Litigation And Settlement In A Game With Incomplete Information
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Litigation And Settlement In A Game With Incomplete Information
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Author : Wolfgang Ryll
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2012-12-06
Litigation And Settlement In A Game With Incomplete Information written by Wolfgang Ryll and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-12-06 with Business & Economics categories.
We investigate a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. So far, various theoretical attempts have been made to answer the question of why some people choose not to resolve their disputes and instead go to court and incur litigation costs, even if bargaining leaves room for both parties to fare better when avoiding the conflict. We can distinguish between games which focus on strategic elements like games with incomplete information (see, for example, P'ng (1983), Samuelson (1982) and Schweizer (1989» and decision-theoretic models neglecting strategic elements (see, for example, Landes (1971) and Gould (1973». The single-person decision theory approach to litigation assumes litigants to have a subjective estimate of the likelihood that the plaintiff will win the action. Differing views on the probability of winning the court case help to explain the fraction of cases that actually go to trial. Among others, P'ng (1983) points out the shortcomings of the single-person decision theory approach which does not take into account, for example, the different fee systems in England and the U.S. and the differences in information conflicting parties may have. P'ng constructs a model of one-sided incomplete information where the settlement terms are given exogenously. Schweizer (1989), on the other hand, extends P'ng's model and allows for two-sided asymmetric information where the settlement terms are determined endogenously.
University Of Chicago Law Review Symposium Revelation Mechanisms And The Law
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Author : University of Chicago Law Review
language : en
Publisher: Quid Pro Books
Release Date : 2014-03-23
University Of Chicago Law Review Symposium Revelation Mechanisms And The Law written by University of Chicago Law Review and has been published by Quid Pro Books this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-03-23 with Law categories.
The first issue of 2014 features articles and essays from internationally recognized legal and economics scholars, including an extensive Symposium on "Revelation Mechanisms and the Law." Topics include voting options and strategies to reveal preferences, corporate governance, regulatory intensity, tort calculations of risk, mandatory disclosure of choices, partitioning interests in land, and shopping for expert witnesses. In addition, Issue 1 includes an article, "Libertarian Paternalism, Path Dependence, and Temporary Law," by Tom Ginsburg, Jonathan S. Masur & Richard H. McAdams. Applications include smoking bans and seat belt laws. Also included is a student Comment, "Too Late to Stipulate: Reconciling Rule 68 with Summary Judgments," by Channing J. Turner; and a Book Review, "Common Good and Common Ground: The Inevitability of Fundamental Disagreement," by Rebecca L. Brown, reviewing Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and Virtues. The issue serves, in effect, as a new and extensive book on cutting-edge issues of revelation mechanisms, strategies, prompts, nudges, and effects. The Symposium's contents are: * "Governing Communities by Auction," by Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky * "Partition and Revelation," by Yun-chien Chang & Lee Anne Fennell * "Savage Tables and Tort Law: An Alternative to the Precaution Model," by Janet M. Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod * "Revelation and Suppression of Private Information in Settlement-Bargaining Models," by Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum * "The Use and Limits of Self-Valuation Systems," by Richard A. Epstein * "Expert Mining and Required Disclosure," by Jonah B. Gelbach * "Renegotiation Design by Contract," by Richard Holden & Anup Malani * "Audits as Signals," by Maciej H. Kotowski, David A. Weisbach & Richard J. Zeckhauser * "Irreconcilable Differences: Judicial Resolution of Business Deadlock," by Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier * "From Helmets to Savings and Inheritance Taxes: Regulatory Intensity, Information Revelation, and Internalities," by Saul Levmore * "Quadratic Voting as Efficient Corporate Governance," by Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl * "The Efficiency of Bargaining under Divided Entitlements," by Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston Quality ebook formatting includes active TOC, linked notes, active URLs in notes, and all the charts, tables, and formulae found in the original print version.
The Core Of Economies With Asymmetric Information
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Author : Ulrich Schwalbe
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2012-12-06
The Core Of Economies With Asymmetric Information written by Ulrich Schwalbe and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-12-06 with Business & Economics categories.
and should therefore constitute a part of every area of economic 3 theory. The spectrum covered by information economics today ranges from Stigler's search theory4 to industrial economics, including oligopoly theory, innovation, as well as research and develop 5 ment. However, the area information economics is most closely connected with is the theory of optimal contracts, mainly ana 6 lyzed in principal-agent models. Contract theory deals primar ily with the question of how optimal arrangements (contracts) for the purchase and sale of commodities and services between two or more agents should be structured. In these models, it is often assumed that the parties to the contract are informed differently or asymmetrically about relevant variables (e. g. the health of one party in the case of insurance contracts, or the effort in relation to employment contracts). As a result of this asymmetric in formation, phenomena such as moral hazard, adverse selection, signaling, and screening may arise. Frequently, results from con tract theory are referred to when making statements about the effects of asymmetric information on an economy. Models of this kind are often used to explain phenomena such as fixed wages or unemployment, among others. 7 However, such conclusions must be treated with caution for two reasons. In the first place, in these models, a contract (explicit or implicit) is determined by the solution of an optimization prob lem.
