Manipulative Voting Dynamics
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Manipulative Voting Dynamics
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Author : Neelam Gohar
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge Scholars Publishing
Release Date : 2017-05-11
Manipulative Voting Dynamics written by Neelam Gohar and has been published by Cambridge Scholars Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017-05-11 with Political Science categories.
One of the most actively growing subareas in multi-agent systems is computational social choice theory, which provides a theoretical foundation for preference aggregation and collective decision-making in multi-agent domains. It is concerned with the application of techniques developed in computer science, including complexity analysis and algorithm design, in the study of social choice mechanisms, such as voting. It seeks to import concepts from social choice theory into Artificial Intelligence and computing. People often have to reach a joint decision despite conflicting preferences over the alternatives. This joint decision can be reached by an informal negotiating process or by a carefully specified protocol. Over the course of the past decade or so, computer scientists have also become deeply involved in this study. Within computer science, there is a number of settings where a decision must be made based on the conflicting preferences of multiple parties. The paradigms of computer science give a different and useful perspective on some of the classic problems in economics and related disciplines. A natural and very general approach for deciding among multiple alternatives is to vote on them. Voting is one of the most popular ways of reaching common decisions. As such, the study of elections is an area where fields such as computer science, economics, business, operations research, and political science can be brought together. Social choice theory deals with voting scenarios, in which a set of individuals must select an outcome from a set of alternatives. This book focuses on convergence to pure strategy Nash equilibria in plurality voting games and a number of other positional and non-positional scoring rules. In such games, the voters strategically choose a candidate to vote for, and the winner is determined by the plurality (or other) voting rules. Voters take turns modifying their votes; these manipulations are classified according to the way in which they affect the outcome of the election. The focus is on achieving a stable outcome, taking strategic behaviour into account. A voting profile is in equilibrium, when no voter can change his vote so that his more preferable candidate gets elected. The book investigates restrictions on the number of iterations that can be made for different voting rules, considering both weighted and equi-weighted voting settings.
Tactical Manipulation Of Runoff Voting
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Author : Fouad Sabry
language : en
Publisher: One Billion Knowledgeable
Release Date : 2024-10-16
Tactical Manipulation Of Runoff Voting written by Fouad Sabry and has been published by One Billion Knowledgeable this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2024-10-16 with Political Science categories.
Explore the complex world of runoff voting and its strategic implications in this insightful guide. Aimed at professionals, students, and enthusiasts, this book unveils the subtle tactics that can dramatically shape election outcomes. 1: Tactical Manipulation of Runoff Voting: Grasp how tactical manipulation can shift electoral results, shaping the outcome. 2: Strategic Voting: Understand how voters may cast votes not solely by preference but for favorable outcomes. 3: Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: Explore how election results are affected by non-winning candidates. 4: Vote Pairing: Learn how voters agree to swap votes to achieve mutually beneficial results. 5: Vote Splitting: Analyze how multiple similar candidates can split votes, affecting results. 6: 2002 French Presidential Election: A case study illustrating tactical voting in the 2002 French presidential election. 7: Coombs' Method: Explore an elimination-based voting system that removes the least popular candidates. 8: Exhaustive Ballot: Understand how this system works by eliminating candidates one by one. 9: Contingent Vote: Explore a hybrid system combining elements of plurality and instant-runoff voting. 10: Instant-Runoff Voting: Learn the mechanics of ranking candidates and how votes transfer in rounds. 11: Approval Voting: Discover a system where voters can approve multiple candidates at once. 12: Plurality Voting: Examine the plurality system, where the most votes win, despite possible manipulation. 13: Two-Round System: Learn about this system, which calls for a second voting round if no majority is achieved. 14: Bullet Voting: Understand the practice of voting for only one candidate despite having more options. 15: 2002 French Legislative Election: Analyze another case study of tactical voting in French legislative elections. 16: Supplementary Vote: Learn about this variation of instant-runoff voting in elections. 17: Plural Left: Study the coalition within the Plural Left and its electoral influence. 18: Borda Count: Explore a ranking system where points are assigned based on candidates' positions. 19: Schulze STV: Learn about this method, which aims to minimize wasted votes. 20: 2016 The Republicans Presidential Primary: A case study on strategic voting in the 2016 French Republican primary. 21: STAR Voting: Understand the STAR voting system, combining scoring and runoff methods. Through this exploration, you’ll unlock the hidden strategies used in elections and gain the tools to analyze or participate in political systems with greater expertise. With in-depth insights into voting systems from around the globe, you’ll be well-equipped to navigate and influence electoral outcomes more strategically. Whether you're involved in political campaigns or academic research, this guide offers a transformative understanding of runoff voting tactics.
