Identification And Estimation Of Auction Models With A Random Number Of Bidders
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Identification And Estimation Of Auction Models With A Random Number Of Bidders
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Identification And Estimation Of Auction Models With A Random Number Of Bidders written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.
This dissertation is a collection of three chapters on structural analysis of auctions. The first chapter studies nonparametric identification of the distribution of bidder valuations in auctions where valuations are independently and symmetrically distributed, the number of bidders follows a Poisson distribution, and the number is not known to the bidders. I consider both first and second-price sealed bid auctions. If the data set consists of all auctions, including auctions with no bids or only one bid, then I show that data on either the first or second highest bid is sufficient for the model to be identified. If the data set does not include auctions with no bids and only the highest bids are observed, then information on the number of bidders is also needed for identification. In the second chapter, I develop a method for identifying and estimating a dynamic model of auctions like eBay. The market is modeled as an infinite sequence of second-price, sealed bid auctions of a homogenous good. Bidders arrive randomly and, upon arrival, they enter a pool of potential bidders. The actual bidders in an auction are drawn randomly from the pool. Conditional on bidding, a bidder exits if she wins and returns to the pool if she loses. Then bidders in the pool exit with some probability each period. I define and solve for the oblivious equilibrium (Weintraub et al. (2008)). I prove the stochastic stability and the existence of an equilibrium. The equilibrium yields a closed form solution for the bid function in which bidders shade their bids by their continuation values. I demonstrate that the model is identified (modulo the discount factor) from the data of bidder identities and the second highest bid. Based on the identification result, an estimation procedure is developed. In the third chapter I apply the model to a data from a Japanese online auction website. The estimation results suggest that market dynamics are important. The estimate of the valuations obtained when each auction is treated independently is 23% smaller than the estimates obtained from the dynamic model.
Essays On Empirical Auctions And Related Econometrics
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
Essays On Empirical Auctions And Related Econometrics written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
The first chapter studies identification and estimation of first-price auctions if the bidders face ambiguity about the distribution of valuations. Ambiguity is modeled using Gilboa and Schmeidler's (1989) Maxmin Expected Utility preferences. We exploit variation in the number of bidders to identify the essential primitives of the model. The identification result yields a closed form for the inverse bid function, which suggests a two-step estimation procedure. We study asymptotic and finite sample properties of the estimators. We find evidence of ambiguity in USFS timber auctions which leads to aggressive bidding for bidders with high valuations and has important implications for auction design. The second chapter proposes a procedure to test restrictions on infinite-dimensional parameters (partially) identified by unconditional or conditional moment equalities. Our new method allows us to test restrictions involving a continuum of inequalities. Examples of such restrictions include weakly increasing, concavity and first-order stochastic dominance. We show that our testing procedure controls size uniformly and has power approaching 1 against fixed alternatives. We conduct Monte Carlo Experiments to study the finite sample properties of our procedure. The third chapter studies the inference problem of bidders' risk attitudes in Independent Private Value (IPV) first-price auctions with multiplicative auction-level unobserved heterogeneity. Bidders are assumed to have Constant Relative Risk Aversion. Under the exclusion restriction that bidders randomly select themselves into auctions given the auction-level unobserved heterogeneity, bidders' CRRA coefficient is point-identified from bid data of auctions with at least two different number of active bidders. Our exclusion restriction is consistent with a variety of models with endogenous entry. Empirical application to USFS timber auctions shows that we will conclude that timber firms are risk averse if we ignoring the unobserved heterogeneity. But once we take the unobserved heterogeneity into account, risk neutrality is consistent with the data.
Identification And Estimation Of Risk Aversion In First Price Auctions With Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity
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Author : Serafin Grundi
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Identification And Estimation Of Risk Aversion In First Price Auctions With Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity written by Serafin Grundi and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with Auctions categories.
This paper shows point identification in first-price auction models with risk aversion and unobserved auction heterogeneity by exploiting multiple bids from each auction and variation in the number of bidders. The required exclusion restriction is shown to be consistent with a large class of entry models. If the exclusion restriction is violated, but weaker restrictions hold instead, the same identification strategy still yields valid bounds for the primitives. We propose a sieve maximum likelihood estimator. A series of Monte Carlo experiments illustrate that the estimator performs well in finite samples and that ignoring unobserved auction heterogeneity can lead to a significant bias in risk-aversion estimates. In an application to U.S. Forest Service timber auctions we find that the bidders are risk neutral, but we would reject risk neutrality without accounting for unobserved auction heterogeneity.
