Evolutionary Game Dynamics
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Evolutionary Game Dynamics
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Author : American Mathematical Society. Short Course
language : en
Publisher: American Mathematical Soc.
Release Date : 2011-10-27
Evolutionary Game Dynamics written by American Mathematical Society. Short Course and has been published by American Mathematical Soc. this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011-10-27 with Mathematics categories.
This volume is based on lectures delivered at the 2011 AMS Short Course on Evolutionary Game Dynamics, held January 4-5, 2011 in New Orleans, Louisiana. Evolutionary game theory studies basic types of social interactions in populations of players. It combines the strategic viewpoint of classical game theory (independent rational players trying to outguess each other) with population dynamics (successful strategies increase their frequencies). A substantial part of the appeal of evolutionary game theory comes from its highly diverse applications such as social dilemmas, the evolution of language, or mating behaviour in animals. Moreover, its methods are becoming increasingly popular in computer science, engineering, and control theory. They help to design and control multi-agent systems, often with a large number of agents (for instance, when routing drivers over highway networks or data packets over the Internet). While these fields have traditionally used a top down approach by directly controlling the behaviour of each agent in the system, attention has recently turned to an indirect approach allowing the agents to function independently while providing incentives that lead them to behave in the desired way. Instead of the traditional assumption of equilibrium behaviour, researchers opt increasingly for the evolutionary paradigm and consider the dynamics of behaviour in populations of agents employing simple, myopic decision rules.
Evolutionary Games And Population Dynamics
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Author : Josef Hofbauer
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 1998-05-28
Evolutionary Games And Population Dynamics written by Josef Hofbauer and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1998-05-28 with Mathematics categories.
Every form of behaviour is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through individual learning or through natural selection, the basis of evolution. Since the work of Maynard Smith and others, it has been realised how game theory can model this process. Evolutionary game theory replaces the static solutions of classical game theory by a dynamical approach centred not on the concept of rational players but on the population dynamics of behavioural programmes. In this book the authors investigate the nonlinear dynamics of the self-regulation of social and economic behaviour, and of the closely related interactions between species in ecological communities. Replicator equations describe how successful strategies spread and thereby create new conditions which can alter the basis of their success, i.e. to enable us to understand the strategic and genetic foundations of the endless chronicle of invasions and extinctions which punctuate evolution. In short, evolutionary game theory describes when to escalate a conflict, how to elicit cooperation, why to expect a balance of the sexes, and how to understand natural selection in mathematical terms.
Population Games And Evolutionary Dynamics
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Author : William H. Sandholm
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date : 2010-12-17
Population Games And Evolutionary Dynamics written by William H. Sandholm and has been published by MIT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010-12-17 with Business & Economics categories.
Evolutionary game theory studies the behaviour of large populations of strategically interacting agents & is used by economists to predict in settings where traditional assumptions about the rationality of agents & knowledge may be inapplicable.
Essay On Nonlinear Evolutionary Game Dynamics
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Author : Marius Ionut Ochea
language : en
Publisher: Rozenberg Publishers
Release Date : 2010
Essay On Nonlinear Evolutionary Game Dynamics written by Marius Ionut Ochea and has been published by Rozenberg Publishers this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with categories.
Game Equilibrium Models I
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Author : Reinhard Selten
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2013-06-29
Game Equilibrium Models I written by Reinhard Selten and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013-06-29 with Mathematics categories.
There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to characterize the long-term outcome of frequency dependent selection, these concepts differ considerably in the 'philosophies' on which they are based. It is therefore not too surprising that they often lead to quite different evolutionary predictions (see, e. g. , Weissing 1983). The present paper intends to illustrate the incongruities between the two approaches towards a phenotypic theory of natural selection. A detailed game theoretical and dynamical analysis is given for a generic class of evolutionary normal form games.
Evolutionary Game Dynamics
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Author : Emin Dokumaci
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Evolutionary Game Dynamics written by Emin Dokumaci and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
Evolutionary Games In Natural Social And Virtual Worlds
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Author : Daniel Friedman
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2016-02-01
Evolutionary Games In Natural Social And Virtual Worlds written by Daniel Friedman and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016-02-01 with Business & Economics categories.
