Intelligence Failure In Korea
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Intelligence Failure In Korea
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Author : Major Justin M. Haynes
language : en
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
Release Date : 2015-11-06
Intelligence Failure In Korea written by Major Justin M. Haynes and has been published by Pickle Partners Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015-11-06 with History categories.
In November, 1950, the United States Army suffered one of its most devastating defeats ever, in the frozen mountains of North Korea at the hands of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. This defeat fundamentally changed the nature of the Korean War, from a near-certain United Nations victory into a fight for its very survival. It was, however, avoidable. This Chinese victory was partially the result of one of the most glaring failures in U.S. military intelligence history. The officer most responsible for this failure was the Far East Command Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G2), Major General Charles Andrew Willoughby. His inaccurate intelligence picture contributed to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur’s flawed understanding of the nature of the Chinese Communist intent. Charles Willoughby correctly identified the potential threat of a Chinese Communist intervention in Korea in late 1950, yet failed to acknowledge the significance of China’s strategic warnings, operational preparations for war and tactical confirmation of their intentions. Willoughby’s flawed assessment of Chinese intentions in the fall of 1950 was a result of rampant mirror imaging, complicated by circular analysis stemming from his exclusive control over intelligence reporting on the Korean theater. His significant personal prejudices against the Chinese ability fight exacerbated this problem. Once the United Nations Command undeniably confirmed that Chinese forces had entered North Korea, he minimized their significance in order to support MacArthur’s final offensive to the Yalu River in late November, ultimately resulting in the defeat of his command.
Intelligence Failure In Korea
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Author : U S Army Command and General Staff Coll
language : en
Publisher: CreateSpace
Release Date : 2014-11-07
Intelligence Failure In Korea written by U S Army Command and General Staff Coll and has been published by CreateSpace this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-11-07 with categories.
In November, 1950, the United States Army suffered one of its most devastating defeats ever, in the frozen mountains of North Korea at the hands of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. This defeat fundamentally changed the nature of the Korean War. It was, however, avoidable. This Chinese victory was partially the result of one of the most glaring failures in U.S. military intelligence history. The officer most responsible for this failure was the Far East Command Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G2), Major General Charles Andrew Willoughby. His inaccurate intelligence picture contributed to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's flawed understanding of the nature of the Chinese Communist intent.
Intelligence Failures And Decent Intervals
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Author : Esquire P. G. Kivett
language : en
Publisher: Intelligence Failures
Release Date : 2006
Intelligence Failures And Decent Intervals written by Esquire P. G. Kivett and has been published by Intelligence Failures this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with History categories.
Intelligence Failures and Decent Intervals provides a look at the truth behind military and diplomatic blunders to which "intelligence failure labels" have been attached that are intended to hide leadership failures responsible for the blunders. From the 1950 Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean War, to the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam and the so-called surprise attack that began the 1973 Yom Kippur War in the Middle East, the book exposes instance after instance in which this egregious practice has occurred. The detriment thus reaped by the practice inures to the erosion of the Intelligence Community's effectiveness and ultimately that of our national security. The book also offers support in the official position of the U.S. Army's Center of Military History for the author's suspicion that the Vietnam War was "lost" as a result of widespread leadership failures related to the discipline of Signals Intelligence.
Intelligence Success And Failure
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Author : Uri Bar-Joseph
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2017-03-03
Intelligence Success And Failure written by Uri Bar-Joseph and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017-03-03 with Political Science categories.
The study of strategic surprise has long concentrated on important failures that resulted in catastrophes such as Pearl Harbor and the September 11th attacks, and the majority of previously published research in the field determines that such large-scale military failures often stem from defective information-processing systems. Intelligence Success and Failure challenges this common assertion that catastrophic surprise attacks are the unmistakable products of warning failure alone. Further, Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott approach this topic uniquely by highlighting the successful cases of strategic surprise, as well as the failures, from a psychological perspective. This book delineates the critical role of individual psychopathologies in precipitating failure by investigating important historical cases. Bar-Joseph and McDermott use six particular military attacks as examples for their analysis, including: "Barbarossa," the June 1941 German invasion of the USSR (failure); the fall-winter 1941 battle for Moscow (success); the Arab attack on Israel on Yom Kippur 1973 (failure); and the second Egyptian offensive in the war six days later (success). From these specific cases and others, they analyze the psychological mechanisms through which leaders assess their own fatal mistakes and use the intelligence available to them. Their research examines the factors that contribute to failure and success in responding to strategic surprise and identify the learning process that central decision makers use to facilitate subsequent successes. Intelligence Success and Failure presents a new theory in the study of strategic surprise that claims the key explanation for warning failure is not unintentional action, but rather, motivated biases in key intelligence and central leaders that null any sense of doubt prior to surprise attacks.
Defiant Failed State
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Author : Bruce E. Bechtol
language : en
Publisher: Potomac Books, Inc.
Release Date : 2010-10
Defiant Failed State written by Bruce E. Bechtol and has been published by Potomac Books, Inc. this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010-10 with History categories.
Delineates the challenges posed by North Korea
Military Intelligence
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1994
Military Intelligence written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1994 with Military intelligence categories.
