Essays On The Theory Of Financial Intermediation
DOWNLOAD
Download Essays On The Theory Of Financial Intermediation PDF/ePub or read online books in Mobi eBooks. Click Download or Read Online button to get Essays On The Theory Of Financial Intermediation book now. This website allows unlimited access to, at the time of writing, more than 1.5 million titles, including hundreds of thousands of titles in various foreign languages. If the content not found or just blank you must refresh this page
The Theory Of Financial Intermediation
DOWNLOAD
Author : Bert Scholtens
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003
The Theory Of Financial Intermediation written by Bert Scholtens and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with Finance categories.
Essays In The Theory Of Financial Intermediation
DOWNLOAD
Author : Nathalie Rossiensky
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1998
Essays In The Theory Of Financial Intermediation written by Nathalie Rossiensky and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1998 with categories.
Essays On The Theory Of Financial Intermediation
DOWNLOAD
Author : Michel de Lange
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1992
Essays On The Theory Of Financial Intermediation written by Michel de Lange and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1992 with Credit categories.
Essays On Financial Intermediation
DOWNLOAD
Author : Igor Salitskiy
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
Essays On Financial Intermediation written by Igor Salitskiy and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
This dissertation consists of three studies. In the first study I This paper extends the costly state verification model from Townsend (1979) to a dynamic and hierarchical setting with an investor, a financial intermediary, and an entrepreneur. Such a hierarchy is natural in a setting where the intermediary has special monitoring skills. This setting yields a theory of seniority and dynamic control: it explains why investors are usually given the highest priority on projects' assets, financial intermediaries have middle priority and entrepreneurs have the lowest priority; it also explains why more cash flow and control rights are allocated to financial intermediaries if a project's performance is bad and to entrepreneurs if it is good. I show that the optimal contracts can be replicated with debt and equity. If the project requires a series of investments until it can be sold to outsiders, the entrepreneur sells preferred stock (a combination of debt and equity) each time additional financing is needed. If the project generates a series of positive payoffs, the entrepreneur sells a combination of short-term and long-term debt. In the second study I I study optimal government interventions during asset fire sales by banks. Fire sales happen when a large portion of banks receive liquidity shocks. This depletes bank balance sheets directly and indirectly because these assets are used as collateral. The government can respond by buying distressed assets or buying stock from banks. Stock purchases do not deprive banks of collateral, but may have a lower effect on asset prices. The optimal policy depends on the elasticity of asset prices to asset supply and the amount of assets held by banks. Calibration to the recent financial crisis is provided. In the third study conducted with Attila Ambrus and Eric Chaney we use ransom prices and time to ransom for over 10,000 captives rescued from two Barbary strongholds to investigate the empirical relevance of dynamic bargaining models with one-sided asymmetric information in ransoming settings. We observe both multiple negotiations that were ex ante similar from the uninformed party's (seller's) point of view, and information that only the buyer knew. Through reduced-form analysis, we test some common qualitative predictions of dynamic bargaining models. We also structurally estimate the model in Cramton (1991) to compare negotiations in different Barbary strongholds. Our estimates suggest that the historical bargaining institutions were remarkably efficient, despite the presence of substantial asymmetric information.
Essays On Banking And Financial Intermediation
DOWNLOAD
Author : Yuteng Cheng (Ph.D.)
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2022
Essays On Banking And Financial Intermediation written by Yuteng Cheng (Ph.D.) and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2022 with categories.
Chapter 1 uses a mix of theory and data to study the unintended consequences of mandatory retention rules in securitization. The Dodd-Frank Act and the EU Securitization Regulation both impose a 5% mandatory retention requirement in securitization to motivate financial intermediaries to screen and monitor their borrowers more carefully. To better understand the impact of the policy, this chapter studies two related research questions. First, can mandatory retention have unintended consequences? Second, is the current level of retention optimal? To answer those questions, I propose a novel trade-off model in which retention strengthens monitoring but may also encourage banks to shift risk. I go on to provide empirical evidence supporting this unintended consequence: in the data, banks shifted toward riskier portfolios after the implementation of the retention rules embedded in Dodd-Frank. Furthermore, the model provides clear testable predictions about policy and corresponding consequences. I show in the data that stricter retention rules caused banks to monitor and shift risk simultaneously. According to the model prediction, such a simultaneous increase can only occur when the retention level is above optimal, which suggests that the current rate of 5% in the US is too high. Chapter 2Chapter 2 studies the source of fragility of OTC-natured interbank markets. Most research on the fragility of interbank markets -in the sense of multiplicity of equilibria driven by adverse selection-relies on a competitive market structure. By contrast, this chapter accounts for the OTC market nature and the market power of some players. Under adverse selection alone, markets are not fragile; that is, the equilibrium is unique. However, when adverse selection is combined with moral hazard on the borrowers' side, multiple equilibria arise again, and the bad equilibrium exhibits troubled banks gambling for resurrection. An interest rate floor eliminates the bad equilibrium. More generally, policies to reduce fragility should address moral hazard rather than adverse selection. Chapter 3Chapter 3 studies the contracting differences between corporate loans that are sold in the secondary market and that are securitized in the CLO market. With secondary loan sales and CLO markets being the two markets for corporate loan commoditization, empirical studies find that banks add additional restrictive covenants to loans sold and looser covenants to loans securitized. Why is it so? This chapter builds a theoretical model to explain such contracting differences in these two markets. The key mechanism is that the bank alleviates the borrowers' moral hazard problem via public monitoring and charges higher interest rates due to the relaxing of incentives provided. Those high interest rates facilitate loan sales because the information problem embedded in loan sales is lessened. In contrast, adverse selection is less severe in securitization since the bank retains the information-sensitive tranche.