Frontiers Of Dynamic Games
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Author : Leon A. Petrosyan
language : en
Publisher: Springer Nature
Release Date : 2022-03-09
Frontiers Of Dynamic Games written by Leon A. Petrosyan and has been published by Springer Nature this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2022-03-09 with Mathematics categories.
This book features contributions from the GTM 2020 International Meeting on Game Theory held virtually from St. Petersburg, Russia, including presentations by plenary speakers. The topics cover a wide range of game-theoretic models and include both theory and applications, including applications to management.
Mechanisms For Stability And Welfare Increasing Cooperation Among Self Interested Agents
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Author : Reshef Meir
language : en
Publisher: Lulu.com
Release Date : 2014-08-10
Mechanisms For Stability And Welfare Increasing Cooperation Among Self Interested Agents written by Reshef Meir and has been published by Lulu.com this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-08-10 with Computers categories.
Too often an interaction among self-interested parties leads to an outcome that is not in the best interest of any of them. In this thesis, I look at such interactions as games, so that the loss of stability and welfare can be measured and studied using the standard concepts of game theory such as equilibrium and utility. I study and design mechanisms that alter these games in order to induce more cooperation, stable outcomes, and higher utility for the participants.
Voting Paradoxes And Group Coherence
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Author : William V. Gehrlein
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2010-11-11
Voting Paradoxes And Group Coherence written by William V. Gehrlein and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010-11-11 with Business & Economics categories.
The likelihood of observing Condorcet's Paradox is known to be very low for elections with a small number of candidates if voters’ preferences on candidates reflect any significant degree of a number of different measures of mutual coherence. This reinforces the intuitive notion that strange election outcomes should become less likely as voters’ preferences become more mutually coherent. Similar analysis is used here to indicate that this notion is valid for most, but not all, other voting paradoxes. This study also focuses on the Condorcet Criterion, which states that the pairwise majority rule winner should be chosen as the election winner, if one exists. Representations for the Condorcet Efficiency of the most common voting rules are obtained here as a function of various measures of the degree of mutual coherence of voters’ preferences. An analysis of the Condorcet Efficiency representations that are obtained yields strong support for using Borda Rule.
Algorithmic Aspects Of Manipulation And Anonymization In Social Choice And Social Networks
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Author : Talmon, Nimrod
language : en
Publisher: Universitätsverlag der TU Berlin
Release Date : 2016-05-20
Algorithmic Aspects Of Manipulation And Anonymization In Social Choice And Social Networks written by Talmon, Nimrod and has been published by Universitätsverlag der TU Berlin this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016-05-20 with Computers categories.