Structural Analysis Of Auction Data With An Unknown Number Of Bidders
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Author : Unjy Song
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004
Structural Analysis Of Auction Data With An Unknown Number Of Bidders written by Unjy Song and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with categories.
Modeling Online Auctions
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Author : Wolfgang Jank
language : en
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
Release Date : 2010-12-01
Modeling Online Auctions written by Wolfgang Jank and has been published by John Wiley & Sons this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010-12-01 with Mathematics categories.
Explore cutting-edge statistical methodologies for collecting, analyzing, and modeling online auction data Online auctions are an increasingly important marketplace, as the new mechanisms and formats underlying these auctions have enabled the capturing and recording of large amounts of bidding data that are used to make important business decisions. As a result, new statistical ideas and innovation are needed to understand bidders, sellers, and prices. Combining methodologies from the fields of statistics, data mining, information systems, and economics, Modeling Online Auctions introduces a new approach to identifying obstacles and asking new questions using online auction data. The authors draw upon their extensive experience to introduce the latest methods for extracting new knowledge from online auction data. Rather than approach the topic from the traditional game-theoretic perspective, the book treats the online auction mechanism as a data generator, outlining methods to collect, explore, model, and forecast data. Topics covered include: Data collection methods for online auctions and related issues that arise in drawing data samples from a Web site Models for bidder and bid arrivals, treating the different approaches for exploring bidder-seller networks Data exploration, such as integration of time series and cross-sectional information; curve clustering; semi-continuous data structures; and data hierarchies The use of functional regression as well as functional differential equation models, spatial models, and stochastic models for capturing relationships in auction data Specialized methods and models for forecasting auction prices and their applications in automated bidding decision rule systems Throughout the book, R and MATLAB software are used for illustrating the discussed techniques. In addition, a related Web site features many of the book's datasets and R and MATLAB code that allow readers to replicate the analyses and learn new methods to apply to their own research. Modeling Online Auctions is a valuable book for graduate-level courses on data mining and applied regression analysis. It is also a one-of-a-kind reference for researchers in the fields of statistics, information systems, business, and marketing who work with electronic data and are looking for new approaches for understanding online auctions and processes. Visit this book's companion website by clicking here
Nonparametric Identification And Estimation Of K Double Auctions
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Author : Huihui Li
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Nonparametric Identification And Estimation Of K Double Auctions written by Huihui Li and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.
This dissertation consists of two chapters on nonparametrically identifying and estimating the sealed-bid k-double auction models between single buyer and single seller.Chapter 1: Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of k-Double Auctions Using Bid DataThis chapter studies the nonparametric identification and estimation of double auctions with one buyer and one seller. This model assumes that both bidders submit their own sealed bids, and the transaction price is determined by a weighted average between the submitted bids when the buyers offer is higher than the sellers ask. It captures the bargaining process between two parties. Working within this double auction model, we first establish the nonparametric identification of both the buyers and the sellers private value distributions in two bid data scenarios; from the ideal situation in which all bids are available, to a more realistic setting in which only the transacted bids are available. Specifically, we can identify both private value distributions when all of the bids are observed. However, we can only partially identify the private value distributions on the support with positive (conditional) probability of trade when only the transacted bids are available in the data. Second, we estimate double auctions with bargaining using a two-step procedure that incorporates bias correction. We then show that our value density estimator achieves the same uniform convergence rate as Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) for one-sided auctions. Monte Carlo experiments show that, in finite samples, our estimation procedure works well on the whole support and significantly reduces the large bias of the standard estimator without bias correction in both interior and boundary regions.Chapter 2: Nonparametric Identification of k-Double Auctions Using Price DataThis chapter studies the model identification problem of k-double auctions between one buyer and one seller when the transaction price, rather than the traders bids, can be observed. Given that only the price data is available, I explore an identification strategy that utilizes the double auctions with extreme pricing weight (k=1 or 0) and exclusive covariates that shift only one traders value distribution to identify both the buyers and the sellers value distributions nonparametrically. First, as each exclusive covariate can take at least two values, the buyers and the sellers value distributions are partially identified from the price distribution for k=1 or k=0. The identified set is sharp and can be easily computed. I provide a set of sufficient conditions under which the traders value distributions are point identified. Second, when the exclusive covariates are continuous, it is shown that the buyers and the sellers value distributions will be uniquely determined by a partial differential equation that only depends on the price distribution, provided that the value distributions are known for at least one value of the exclusive covariates.