Essays On Banking And Financial Intermediation
DOWNLOAD
Author : Yuteng Cheng (Ph.D.)
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2022
Essays On Banking And Financial Intermediation written by Yuteng Cheng (Ph.D.) and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2022 with categories.
Chapter 1 uses a mix of theory and data to study the unintended consequences of mandatory retention rules in securitization. The Dodd-Frank Act and the EU Securitization Regulation both impose a 5% mandatory retention requirement in securitization to motivate financial intermediaries to screen and monitor their borrowers more carefully. To better understand the impact of the policy, this chapter studies two related research questions. First, can mandatory retention have unintended consequences? Second, is the current level of retention optimal? To answer those questions, I propose a novel trade-off model in which retention strengthens monitoring but may also encourage banks to shift risk. I go on to provide empirical evidence supporting this unintended consequence: in the data, banks shifted toward riskier portfolios after the implementation of the retention rules embedded in Dodd-Frank. Furthermore, the model provides clear testable predictions about policy and corresponding consequences. I show in the data that stricter retention rules caused banks to monitor and shift risk simultaneously. According to the model prediction, such a simultaneous increase can only occur when the retention level is above optimal, which suggests that the current rate of 5% in the US is too high. Chapter 2Chapter 2 studies the source of fragility of OTC-natured interbank markets. Most research on the fragility of interbank markets -in the sense of multiplicity of equilibria driven by adverse selection-relies on a competitive market structure. By contrast, this chapter accounts for the OTC market nature and the market power of some players. Under adverse selection alone, markets are not fragile; that is, the equilibrium is unique. However, when adverse selection is combined with moral hazard on the borrowers' side, multiple equilibria arise again, and the bad equilibrium exhibits troubled banks gambling for resurrection. An interest rate floor eliminates the bad equilibrium. More generally, policies to reduce fragility should address moral hazard rather than adverse selection. Chapter 3Chapter 3 studies the contracting differences between corporate loans that are sold in the secondary market and that are securitized in the CLO market. With secondary loan sales and CLO markets being the two markets for corporate loan commoditization, empirical studies find that banks add additional restrictive covenants to loans sold and looser covenants to loans securitized. Why is it so? This chapter builds a theoretical model to explain such contracting differences in these two markets. The key mechanism is that the bank alleviates the borrowers' moral hazard problem via public monitoring and charges higher interest rates due to the relaxing of incentives provided. Those high interest rates facilitate loan sales because the information problem embedded in loan sales is lessened. In contrast, adverse selection is less severe in securitization since the bank retains the information-sensitive tranche.
Essays On Financial Intermediation
DOWNLOAD
Author : Gabriel Asaftei
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004
Essays On Financial Intermediation written by Gabriel Asaftei and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with Banks and banking categories.
Four Essays On Financial Intermediation
DOWNLOAD
Author : Stephen Donald Williamson
language : en
Publisher: Ann Arbor, Mich. : University Microfilms International
Release Date : 1984
Four Essays On Financial Intermediation written by Stephen Donald Williamson and has been published by Ann Arbor, Mich. : University Microfilms International this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1984 with Financial institutions categories.
Finance And Financial Intermediation
DOWNLOAD
Author : Harold L. Cole
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2019-03-29
Finance And Financial Intermediation written by Harold L. Cole and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019-03-29 with Business & Economics categories.
The financial system is a densely interconnected network of financial intermediaries, facilitators, and markets that serves three major purposes: allocating capital, sharing risks, and facilitating intertemporal trade. Asset prices are an important mechanism in each of these phenomena. Capital allocation, whether through loans or other forms of investment, can vary both across sectors-at the broadest, manufactures, agriculture, and services-and within sectors, for example different firms. The risk that various investors are willing to take reflects their financial position and alternative opportunities. Risk and asset allocation are also influenced by whether money, and especially its expenditure, is more important now or in the future. These decisions are all influenced by governmental policies. When there are mismatches, the results include financial meltdowns, fiscal deficits, sovereign debt, default and debt crises. Harold L. Cole provides a broad overview of the financial system and assets pricing, covering history, institutional detail, and theory. The book begins with an overview of financial markets and their operation and then covers asset pricing for standard assets and derivatives, and analyzes what modern finance says about firm behavior and capital structure. It then examines theories of money, exchange rates, electronic payments methods, and cryptocurrencies. After exploring banks and other forms of financial intermediation, the book examines the role they played in the Great Recession. Having provided an overview of the provate sector, Cole switches to public finance and government borrowing as well as the incentives to monetize the public debt and its consequences. The book closes with an examination of sovereign debt crises and an analysis of their various forms. Finance and financial intermediation are central to modern economies. This book covers all of the material a sophisticated economist needs to know about this area.
Theory And Reality In Financial Economics
DOWNLOAD
Author : George M. Frankfurter
language : en
Publisher: World Scientific
Release Date : 2007
Theory And Reality In Financial Economics written by George M. Frankfurter and has been published by World Scientific this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with Business & Economics categories.
A collection of essays dealing with financial markets' imperfections, and the inability of neoclassical economics to deal with such imperfections. This book argues that financial economics, as based on the tenets of neoclassical economics, cannot answer or solve the real-life problems that people face.