This thesis presents a study of several combinatorial problems related to social choice and social networks. The main concern is their computational complexity, with an emphasis on their parameterized complexity. The goal is to devise efficient algorithms for each of the problems studied here, or to prove that, under widely-accepted assumptions, such algorithms cannot exist. The problems discussed in Chapter 3 and in Chapter 4 are about manipulating a given election, where some relationships between the entities of the election are assumed. This can be seen as if the election occurs on top of an underlying social network, connecting the voters participating in the election or the candidates which the voters vote on. The problem discussed in Chapter 3, Combinatorial Candidate Control, is about manipulating an election by changing the set of candidates which the voters vote on. That is, there is an external agent who can add new candidates or delete existing candidates. A combinatorial structure over the candidates is assumed, such that whenever the external agent adds or removes a candidate, a predefined set of candidates (related to the chosen candidate) are added or removed from the election. The problem discussed in Chapter 4, Combinatorial Shift Bribery, is also about manipulating an election. Here, however, the external agent can change the way some voters vote. Specifically, a combinatorial structure over the voters is assumed, such that the external agent can change the position of its preferred candidate in sets of voters, following some predefined patterns. The problem discussed in Chapter 5, Election Anonymization, is also about elections. The main concern here, however, is preserving the privacy of the voters, when the votes are published, along with some additional (private) information. The task is to transform a given election such that each vote would appear at least k times. By doing so, even an adversary which knows how some voters vote, cannot identify individual voters. The problems discussed in Chapter 6 and in Chapter 7 are also about privacy. Specifically, a social network (modeled as a graph) is to become publicly available. The task is to anonymize the graph; that is, to transform the graph such that, for every vertex, there will be at least $k - 1$ other vertices with the same degree. By doing so, even an adversary which knows the degrees of some vertices cannot identify individual vertices. In the problem discussed in Chapter 6, Degree Anonymization by Vertex Addition, the way to achieve anonymity is by introducing new vertices. In the problem discussed in Chapter 7, Degree Anonymization By Graph Contractions, the way to achieve anonymity is by contracting as few edges as possible. The main aim of this thesis, considering the problems mentioned above, is to explore some boundaries between tractability and intractability. Specifically, as most of these problems are computationally intractable (that is, NP-hard or even hard to approximate), some restricted cases and parameterizations for these problems are considered. The goal is to devise efficient algorithms for them, running in polynomial-time when some parameters are assumed to be constant, or, even better, to show that the problems are fixed-parameter tractable for the parameters considered. If such algorithms cannot be devised, then the goal is to prove that these problems are indeed not fixed-parameter tractable with respect to some parameters, or, even better, to show that the problems are NP-hard even when some parameters are assumed to be constant. Diese Dissertation stellt eine Untersuchung von verschiedenen kombinatorischen Problemen im Umfeld von Wahlen und sozialen Netzwerken dar. Das Hauptziel ist die Analyse der Berechnungskomplexität mit dem Schwerpunkt auf der parametrisierten Komplexität. Dabei werden für jedes der untersuchten Probleme effiziente Algorithmen entworfen oder aber gezeigt, dass unter weit akzeptierten Annahmen solche Algorithmen nicht existieren können. Die Probleme, welche im Kapitel 3 und im Kapitel 4 diskutiert werden, modellieren das Manipulieren einer gegebenen Wahl, bei welcher gewisse Beziehungen zwischen den Beteiligten angenommen werden. Dies kann so interpretiert werden, dass die Wahl innerhalb eines Sozialen Netzwerks stattfindet, in dem die Wähler oder die Kandidaten miteinander in Verbindung stehen. Das Problem Combinatorial Candidate Control ONTROL, welches in Kapitel 3 untersucht wird, handelt von der Manipulation einer Wahl durch die änderung der Kandidatenmenge über welche die Wähler abstimmen. Genauer gesagt, gibt es einen externen Agenten, welcher neue Kandidaten hinzufügen oder existierende Kandidaten entfernen kann. Es wird eine kombinatorische Struktur über der Kandidatenmenge angenommen, so dass immer wenn der externe Agent einen Kandidaten hinzufügt oder entfernt, eine vordefinierte Kandidatenmenge (welche mit den ausgewählten Kandidaten in Beziehung steht) ebenfalls hinzugefügt bzw. entfernt wird. Das Problem Combinatorial Shift Bribery, welches in Kapitel 4 untersucht wird, thematisiert ebenfalls