Over the last 25 years, evolutionary game theory has grown with theoretical contributions from the disciplines of mathematics, economics, computer science and biology. It is now ripe for applications. In this book, Daniel Friedman---an economist trained in mathematics---and Barry Sinervo---a biologist trained in mathematics---offer the first unified account of evolutionary game theory aimed at applied researchers. They show how to use a single set of tools to build useful models for three different worlds: the natural world studied by biologists; the social world studied by anthropologists, economists, political scientists and others; and the virtual world built by computer scientists and engineers. The first six chapters offer an accessible introduction to core concepts of evolutionary game theory. These include fitness, replicator dynamics, sexual dynamics, memes and genes, single and multiple population games, Nash equilibrium and evolutionarily stable states, noisy best response and other adaptive processes, the Price equation, and cellular automata. The material connects evolutionary game theory with classic population genetic models, and also with classical game theory. Notably, these chapters also show how to estimate payoff and choice parameters from the data. The last eight chapters present exemplary game theory applications. These include a new coevolutionary predator-prey learning model extending rock-paper-scissors; models that use human subject laboratory data to estimate learning dynamics; new approaches to plastic strategies and life cycle strategies, including estimates for male elephant seals; a comparison of machine learning techniques for preserving diversity to those seen in the natural world; analyses of congestion in traffic networks (either internet or highways) and the "price of anarchy"; environmental and trade policy analysis based on evolutionary games; the evolution of cooperation; and speciation. As an aid for instruction, a web site provides downloadable computational tools written in the R programming language, Matlab, Mathematica and Excel.
Game Equilibrium Models I
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Author : Reinhard Selten
language : en
Publisher: Springer
Release Date : 2010-12-01
Game Equilibrium Models I written by Reinhard Selten and has been published by Springer this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010-12-01 with Mathematics categories.
There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to characterize the long-term outcome of frequency dependent selection, these concepts differ considerably in the 'philosophies' on which they are based. It is therefore not too surprising that they often lead to quite different evolutionary predictions (see, e. g. , Weissing 1983). The present paper intends to illustrate the incongruities between the two approaches towards a phenotypic theory of natural selection. A detailed game theoretical and dynamical analysis is given for a generic class of evolutionary normal form games.
Evolutionary Dynamics And Extensive Form Games
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Author : Ross Cressman
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date : 2003
Evolutionary Dynamics And Extensive Form Games written by Ross Cressman and has been published by MIT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with Business & Economics categories.
Evolutionary game theory attempts to predict individual behavior (whether of humans or other species) when interactions between individuals are modeled as a noncooperative game. Most dynamic analyses of evolutionary games are based on their normal forms, despite the fact that many interesting games are specified more naturally through their extensive forms. Because every extensive form game has a normal form representation, some theorists hold that the best way to analyze an extensive form game is simply to ignore the extensive form structure and study the game in its normal form representation. This book rejects that suggestion, arguing that a game's normal form representation often omits essential information from the perspective of dynamic evolutionary game theory.
The Stability Concept Of Evolutionary Game Theory
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Author : Ross Cressman
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2013-03-09
The Stability Concept Of Evolutionary Game Theory written by Ross Cressman and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013-03-09 with Mathematics categories.
These Notes grew from my research in evolutionary biology, specifically on the theory of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS theory), over the past ten years. Personally, evolutionary game theory has given me the opportunity to transfer my enthusiasm for abstract mathematics to more practical pursuits. I was fortunate to have entered this field in its infancy when many biologists recognized its potential but were not prepared to grant it general acceptance. This is no longer the case. ESS theory is now a rapidly expanding (in both applied and theoretical directions) force that no evolutionary biologist can afford to ignore. Perhaps, to continue the life-cycle metaphor, ESS theory is now in its late adolescence and displays much of the optimism and exuberance of this exciting age. There are dangers in writing a text about a theory at this stage of development. A comprehensive treatment would involve too many loose ends for the reader to appreciate the central message. On the other hand, the current central message may soon become obsolete as the theory matures. Although the restricted topics I have chosen for this text reflect my own research bias, I am confident they will remain the theoretical basis of ESS theory. Indeed, I feel the adult maturity of ESS theory is close at hand and I hope the text will play an important role in this achievement.