Identification And Estimation Of Auction Model With Two Dimensional Unobserved Heterogeneity
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Author : Elena Krasnokutskaya
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012
Identification And Estimation Of Auction Model With Two Dimensional Unobserved Heterogeneity written by Elena Krasnokutskaya and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.
This article investigates the empirical importance of allowing for multidimensional sources of unobserved heterogeneity in auction models with private information. It develops the estimation procedure to recover the distribution of private information in the presence of two sources of unobserved heterogeneity. It is shown that this estimation procedure identifies components of the model and produces uniformly consistent estimators of these components. The results of the estimation with highway procurement data indicate that allowing for two-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity may significantly affect the results of estimation as well as policy-relevant instruments derived from the estimated distributions of bidders' costs.
Three Essays In Empirical Auctions
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Author : Sudip Gupta
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005
Three Essays In Empirical Auctions written by Sudip Gupta and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with categories.
Identification Estimation And Testing Of Auction Models
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Author : Jie Wei
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
Identification Estimation And Testing Of Auction Models written by Jie Wei and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with Auctions categories.
The third chapter shows nonparametric identification and estimation of private value distribution and density functions in first-price auctions with endogenous entry. In the model, symmetric bidders face a nontrivial entry cost and a binding reserve price. We identify latent structures by solving a two stage game, and estimate density functions (point-wisely) by using and comparing two different methods. Monte Carlo experiments show good performance of our estimators.
Nonparametric Identication And Structural Estimation Of Auction Models
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Author : Ming He
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Nonparametric Identication And Structural Estimation Of Auction Models written by Ming He and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with Auction theory categories.
This dissertation contributes to the structural auction literature in two different auction models, namely the pure common value model and the affiliated private value model. The goal of structural analysis of auction data is to recover the model primitives and to provide policy guidance for welfare analysis. In Chapter 1, we study identification in the first-price and the second-price sealed-bid auctions within the pure common value framework. In Chapter 2, we apply the identification results and estimation method in Chapter 1 to analyze the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) wildcat auction data and provide policy guidance for welfare analysis. In Chapter 3, we develop identification and partial identification results for the first-price and the second-price sealed-bid auction models with affiliated private values and incomplete sets of bids. Chapter 1: In this chapter, we establish novel identification results for both the first-price and the second-price sealed-bid auction models within the pure common value framework. We show that the policy parameters, including the expected total welfare, the seller's expected revenue, and the bidders' expected surplus under any reserve price are identified for a general nonparametric class of latent joint distributions when the ex-post common value is unobserved. Moreover, we establish that these policy parameters are nonparametric identified without normalization assumption when the ex-post common value is observed. We propose a semiparametric estimation method and establish consistency of the estimator. Results from Monte Carlo experiments reveal good finite sample performance of the estimator. Chapter 2: In this chapter, we employ the identification strategy and estimation method in Chapter 1 to analyze data from the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) wildcat auctions in the pure common value framework. We study the welfare implication of different counterfactual reserve prices, focusing on the cases with two and three bidders. The empirical results suggest that if the U.S. government had set reserve prices optimally using the newly-developed econometric method in Chapter 1, its expected revenue can be increased by around $34\%$ and $30\%$ for these two cases, respectively. Lastly, we compare our results with those estimated under the affiliated private value framework, and find that the estimated welfare curves under the two different frameworks are very different. Chapter 3: In this chapter, we address the identification issue in the first-price sealed-bid affiliated private value model when an incomplete set of bids is observed. In the simple case with symmetric bidders and non-binding reserve price, we establish identification or partial identification results in two scenarios of practical interest. First, when the two highest bids are observed, we achieve identification of the joint distribution function of private values by assuming the copula function of private values to be a nonparametric Archimedean copula with weak requirement. Second, when only the highest bid is observed, we establish partial identification for the quantile function of private value and several policy parameters by parameterizing the copula function. Further, we extend the identification/partial identification results to the cases with asymmetric bidders and/or binding reserve price. We also extend our identification/partial identification results to the second-price sealed-bid auction.