. Theory has focused on two leading models of social learning on networks: Bayesian and DeGroot rules of thumb learning. These models can yield greatly divergent behavior; individuals employing rules of thumb often double-count information and may not exhibit convergent behavior in the long run. By conducting a unique lab experiment in rural Karnataka, India, set up to exactly differentiate between these two models, we test which model best describes social learning processes on networks. We study experiments in which seven individuals are placed into a network, each with full knowledge of its structure. The participants attempt to learn the underlying (binary) state of the world. Individuals receive independent, identically distributed signals about the state in the first period only; thereafter, individuals make guesses about the underlying state of the world and these guesses are transmitted to their neighbors at the beginning of the following round. We consider various environments including incomplete information Bayesian models and provide evidence that individuals are best described by DeGroot models wherein they either take simple majority of opinions in their neighborhood.
Essays In Social Networks And Development Economics
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Essays In Social Networks And Development Economics written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
This dissertation is a collection of three essays on social networks and development economics. The first chapter examines the effect of peer networks on self-control problems. I construct a theoretical model to describe the way in which peer networks influence consumption behaviors through social norms, which guide individuals to conform to their friends' behavior. Using comprehensive data from a monthly survey conducted in 16 villages in Thailand from 1999 through 2004, I empirically examine peer effects on temptation consumption patterns, and test the mechanism underlying this relationship. Detailed social network information in the dataset allows the identification of impacts using a friend of a friend (excluded network) as the instrument. The empirical results provide evidence that peer decisions significantly impact individuals' temptation consumption such as alcohol and gambling, as well as savings. These peer effects are driven primarily by social norms, rather than by risk sharing. In the second chapter, co-authored with professor Laura Schechter, we first conduct an extensive review of the disparate literature studying the stability of preferences measured in experiments. Then, we test the stability of individuals' choices in panel data from rural Paraguay, including both experimental and survey measures of risk, time, and social preferences collected over almost a decade. Answers to survey questions are quite stable, while experimental measures are less so. If choices made in experiments are not stable, it may be because these choices are influenced by shocks, or because they include high levels of noise. We find no evidence that real-world shocks influence play in games. We suggest that in a developing country context, researchers may want to design simpler experiments or make more use of survey questions to measure preferences. The third chapter explores the impact of weather shocks on farmers' income diversification strategies. I combine historical weather data with household data in India to explore whether farmers employ different responses toward weather shocks in regions with different levels of historical variation. I find that weather shocks can negatively affect agricultural income, but this effect decreases in a riskier place where people have, over time, diversified their income into off-farm employment. I also find evidence that caste-networks can potentially determine people's income diversification strategies. Households who are within a different caste from the majority of their village peers will be more likely to seek for off-farm jobs, while households who are in a similar caste to the majority of the people within the village will seek agricultural wage jobs from others in the village.
Essays On Signaling And Social Networks
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Author : Tomas Rodriguez Barraquer
language : en
Publisher: Stanford University
Release Date : 2011
Essays On Signaling And Social Networks written by Tomas Rodriguez Barraquer and has been published by Stanford University this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
Over the last few decades some analytic tools intensely used by economics have produced useful insights in topics formerly in the exclusive reach of other social sciences. In particular game theory, justifiable from either a multi-person decision theoretic perspective or from an evolutionary one, often serves as a generous yet sufficiently tight framework for interdisciplinary dialogue. The three essays in this collection apply game theory to answer questions with some aspects of economic interest. The three of them have in common that they are related to topics to which other social sciences, specially sociology, have made significant contributions. While working within economics I have attempted to use constructively and faithfully some of these ideas. Chapter 1, coauthored with Xu Tan, studies situations in which a set of agents take actions in order to convey private information to an observing third party which then assigns a set of prizes based on its beliefs about the ranking of the agents in terms of the unobservable characteristic. These situations were first studied using game theoretic frameworks by Spence and Akerlof in the early seventies, but some of the key insights date back to the foundational work of Veblen. In our analysis we focus on the competitive aspect of some of these situations and cast signals as random variables whose distributions are determined by the underlying unobservable characteristics. Under this formulation different signals have