Chengdu
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Author : Jack Quian
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
Chengdu written by Jack Quian and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with Chengdu (China) categories.
Intelligence Failures and Decent Intervals provides a look at the truth behind military and diplomatic blunders to which "intelligence failure labels" have been attached that are intended to hide leadership failures responsible for the blunders. From the 1950 Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean War, to the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam and the so-called surprise attack that began the 1973 Yom Kippur War in the Middle East, the book exposes instance after instance in which this egregious practice has occurred. The detriment thus reaped by the practice inures to the erosion of the Intelligence Community's effectiveness and ultimately that of our national security. The book also offers support in the official position of the U.S. Army's Center of Military History for the author's suspicion that the Vietnam War was "lost" as a result of widespread leadership failures related to the discipline of Signals Intelligence.
Loyalty First
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Author : David A. Foy
language : en
Publisher: Casemate
Release Date : 2023-08-31
Loyalty First written by David A. Foy and has been published by Casemate this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2023-08-31 with Biography & Autobiography categories.
First full biography of MacArthur's chief intelligence officer Charles Willoughby, reflecting on the consequences of prioritizing loyalty to a superior over objectivity of intelligence. Major General Charles A. Willoughby served as Douglas MacArthur's stalwart chief intelligence officer (G-2} for over a decade, throughout World War II and the Korean War. This first full biography examines Willoughby's shadowy origins in his native Germany, his curious arrival in the United States, and his military service in World War I, as well as his work during the interwar years as a junior diplomat, budding historian, and neophyte intelligence officer. His chance encounter with MacArthur in the mid-1930s would prove to be the genesis of a near-symbiotic relationship between the two, with significant consequences for both. Throughout his life, Willoughby identified with strong, authoritarian leaders, notably Franco, and—especially—MacArthur. The author also assesses Willoughby's performance as a professional intelligence officer both in World War II and Korea, where he is often vilified for his inaccurate assessments of enemy strength and most likely courses of action, as well as his sycophantic relationship with his commander. Willoughby is most often criticized for his failing to foresee the entry of Chinese forces into the Korean War and its impact upon the US Army and the prosecution of the war. Following MacArthur’s removal by President Truman in 1951, Willoughby retired and spent the rest of his days engaged in right-wing political activity and in staunchly defending his much-maligned boss. The legacy he left is one filled with lingering and important questions about loyalty to superiors, in civilian as well as military environments, how far that loyalty should extend, and walking the tightrope involved in telling truth to power.
Senseless Secrets
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Author : Michael Lee Lanning
language : en
Publisher: Carol Publishing Corporation
Release Date : 1996
Senseless Secrets written by Michael Lee Lanning and has been published by Carol Publishing Corporation this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with History categories.
A historical review of military intelligence failures from the American revolution to Desert Storm written by a US veteran who served in Vietnam. Lanning argues that military intelligence needs to be restructured in order to eliminate the rivalry between the various divisions, and that attention to this continuing problem would save both money and lives. One of the more spectacular bloopers documented occurred in Grenada when forces landed with useless tourist maps and incorrect information about the location of the students and officials they were sent to rescue. No bibliography. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
Baptism By Fire Cia Analysis Of The Korean War
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Author : Central Intelligence Agency
language : en
Publisher: Independently Published
Release Date : 2019-03-12
Baptism By Fire Cia Analysis Of The Korean War written by Central Intelligence Agency and has been published by Independently Published this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019-03-12 with History categories.
The Korean War erupted less than three years after President Harry S. Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947, establishing the Central Intelligence Agency. Before North Korean forces invaded the South on 25 June 1950, the CIA had only a few officers in Korea, and none reported to the Agency's analytic arm, the Office of Research and Estimates (ORE). Analytical production relating to Korea reflected the generally low priority given the region by the Truman Administration's State Department and the military services. Indeed, most ORE current intelligence products, such as the Daily Summary, Weekly Summary, and Review of the World Situation, contained information derived from State Department and military reporting, usually supplemented with open source media material from domestic and foreign sources. New information or unique CIA contributions only rarely entered the mix. The Daily Summary, for example, which was intended primarily for President Truman, consisted of a highly selective digest of all dispatches and reports received on any given day from government sources. From 1947 on, in response to customer demands, the Daily began to include CIA interpretive comments, although they were not extensive. All members of the National Security Council, plus principal officers in the State Department and Pentagon, received the Daily, as they did the later Weekly Summary. The Review of the World Situation, which first appeared one week before the founding of the CIA, differed from the summaries as it was somewhere between current intelligence - published uncoordinated each month and brought up to date as of publication - and estimative intelligence. Written primarily for the NSC, the Review did not initially circulate beyond that small group. Truman did not attend NSC meetings until after the North Korean invasion, and he favored the smaller Daily and Weekly Summary, so it is doubtful the Review routinely came to his attention. By May 1948, however, copies of the Review did reach a minimum of 24 military and government offices, including the White House. Wider distribution, however, did not necessarily indicate the Review or the summaries had a wider readership or that government and military decision makers responded to the intelligence they contained by changing policies or formulating new courses of action.