die Manipulation einer Wahl. Hier allerdings kann der externe Agent Änderungen des Abstimmungsverhaltens einiger Wähler herbeiführen. Dabei wird eine kombinatorische Struktur über den Wählern angenommen, so dass der externe Agent die Position des von ihm präferierten Kandidaten bei mehreren Wählern entsprechend vordefinierter Muster gleichzeitig ändern kann. Das Problem Election Anonymization, welches in Kapitel 5 untersucht wird, befasst sich ebenso mit Wahlen. Das Hauptanliegen hier ist es jedoch, die Privatsphäre der Wähler bei der Veröffentlichung der Stimmenabgaben zusammen mit einigen zusätzlichen (privaten) Informationen aufrecht zu erhalten. Die Aufgabe ist es eine gegebene Wahl so zu verändern, dass jede Stimmenabgabe mindestens k-fach vorkommt. Dadurch kann noch nicht einmal ein Gegenspieler einzelne Wähler identifizieren, wenn er die Stimmenabgaben einiger Wähler bereits kennt. Die in Kapitel 6 und 7 untersuchten Probleme behandeln gleichermaßen Privatsphärenaspekte. Präziser gesagt, geht es darum, dass ein soziales Netzwerk (modelliert als Graph) veröffentlicht werden soll. Die Aufgabe ist es den Graphen zu anonymisieren; dies bedeutet man verändert den Graphen, so dass es für jeden Knoten mindestens k − 1 weitere Knoten mit dem selben Grad gibt. Dadurch wird erreicht, dass selbst ein Gegenspieler, welcher die Knotengrade einiger Knoten kennt, nicht in der Lage ist einzelne Knoten zu identifizieren. Bei dem Problem Degree Anonymization by Vertex Addition, welches in Kapitel 6 untersucht wird, wird Anonymität durch Einführung neuer Knoten erreicht. Bei dem Problem Degree Anonymization by Graph Contractions, welches in Kapitel 7 untersucht wird, wird Anonymität durch die Kontraktion von möglichst wenigen Kanten erreicht. Das Hauptanliegen dieser Dissertation in Bezug auf die obig genannten Probleme ist es die Grenzen der effizienten Lösbarkeit auszuloten. Insbesondere da die meisten dieser Probleme berechnungsschwer (genauer NP-schwer bzw. sogar schwer zu approximieren) sind, werden einige eingeschränkte Fälle und Parametrisierungen der Probleme betrachtet. Das Ziel ist es effiziente Algorithmen für sie zu entwickeln, welche in Polynomzeit laufen, wenn einige Parameter konstante Werte aufweisen, oder besser noch zu zeigen, dass die Probleme “fixed-parameter tractable” für die betrachteten Parameter sind. Wenn solche Algorithmen nicht gefunden werden können, dann ist es das Ziel zu beweisen, dass diese Probleme tatsächlich nicht “fixed-parameter tractable” bezüglich der entsprechenden Parameter sind, oder noch besser zu zeigen, dass die Probleme NP-schwer sind, sogar wenn die entsprechenden Parameter konstante Werte aufweisen.
How Voters Decide
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Author : Richard R. Lau
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2006-06-26
How Voters Decide written by Richard R. Lau and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006-06-26 with Political Science categories.
This book attempts to redirect the field of voting behavior research by proposing a paradigm-shifting framework for studying voter decision making. An innovative experimental methodology is presented for getting 'inside the heads' of citizens as they confront the overwhelming rush of information from modern presidential election campaigns. Four broad theoretically-defined types of decision strategies that voters employ to help decide which candidate to support are described and operationally-defined. Individual and campaign-related factors that lead voters to adopt one or another of these strategies are examined. Most importantly, this research proposes a new normative focus for the scientific study of voting behavior: we should care about not just which candidate received the most votes, but also how many citizens voted correctly - that is, in accordance with their own fully-informed preferences.
Political Cycles In A Developing Economy
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Author : Stuti Khemani
language : en
Publisher: World Bank Publications
Release Date : 2000
Political Cycles In A Developing Economy written by Stuti Khemani and has been published by World Bank Publications this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2000 with Business cycles categories.
Empirical results from India suggest that politicians exert greater effort in managing public works during election years. Surprisingly, there is no evidence of a populist spending spree to sway voters just before elections.
Algorithmic Aspects Of Resource Allocation And Multiwinner Voting Theory And Experiments
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Author : Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej
language : en
Publisher: Universitätsverlag der TU Berlin
Release Date : 2021-12-10
Algorithmic Aspects Of Resource Allocation And Multiwinner Voting Theory And Experiments written by Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej and has been published by Universitätsverlag der TU Berlin this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021-12-10 with Computers categories.