Litigation And Settlement New Evidence From Labor Courts In Mexico
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Author : David S. Kaplan
language : en
Publisher: World Bank Publications
Release Date :
Litigation And Settlement New Evidence From Labor Courts In Mexico written by David S. Kaplan and has been published by World Bank Publications this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on with categories.
A Bayesian Theory Of Games
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Author : Dr Jimmy Teng
language : en
Publisher: Chartridge Books Oxford
Release Date : 2013-10-01
A Bayesian Theory Of Games written by Dr Jimmy Teng and has been published by Chartridge Books Oxford this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013-10-01 with Mathematics categories.
Summary A Bayesian Theory of Games introduces a new game theoretic equilibrium concept: Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures (BEIC). The new equilibrium concept achieves consistencies in results among different types of games that current games theory at times fails to. BEIC requires players to make predictions on the strategies of other players starting from first order uninformative predictive distribution functions (or conjectures) and keep updating with Bayesian statistical decision theoretic and game theoretic reasoning until a convergence of conjectures is achieved. In a BEIC, conjectures are consistent with the equilibrium or equilibriums they supported and so rationality is achieved for actions, strategies and beliefs and (statistical) decision rule. Given its ability to typically select only a unique equilibrium in games, the BEIC approach is capable of analyzing a larger set of games than current games theory, including games with noisy inaccurate observations and games with multiple sided incomplete information games. Key Features Provides a unified and consistent analysis of many categories of games. Its solution algorithm is iterative and has good computation properties. Can analyze more types of games than current existing games theory. The equilibrium concept and solution algorithm are based on Bayesian statistical decision theory. In the new equilibrium, rationality is achieved for action, strategy, belief (both prior and posterior) and decision rule. Beliefs are the results of optimization exercises of players. Uses first order uninformative conjectures and reaction functions to derive higher and higher orders of conjectures until a convergence of conjectures is achieved. Has great application value for it could solve many types of games and could model beliefs. The Author Dr Jimmy Teng currently teaches at the School of Economics of the University of Nottingham (Malaysia Campus). He is the author of many articles and two books. He received his economics PhD from the University of Toronto. He also earned a PhD in political Science and a MS in statistics from Duke University. He previously held research and teaching positions in Academia Sinica, National Taiwan University and Nanyang Technological University Readership Games theorists, decision theorists, economists, mathematicians, statisticians, operational researchers, social scientists, management researchers, public policy researchers, computer scientists Contents Preface Acknowledgments About the author Introduction Sequential games with incomplete information and noisy inaccurate observation; introduction; an inflationary game; Bayesian iterative conjectures algorithm as a Bayes decision rule; conclusions Sequential games with perfect and imperfect information; introduction; the Bayesian iterative conjecture algorithm, sub-game perfect equilibrium and perfect Bayesian equilibrium; solving sequential games of incomplete and perfect information; multiple-sided incomplete information sequential games with perfect information; conclusions Simultaneous games; introduction; complete information simultaneous games; BEIC and refinements of Nash equilibrium; simultaneous games with incomplete information; conclusions Conclusions References Index
Search Games And Other Applications Of Game Theory
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Author : Andrey Garnaev
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2012-12-06
Search Games And Other Applications Of Game Theory written by Andrey Garnaev and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-12-06 with Business & Economics categories.
This book is on applications of game theory. The title of this book is not "Game Theory and its Applications" because it does not construct a general theory for considered games. The book contains a lot of examples of applica tion of game theory together with the background of those games considered and a list of unsolved problems. Also we consider only the game where the optimal strategies of the players are found in closed form. This book is an attempt to carryon the approach developed in nice books "Search Games" by Gal and "Geometric Games and their Applications" by Ruckle. The first chapter of this book supplies the required definitions and theorems from game theory. The second chapter deals with discrete search games where both players act simultaneously: the games of protection of a channel from infiltration of a submarine, the submarine versus helicopter game, the matrix search games and others. The third chapter considers the game where the players allocate their contin uousefforts. In these games players face up an alternative either not to come into contest if the cost of efforts seems too high, or come into it. In the last case the player have to decide how much resources they can afford to spend. The allocation models of search, antiballistic protection and marketing are investigated.
