Patent Protection When Innovation In Cumulative
DOWNLOAD
Download Patent Protection When Innovation In Cumulative PDF/ePub or read online books in Mobi eBooks. Click Download or Read Online button to get Patent Protection When Innovation In Cumulative book now. This website allows unlimited access to, at the time of writing, more than 1.5 million titles, including hundreds of thousands of titles in various foreign languages. If the content not found or just blank you must refresh this page
Patent Protection When Innovation In Cumulative
DOWNLOAD
Author : Edward Donald O'Donoghue
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996
Patent Protection When Innovation In Cumulative written by Edward Donald O'Donoghue and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with Patent laws and legislation categories.
Patent Protection When Innovation Is Cumulative
DOWNLOAD
Author : Edward Donald O'Donoghue
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1997
Patent Protection When Innovation Is Cumulative written by Edward Donald O'Donoghue and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1997 with Petent laws and legislation categories.
The Decision To Patent Cumulative Innovation And Optimal Policy
DOWNLOAD
Author : Nisvan Erkal
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
The Decision To Patent Cumulative Innovation And Optimal Policy written by Nisvan Erkal and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
This paper analyzes optimal policy in the context of cumulative innovation in a model that endogenizes patenting decisions of early innovators. Secrecy can significantly decrease investment in the second innovation. We show that as the effectiveness of secrecy as a protection mechanism increases, which may be the case if the government has a strong trade secret policy or innovators can monitor the flow of their technological information, it becomes optimal to have broad patent protection over a larger parameter space. In cases when patent policy is ineffective in achieving disclosure, it is socially desirable to have a lenient antitrust policy and allow collusive agreements.
Innovation Specific Patent Protection And Growth
DOWNLOAD
Author : Silvia Galli
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012
Innovation Specific Patent Protection And Growth written by Silvia Galli and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with Economic development categories.
In this thesis, I am undertaking the analysis of the effects of increasing intellectual property rights on the reallocation of different kinds of research and development within an endogenous growth framework. This thesis' approach considers the innovation process as sequential and cumulative in nature and studies the effects of different property rights regimes on a country's innovative performance. In particular, by explicitly modelling basic and applied research and development (R & D) within a general equilibrium framework, I try to overtake the existing growth theory, which usually aggregates all sources of R & D and innovation, neglecting intermediate inventive steps. My approach is certainly inspired by the current Schumpeterian growth theory (see Aghion and Howitt, 1998 and 2009), which envisages new products and processes arising from Poisson processes, whose arrival rates depend on private and public R & D. However, unlike the previous Schumpeterian models, in most of the chapters of this thesis, creative destruction itself is modelled as a two-stage processes, or more precisely, as a sequence of investment decisions in R & D, whose result is a probability to invent (basic research) or to innovate (applied research). Hence, the first step, "basic research", creates a research tool which is by itself not profitable, but has the potential to become the basis for the second step innovation. The second step is a marketable product which increases consumers' utility and, through the grant of a patent, generates the monopolistic rent for the second step innovator, i.e. the manufacturer of the new product. This is a natural and simple way to explicitly model basic and applied research, yet it entails non-trivial technical complications in the models along with strong policy implications. Chapter 2 tries to answer the following research question: in order to foster innovation and growth should basic research be publicly or privately funded? This chapter studies the impact of the shift in the U.S. patent system towards the patentability and commercialization of the basic R & D undertaken by universities. Such a shift rendered the U.S. universities more responsive to "market" forces. Prior to 1980, universities undertook research employing researchers motivated by "curiosity." After 1980, universities patent their research and behave as private firms. This move, in a context of two-stage inventions (basic and applied research) has an a priori ambiguous effect on innovation and welfare. Chapter 2 builds a Schumpeterian model and matches it to the data to evaluate this important turning point. iii Chapter 3 extends the model presented by Chapter 2 by introducing Kremer's (1998) mechanism for inducing innovation by means of auctions for new patents. Such patent buy-outs are run by the public sector in order to reward innovators and freely disseminate most of the new basic research findings. My work is the first attempt to use Kremer's idea to address the