inherent meanings, preceding any stable conventions that may be established. We use these prior meanings to propose an equilibrium selection criterion, which significantly refines the very large set of sequential equilibria in this class of games. In Chapter 2, coauthored with Matthew O. Jackson and Xu Tan, we study the structure of social networks that allow individuals to cooperate with one another in settings in which behavior is non-contractible, by supporting schemes of credible ostracism of deviators. There is a significant literature on the subject of cooperation in social networks focusing on the role of the network in transmitting the information necessary for the timely punishment of deviators, and deriving properties of network structures able to sustain cooperation from that perspective. Ours is one of the first efforts to understand the network restrictions that emerge purely from the credibility of ostracism, carefully considering the implications that the dissolution of any given relationship may have over the sustainability of other relations in the community. In Chapter 3 I study the sets of Pure Strategy Nash equilibria of a variety of binary games of social influence under complete information. In a game of social influence agents simultaneously choose one of two possible strategies (to be inactive or be active), and the optimal choice depends on the strategies of the agents in their social environment. Different social environments and assumptions on the way in which they influence the behavior of the agents lead to different classes of games of varying degrees of tractability. In any such game an equilibrium can be described by the set of agents that are active, and the full set of equilibria can be thus represented as a collection of subsets of the set of agents. I build the analysis of each of the classes of games that I consider around the question: What collections of sets are expressible as the set of equilibria of some game in the class? I am able to provide precise answers to these questions in some of the classes studied, and in other cases just some pointers.
Essays On Signaling And Social Networks
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Author : Tomas Rodriguez Barraquer
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Essays On Signaling And Social Networks written by Tomas Rodriguez Barraquer and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
Over the last few decades some analytic tools intensely used by economics have produced useful insights in topics formerly in the exclusive reach of other social sciences. In particular game theory, justifiable from either a multi-person decision theoretic perspective or from an evolutionary one, often serves as a generous yet sufficiently tight framework for interdisciplinary dialogue. The three essays in this collection apply game theory to answer questions with some aspects of economic interest. The three of them have in common that they are related to topics to which other social sciences, specially sociology, have made significant contributions. While working within economics I have attempted to use constructively and faithfully some of these ideas. Chapter 1, coauthored with Xu Tan, studies situations in which a set of agents take actions in order to convey private information to an observing third party which then assigns a set of prizes based on its beliefs about the ranking of the agents in terms of the unobservable characteristic. These situations were first studied using game theoretic frameworks by Spence and Akerlof in the early seventies, but some of the key insights date back to the foundational work of Veblen. In our analysis we focus on the competitive aspect of some of these situations and cast signals as random variables whose distributions are determined by the underlying unobservable characteristics. Under this formulation different signals have inherent meanings, preceding any stable conventions that may be established. We use these prior meanings to propose an equilibrium selection criterion, which significantly refines the very large set of sequential equilibria in this class of games. In Chapter 2, coauthored with Matthew O. Jackson and Xu Tan, we study the structure of social networks that allow individuals to cooperate with one another in settings in which behavior is non-contractible, by supporting schemes of credible ostracism of deviators. There is a significant literature on the subject of cooperation in social networks focusing on the role of the network in transmitting the information necessary for the timely punishment of deviators, and deriving properties of network structures able to sustain cooperation from that perspective. Ours is one of the first efforts to understand the network restrictions that emerge purely from the credibility of ostracism, carefully considering the implications that the dissolution of any given relationship may have over the sustainability of other relations in the community. In Chapter 3 I study the sets of Pure Strategy Nash equilibria of a variety of binary games of social influence under complete information. In a game of social influence agents simultaneously choose one of two possible strategies (to be inactive or be active), and the optimal choice depends on the strategies of the agents in their social environment. Different social environments and assumptions on the way in which they influence the behavior of the agents lead to different classes of games of varying degrees of tractability. In any such game an equilibrium can be described by the set of agents that are active, and the full set of equilibria can be thus represented as a collection of subsets of the set of agents. I build the analysis of each of the classes of games that I consider around the question: What collections of sets are expressible as the set of equilibria of some game in the class? I am able to provide precise answers to these questions in some of the classes studied, and in other cases just some pointers.