This thesis is concerned with investigating elements of computational social choice in the light of real-world applications. We contribute to a better understanding of the areas of fair allocation and multiwinner voting. For both areas, inspired by real-world scenarios, we propose several new notions and extensions of existing models. Then, we analyze the complexity of answering the computational questions raised by the introduced concepts. To this end, we look through the lens of parameterized complexity. We identify different parameters which describe natural features specific to the computational problems we investigate. Exploiting the parameters, we successfully develop efficient algorithms for spe- cific cases of the studied problems. We complement our analysis by showing which parameters presumably cannot be utilized for seeking efficient algorithms. Thereby, we provide comprehensive pictures of the computational complexity of the studied problems. Specifically, we concentrate on four topics that we present below, grouped by our two areas of interest. For all but one topic, we present experimental studies based on implementations of newly developed algorithms. We first focus on fair allocation of indivisible resources. In this setting, we consider a collection of indivisible resources and a group of agents. Each agent reports its utility evaluation of every resource and the task is to “fairly” allocate the resources such that each resource is allocated to at most one agent. We concentrate on the two following issues regarding this scenario. The social context in fair allocation of indivisible resources. In many fair allocation settings, it is unlikely that every agent knows all other agents. For example, consider a scenario where the agents represent employees of a large corporation. It is highly unlikely that every employee knows every other employee. Motivated by such settings, we come up with a new model of graph envy-freeness by adapting the classical envy-freeness notion to account for social relations of agents modeled as social networks. We show that if the given social network of agents is simple (for example, if it is a directed acyclic graph), then indeed we can sometimes find fair allocations efficiently. However, we contrast tractability results with showing NP-hardness for several cases, including those in which the given social network has a constant degree. Fair allocations among few agents with bounded rationality. Bounded rationality is the idea that humans, due to cognitive limitations, tend to simplify problems that they face. One of its emanations is that human agents usually tend to report simple utilities over the resources that they want to allocate; for example, agents may categorize the available resources only into two groups of desirable and undesirable ones. Applying techniques for solving integer linear programs, we show that exploiting bounded rationality leads to efficient algorithms for finding envy-free and Pareto-efficient allocations, assuming a small number of agents. Further, we demonstrate that our result actually forms a framework that can be applied to a number of different fairness concepts like envy-freeness up to one good or envy-freeness up to any good. This way, we obtain efficient algorithms for a number of fair allocation problems (assuming few agents with bounded rationality). We also empirically show that our technique is applicable in practice. Further, we study multiwinner voting, where we are given a collection of voters and their preferences over a set of candidates. The outcome of a multiwinner voting rule is a group (or a set of groups in case of ties) of candidates that reflect the voters’ preferences best according to some objective. In this context, we investigate the following themes. The robustness of election outcomes. We study how robust outcomes of multiwinner elections are against possible mistakes made by voters. Assuming that each voter casts a ballot in a form of a ranking of candidates, we represent a mistake by a swap of adjacent candidates in a ballot. We find that for rules such as SNTV, k-Approval, and k-Borda, it is computationally easy to find the minimum number of swaps resulting in a change of an outcome. This