Home eBooks Download › handling of tanks in indo pak wars

Handling Of Tanks In Indo Pak Wars

Download Handling Of Tanks In Indo Pak Wars PDF/ePub or read online books in Mobi eBooks. Click Download or Read Online button to get Handling Of Tanks In Indo Pak Wars book now. This website allows unlimited access to, at the time of writing, more than 1.5 million titles, including hundreds of thousands of titles in various foreign languages. If the content not found or just blank you must refresh this page

Handling Of Tanks In Indo Pak Wars

DOWNLOAD

Author : Agha Humayun Amin
language : en
Publisher: Lulu.com
Release Date :

Handling Of Tanks In Indo Pak Wars written by Agha Humayun Amin and has been published by Lulu.com this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on with categories.

Handling And Role Of Tanks In India Pakistan Wars

DOWNLOAD

Author : Agha Amin
language : en
Publisher: CreateSpace
Release Date : 2014-11-03

Handling And Role Of Tanks In India Pakistan Wars written by Agha Amin and has been published by CreateSpace this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-11-03 with categories.

Pakistans Changez Force, a two tank regiment screen performed brilliantly delaying two Indian divisions for 15 days but Pakistans 1 Corps despite having a tank division and a tank brigade miserably failed to counter attack at the right time. Further Pakistans 8 Tank Brigade attack was badly executed as map below explains. ANALYSIS PAKISTAN ARMY AND INDIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE SYSTEMS ARE OUTMODED AND UNREALISTIC

Atlas And Military History Of India Pakistan Wars

DOWNLOAD

Author : Agha Amin
language : en
Publisher: CreateSpace
Release Date : 2012-10-13

Atlas And Military History Of India Pakistan Wars written by Agha Amin and has been published by CreateSpace this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-10-13 with categories.

The first of my book 'The Pakistan Army till 1965' was distributed free of cost to a vast cross section of people including retired and serving Pakistani army officers of ranks varying from captain to four star general. Some copies were sent to libraries both Pakistani as well as foreign and some copies sent to research oriented organisations. No feedback was received from Pakistani readers, a happening, which may be termed as a rule rather than an exception. I have been writing for various Pakistani military journals since 1989. The various articles, which I thus wrote, dealt with doctrine, military training, leadership etc. With the exception of four cases out of which three were letters written praising my articles in two lines by officers who retired as colonels or brigadiers and one in which a factual error inadvertently committed by me was pointed out by the late General Attiq-ur-Rahman. No letter was written by any officer critically analysing my articles. The same is true for the vast majority of articles published in various army journals and magazines. The trend in Pakistan since independence has been towards anti-intellectualism. There are historical reasons for this anti-intellectualism. The irony is that the situation was not remedied after independence. Education in British India was aimed at acquiring degrees so that Indians could become lawyers doctors or government officials. That they surely did, in the process of which some acquired great wealth and also became political leaders, senior civil servants and prosperous middle class professionals. The intellectual basis of modern Europe's success was the renaissance, the French Revolution and the Industrial revolution. During this period great progress was made in Europe in political thought, philosophy and scientific advancement. The Indo-Pak sub-continent was introduced to modern thought by the British by virtue of being colonial subjects of the English East India Company. Thus research intellectual activity etc were never important or of any consequence for the people of the Indo-Pak. On the other hand a mad rush towards acquiring rank and status, government jobs or political power by claiming to be champions of Hindu and Muslim rights plagued the Indo-Pak Sub-Continent! Once this mad rush for government patronage and jobs got an impetus from 1858, communalism became a major factor in Indo-Pak politics. This was since at this time the other parts of the world were talking about nationalism, socialism and political liberties. All the intellectual thrust of Indians was towards interpreting laws in communal terms! This was a Godsend blessing for the British colonial rulers! They encouraged communalism since it divided the Indians and ensured that they stayed away from dangerous ideas like war of liberation against the colonial state or from socialism or communism. The British very cleverly introduced parliamentary institutions, which enabled the leading Indians to divert their energy into harmless constitutional debates! The fathers of communalism as an idea in Indian politics were Syed Ahmad Khan, Lala Lajpat Rai, Gandhi and the Jauhar brothers! The British on the other hand right from 1858 followed a subtle but brilliant policy, introducing parliamentary democracy as bait to divert the energies of the more prominent Indians! A bait, which aroused ambition, whether based on ego, lust for glory, social recognition or material rewards! Peaceful yet heroic! Safe yet glorious! The double advantage of pursuing a prosperous law practice or business career or wielding feudal power while at the same time also being leaders of the subject Indians and the possible successors of the British Viceroys! Parliamentary democracy or its prospects once the British finally left India produced two distinct kinds of reactions, both of which helped the British and went against the people of the Indo-Pak Sub-continent!

Why Indian Army And Pakistan Army Failed In 1965 War

DOWNLOAD

Author : Agha Humayun Amin
language : en
Publisher: CreateSpace
Release Date : 2013-10-29

Why Indian Army And Pakistan Army Failed In 1965 War written by Agha Humayun Amin and has been published by CreateSpace this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013-10-29 with History categories.