Game Theory And Business Applications
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Author : Kalyan Chatterjee
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2013-06-26
Game Theory And Business Applications written by Kalyan Chatterjee and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013-06-26 with Business & Economics categories.
Game theory has been applied to a growing list of practical problems, from antitrust analysis to monetary policy; from the design of auction institutions to the structuring of incentives within firms; from patent races to dispute resolution. The purpose of Game Theory and Business Applications is to show how game theory can be used to model and analyze business decisions. The contents of this revised edition contain a wide variety of business functions – from accounting to operations, from marketing to strategy to organizational design. In addition, specific application areas include market competition, law and economics, bargaining and dispute resolution, and competitive bidding. All of these applications involve competitive decision settings, specifically situations where a number of economic agents in pursuit of their own self-interests and in accordance with the institutional “rules of the game” take actions that together affect all of their fortunes. As this volume demonstrates, game theory provides a compelling guide for analyzing business decisions and strategies.
Research And Practice In Multiple Criteria Decision Making
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Author : Yacov Y. Haimes
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2000-05-26
Research And Practice In Multiple Criteria Decision Making written by Yacov Y. Haimes and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2000-05-26 with Business & Economics categories.
During the past two decades, the consideration of mUltiple objectives in modeling and decision making has grown by leaps and bounds. The nineties in particular have seen the emphasis shift from the dominance of single-objective modeling and optimization toward an emphasis on multiple objectives. The proceedings of this Conference epitomize these evolutionary changes and contribute to the important role that the tield of multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) now plays in planning, design, operational, management, and policy decisions. Of special interest are the contributions of MCDM to manufacturing engineering. For example, it has recently been recognized that optimal, single-objective solutions have often been pursued at the expense of the much broader applicability of designs and solutions that satisfy multiple objectives. In particular, the theme (MCDM and Its Worldwide Role in Risk-Based Decision Making) of the XIVth International Conference on Multiple Criteria Decision Making (Charlottesville, Virginia, USA, June 8-12, 1998) represents the growing importance of risk-cost-benefit analysis in decision making and in engineering design and manufacturing. In such systems, minimizing the of rare and extreme events emerges as an essential objective that risk complements the minimization of the traditional expected value of risk, along with the objectives attached to cost and performance. These proceedings include forty-five papers that were presented at the Conference. A variety of techniques have been proposed for solving multiple criteria decision-making problems. The emphasis and style of the different techniques largely reflect the fields of expertise of their developers.
Litigation Of Questioned Settlement Claims
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Author : Stephen W. Salant
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1982
Litigation Of Questioned Settlement Claims written by Stephen W. Salant and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1982 with Law categories.
Before reforms in legal procedures are implemented, their consequences should be thoroughly explored. In this paper, the authors present a methodology for evaluating the consequences of changes in legal procedures. They consider legal settlements of personal injury disputes. Even though there are assumed to exist out-of-court settlements which both plaintiff and defendant would prefer to a court fight if they had complete information, such settlements may fail to occur because the defendant lacks complete information about the extent of the plaintiff's injuries and sometimes challenges demands he suspects to be inflated. The authors treat adversarial behavior in the settlement process as the strategic interaction of players in a game of incomplete information. To illustrate the value of the methodology, the authors conclude by showing how a seemingly innocuous exogenous change in legal procedures has a surprising qualitative effect on the behavior of defendants and consequently on how frequently cases go to trial.
Design Of Master Agreements For Otc Derivatives
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Author : Dietmar Franzen
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2012-12-06
Design Of Master Agreements For Otc Derivatives written by Dietmar Franzen and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-12-06 with Business & Economics categories.
I first came across the issue of derivatives documentation when writing my diploma thesis on measuring the credit risk ofOTC derivatives while I was an economics student at the University of Bonn. Despite the fact that security design has been an area of research in economics for many years and despite the widespread use of derivatives documentation in financial practice, the task of designing contracts for derivatives transactions has not been dealt with in financial theory. The one thing that aroused my curiosity was that two parties with usually opposing interests, namely banking supervisors and the banking industry's lobby, unanimously endorse the use ofcertain provisions in standardized contracts called master agreements. Do these provisions increase the ex ante efficiency of contracts for all parties involved? I actually began my research expecting to find support for the widely held beliefs about the efficiency or inefficiency of certain provisions and was sur prised to obtain results that contradicted the conventional wisdom. I would strongly advise against using these results in any political debate on deriva tives documentation. They were obtained within a highly stylized model with some restrictive assumptions. This work should rather be seen as an attempt to formalize the discussion on derivatives documentation and to challenge the notion that certain provisions are generally ex ante efficient. It is also an invitation to all those advocating the use of certain provisions in master agreements to formalize their arguments and to explain the economic ratio nale behind these provisions.