task is, however, NP-hard for STV and the Chamberlin-Courant rule. We conclude our study of robustness with experimentally studying the average number of random swaps leading to a change of an outcome for several rules. Strategic voting in multiwinner elections. We ask whether a given group of cooperating voters can manipulate an election outcome in a favorable way. We focus on the k-Approval voting rule and we show that the computational complexity of answering the posed question has a rich structure. We spot several cases for which our problem is polynomial-time solvable. However, we also identify NP-hard cases. For several of them, we show how to circumvent the hardness by fixed-parameter tractability. We also present experimental studies indicating that our algorithms are applicable in practice. Diese Arbeit befasst sich mit der Untersuchung von Themen des Forschungsgebiets Computational Social Choice im Lichte realer Anwendungen. Dabei trägt sie zu einem besseren Verständnis der Bereiche der fairen Zuordnung und der Mehrgewinnerwahlen bei. Für beide Konzepte schlagen wir – inspiriert von realen Anwendungen – verschiedene neue Begriffe und Erweiterungen bestehender Modelle vor. Anschließend analysieren wir die Komplexität der Beantwortung von Berechnungsfragen, die durch die eingeführten Konzepte aufgeworfen werden. Dabei fokussieren wir uns auf die parametrisierte Komplexität. Hierzu identifizieren wir verschiedene Parameter, welche natürliche Merkmale der von uns untersuchten Berechnungsprobleme beschreiben. Durch die Nutzung dieser Parameter entwickeln wir erfolgreich effiziente Algorithmen für Spezialfälle der untersuchten Probleme. Wir ergänzen unsere Analyse indem wir zeigen, welche Parameter vermutlich nicht verwendet werden können um effiziente Algorithmen zu finden. Dabei zeichnen wir ein umfassendes Bild der Berechnungskomplexität der untersuchten Probleme. Insbesondere konzentrieren wir uns auf vier Themen, die wir, gruppiert nach unseren beiden Schwerpunkten, unten vorstellen. Für alle Themen bis auf eines präsentieren wir Experimente, die auf Implementierungen der von uns neu entwickelten Algorithmen basieren. Wir konzentrieren uns zunächst auf die faire Zuordnung unteilbarer Ressourcen. Hier betrachten wir eine Menge unteilbarer Ressourcen und eine Gruppe von Agenten. Jeder Agent gibt eine Bewertung des Nutzens jeder Ressource ab und die Aufgabe besteht darin, eine "faire" Zuordnung der Ressourcen zu finden, wobei jede Ressource höchstens einem Agenten zugeordnet werden kann. Innerhalb dieses Bereiches konzentrieren wir uns auf die beiden folgenden Problemstellungen. Der soziale Kontext bei der fairen Zuordnung unteilbarer Ressourcen. In vielen Szenarien, in denen Ressourcen zugeordnet werden sollen, ist es unwahrscheinlich, dass jeder Agent alle anderen kennt. Vorstellbar ist beispielsweise ein Szenario, in dem die Agenten Mitarbeiter eines großen Unternehmens repräsentieren. Es ist höchst unwahrscheinlich, dass jeder Mitarbeiter jeden anderen Mitarbeiter kennt. Motiviert durch solche Szenarien entwickeln wir ein neues Modell der graph-basierten Neidfreiheit. Wir erweitern den klassischen Neidfreiheitsbegriff um die sozialen Beziehungen von Agenten, die durch soziale Netzwerke modelliert werden. Einerseits zeigen wir, dass wenn das soziale Netzwerk der Agenten einfach ist (zum Beispiel, wenn es sich um einen gerichteten azyklischen Graph handelt), in manchen Fällen faire Zuordnungen effizient gefunden werden können. Andererseits stellen wir diesen algorithmisch positiven Ergebnissen mehrere NP-schweren Fällen entgegen. Ein Beispiel für einen solchen Fall sind soziale Netzwerke mit einem konstanten Knotengrad. Faire Zuteilung an wenige Agenten mit begrenzter Rationalität. Begrenzte Rationalität beschreibt die Idee, dass Menschen aufgrund kognitiver Grenzen dazu neigen, Probleme, mit denen sie konfrontiert werden, zu vereinfachen. Eine mögliche Folge dieser Grenzen ist, dass menschliche Agenten in der Regel einfache Bewertungen der gewünschten Ressourcen abgeben; beispielsweise könnten Agenten die verfügbaren Ressourcen nur in zwei Gruppen, erwünschte und unerwünschte Ressourcen, kategorisieren. Durch Anwendung von Techniken zum Lösen von Ganzzahligen Linearen