ForewordMajor (retd) Agha Humayun Amin is a rare type of army officer. He is a philosopher, debater and a very keen scholar of military affairs. His writings are prolific. He does not hesitate to call into question received wisdom and dares to explode sacred myths behind which military establishments generally hide their blunders and failures. I have benefited a great deal from his scholarly contribution on the Pakistan Army and have cited and quoted him in my book, Pakistan: The Garrison State – Origins, Evolution, Consequences (1947-2011). I particularly found his work very useful to understand the Kashmir War of 1947-48 and the 1965 war. I am therefore truly privileged to note that he has now presented a detailed analysis of the 1965 War in which he explains the reasons why neither India nor Pakistan made much headway in that conflict that lasted 17 days (6 – 23 September 1965). He writes with clarity not mincing words and therefore it is easy even for the general reader to follow his reasoning. However, he writes with an authority that comes only through a long and dedicated commitment to understanding the nature and purpose of war, the sociological and psychological underpinnings of warfare, the quality and competence needed to establish credible armed forces and above all the role and purpose of training for warfare. His knowledge is encyclopedic with regard to military philosophy. Since I have no background in military science or the art of modern warfare I am in no position to comment with authority on his evaluations of the reasons why the 1965 War ended in a stalemate. However, there is no doubt that he brings to bear his vast erudition on his analysis with great skill and persuasion. The roots of the problem are traced to the origins of the British Indian Army from whom both the Indian and Pakistani armies descend. The author argues that the Indians – Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs were recruited into that army essentially with the purpose of maintaining the status quo in the volatile tribal areas. They were never trained to be modern armies capable of independent responsibility to fight national wars. Famously, the British put little trust in the Indians with regard to leadership roles. Even when entry to the officer class or commissioned officers was granted to the Indians in 1919 they were not promoted to command positions beyond the rank of colonels. There were hardly one or two brigadiers when British rule ended in mid-August 1947. Amin asserts that the selection of officers and ordinary ranks was from amongst those sections of society which were traditionally known to have mercenary tendencies. British imperial policy conferred respectability upon them with the dubious “martial races theory”. In reality it was people from the least politically and socially aware sections of society who were employed in the Indian Army. In these circumstances, the partition of India and the division of the Indian Army resulted in sudden quick promotions. Men with little command experience and much less knowledge of strategic planning took over on both countries. While on the Indian side, Mahatma Gandhi's non-violence known as the doctrine of ahmisa resulted in the army being neglected and not being prepared to take upon the task of maintaining a credible defence of that huge country – something Nehru realized to his great horror during the 1962 Sino-Indian boundary war in which his men suffered humiliating defeat. In Pakistan, the military boss General Ayub Khan was content with the acquisition of weapons from the United States as sufficient to safeguard Pakistan. However, the problem was more serious than just two diametrically opposite philosophies on war. It was a lack of perspective on the tasks which devolve upon independent states and their armed forces. Quite simply national armies had to be fully prepared to take up the tasks commensurate with the realities of the territorial state.The author undertakes a detailed and

History Of Pakistan Army Volume Three 1965 War Analysed

DOWNLOAD

Author : Agha Amin
language : en
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
Release Date : 2017-05-11

History Of Pakistan Army Volume Three 1965 War Analysed written by Agha Amin and has been published by Createspace Independent Publishing Platform this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017-05-11 with categories.

CONCLUSION. The Pakistan Army in 1965 had the potential keeping in view its equipment, particularly tanks and artillery, vis a vis the state of Indian Armour and Artillery to inflict a decisive defeat on India.Poor Military leadership at the higher level in the final reckoning stands out as the principal cause of failure of the Pakistan Army to inflict a decisive military defeat on India.Ayub Khan was directly responsible for the leadership failure of the Pakistan Army. Conversely it was superior equipment and in particular tanks and artillery apart from the BRB in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor which enabled Pakistan to contain the Indians despite their considerable numerical superiority in infantry. Valour, Morale, Motivation played a part, but we must remember that valour alone did not save the Poles from being overrun by the Russians and Germans repeatedly during the period from late 18th Century till 1939!Valour did not save the Serbians from being over run by the German-Austrian-Bulgarian force in WW One. The tragedy of the Pakistan Army was that it failed to achieve even 50 % of what it was capable of achieving and only because of Qualitative reasons.The definite edge over equipment was lost after 1965 and in 1971 Pakistan was saved largely because of the fact that Indian superiority in infantry coupled with superior equipment was divided between the Eastern and Western Fronts. The year 1965 was crucial and Providence gave an opportunity to Pakistan to achieve something militarily.The Seeds of defeat were sowed long before partition and the seal of mediocrity was laid once the Ayub-Musa duo headed the army during the period 1951-1965! The Indian Army was handicapped because of an indifferent political leadership.Racially both the armies were largely similar and only fools can think that one was inherently braver than the other! Long ago Hobbes had rightly said; "Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body and mind;as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or quicker of mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he " . 126 The Pakistanis failed to do as well as they potentially could in 1965, keeping in view the on ground tangible realities, because in terms of intangible qualities, by virtue of a common historical experience;they were as qualitatively mediocre as the Indians! My service in Pakistan Army from 1981 to 1994, and an intense study of Sub Continental Military history, has reinforced this conviction that I first developed as a student of Forman Christian College Lahore during the period 1977-1978!The rest is Fiction!

Pakistan S Downfall In Kashmir

DOWNLOAD

Author : M. N. Gulati
language : en
Publisher: Manas
Release Date : 2001

Pakistan S Downfall In Kashmir written by M. N. Gulati and has been published by Manas this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2001 with History categories.

The Shindy Raised By The Ding-Dong Of 1965-War Had Momentarily Clouded Rational Judgement. Soon After The Dust And Fog Of War Had Settled Down, The Searching Minds Asked The Question - What Was All This About? The End Results? The Balance Sheet? They Were Not There In The Clash Of Metal Against Metal, Nor In The Biggest Tank Battle(S) Fought After The Second World War. Nor Could One Find The Answers In Strategic Concepts, Or Territorial Gain Or Loss. The Book Is The Story Of Those Momentous Battles, Fought And Not-Fought - A Birds' Eye View Presenting A Composite Picture Through All The Three Indo-Pak Wars.