Programmen zeigen wir, dass unter der Annahme einer kleinen Anzahl von Agenten die Ausnutzung begrenzter Rationalität dabei hilft, effiziente Algorithmen zum Finden neidfreier und Pareto-effizienter Zuweisungen zu entwickeln. Weiterhin zeigen wir, dass unser Ergebnis ein allgemeines Verfahren liefert, welches auf eine Reihe verschiedener Fairnesskonzepte angewendet werden kann, wie zum Beispiel Neidfreiheit bis auf ein Gut oder Neidfreiheit bis auf irgendein Gut. Auf diese Weise gewinnen wir effiziente Algorithmen für eine Reihe fairer Zuordnungsprobleme (wenige Agenten mit begrenzter Rationalität vorausgesetzt). Darüber hinaus zeigen wir empirisch, dass unsere Technik in der Praxis anwendbar ist. Weiterhin untersuchen wir Mehrgewinnerwahlen, bei denen uns eine Menge von Wählern sowie ihre Präferenzen über eine Reihe von Kandidaten gegeben sind. Das Ergebnis eines Mehrgewinnerwahlverfahrens ist eine Gruppe (oder eine Menge von Gruppen im Falle eines Unentschiedens) von Kandidaten, welche die Präferenzen der Wähler am besten einem bestimmten Ziel folgend widerspiegeln. In diesem Kontext untersuchen wir die folgenden Themen. Die Robustheit von Wahlergebnissen. Wir untersuchen, wie robust die Ergebnisse von Mehrgewinnerwahlen gegenüber möglicher Fehler der Wähler sind. Unter der Annahme, dass jeder Wähler eine Stimme in Form einer Rangliste von Kandidaten abgibt, modellieren wir einen Fehler als einen Tausch benachbarter Kandidaten in der Rangliste. Wir zeigen, dass für Wahlregeln wie SNTV, k-Approval und k-Borda die minimale Anzahl an Vertauschungen, welche zu einer Ergebnisänderung führt, einfach zu berechnen ist. Für STV und die Chamberlin-Courant-Regel ist diese Aufgabe allerdings NP-schwer. Wir schließen unsere Untersuchung der Robustheit unterschiedlicher Wahlregeln ab mit einer experimentellen Evaluierung der durchschnittlichen Anzahl zufälliger Vertauschungen, die zu einer Änderung des Ergebnisses führen. Strategische Abstimmung bei Wahlen mit mehreren Gewinnern. Wir fragen, ob eine bestimmte Gruppe von kooperierenden Wählern ein Wahlergebnis zu ihren Gunsten manipulieren kann. Dabei konzentrieren wir uns auf die k-Approval-Wahlregel. Wir zeigen, dass die Berechnungskomplexität der besagten Manipulation eine reiche Struktur besitzt. Auf der einen Seite identifizieren wir mehrere Fälle in denen das Problem in Polynomzeit lösbar ist. Auf der anderen Seite identifizieren wir jedoch auch NP-schwere Fälle. Für einige von ihnen zeigen wir, wie die Berechnungsschwere durch parametrisierte Algorithmen umgangen werden kann. Wir präsentieren zudem experimentelle Untersuchungen, welche darauf hindeuten, dass unsere Algorithmen in der Praxis anwendbar sind.
Causes And Consequences Of Electoral Manipulation In Hybrid Regimes In Latin America
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Author : Jaroslav Bílek
language : en
Publisher: Springer Nature
Release Date : 2023-06-10
Causes And Consequences Of Electoral Manipulation In Hybrid Regimes In Latin America written by Jaroslav Bílek and has been published by Springer Nature this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2023-06-10 with Political Science categories.
This book fills research gaps in the field of Latin American electoral politics, explaining the causes and consequences of electoral manipulation in the hybrid regimes of Latin America between the 1980s and 2020s. This research falls within the field of comparative democratization with the ambition of deepening knowledge on the topic of electoral manipulation in hybrid regimes. In the last decade there has been a clear shift towards hybrid regimes in a considerable number of states (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Honduras). The common occurrence of such regimes, often referred to by the collective term "hybrid" or "mixed", has led to a rapid expansion of empirical research. However, the current state of research in this field is unsatisfactory. Although existing scholarship tends to agree that the common feature of these regimes is the incumbents' tendency to interfere in political competition, little is known about how incumbents select between different forms of electoral manipulation and how such different forms go on to affect electoral results.