issue of the patentability of basic research and the financing of early innovation. The same Chapter 3 also quantitatively analyses the impact of the so called "research exemption" of patented basic knowledge. Under the research exemption doctrine, if the second innovator is successful in developing a saleable product or process, then he or she can patent it and yet infringe another patent. The key question that modern economies' innovation systems have been facing in the past few decades is: how should basic research be funded in view of maximizing the efficiency of the innovation system as a whole? In other words, is it possible to conceive the privatization of a country's basic knowledge and an efficient system of incentives to basic research? The study presented by Chapter 4 provides a quantitative assessment on the effects of the US patent reforms that, at the beginning of the Eighties, brought to the patentability of research tools, often invented by the university-led research activity. In particular, Chapter 4 re-examines the policy scenarios and the comparisons presented throughout Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 in order to try to provide these two with a robust empirical support. In the first scenario, only the public sector institutions undertake basic research, rendering all results publicly available for firms, racing to find patentable applications. In the second scenario, important for assessing the post-1980 reforms in the US system of innovation, basic research itself is privatized, and hence patented by private firms. The most important question for the political economy of basic research is which system is most conducive to innovation and growth. The public system permits more idea dissemination, but may not give basic researchers enough incentives to focus their research on the directions most needed by the private developers downstream. The private system optimally channels basic research, but, by allowing the patentability of ideas upstream, precludes free entry into applied R & D. This generates conflicting effects, and the policy conclusions depend on the value of all the relevant parameters in the economy. In Chapter 4, I estimated the most important of these parameters with the US data immediately preceding the major reorganization of university and basic research in the 80s, and I simulated the two scenarios. The resulting simulations show that public R & D system, prevailing at that time, was indeed outperforming every privatized alternative scenario. iv Since the incentives to conduct basic or applied research play a central role for economic growth, Chapter 5 tries to answer the following research question: how does increasing early innovation appropriability affect basic research, applied research, education, and wage inequality? Chapter 5 analyses the macroeconomic effects of patent protection by incorporating a two-stage cumulative innovation structure into a quality-ladder growth model with skill acquisition. It focuses on two issues (a) the over-protection vs. the under-protection of intellectual property rights in basic research; (b) the evolution of jurisprudence shaping the bargaining power of the upstream innovators. It shows that the dynamic general equilibrium interactions may seriously mislead the empirical assessment of the growth effects of IPR policy: stronger protection of upstream innovation always looks bad in the short- and possibly medium-run. In a common law system an explicit dynamic macroeconomic analysis is appropriate; hence I have incorporated the mathematical modelling of the evolution of the common law into the rational expectations of the agents. This major modification allows me to schematically replicate the evolution of the skill premium, education, and strengthening of intellectual property rights (IPR) happened in the US during the Eighties and Nineties of the XX century. Chapter 5 also provides a simple "rule of thumb" indicator of the basic researcher bargaining power and 5 shows that IPR evolution can be introduced into a fully rational expectation framework. This helps explaining the well-known dynamics of the skill premium and education in the US, that motivated well-known theories of skill biased technical change and directed technical change (see Acemoglu 2008). Chapter 6, finally, draws inspiration from an important recent empirical literature on competition and productivity in the service sectors (see Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; Alesina et al., 2005; Griffith et al., 2006; Aghion et al., 2006) to build a theoretical framework to predict whether innovation is hampered by the lack of completion in the non-manufacturing sectors. In this final chapter, I have built a simple model of process innovation where the provision of essential services (intermediate inputs, for example financial services or transports) for the production of the final good is subject to sectorial regulation, which shapes the market structure of the intermediate sector as a non-competitive one. The structure adopted in this chapter allows examining the effects on the economy of the presence of two different monopolized tasks: the intermediate service provision and the use of the innovation. The ultimate purpose is to show how the lack of competition in an intermediate essential sector, like the service sector, is actually able to depress productivity growth in the final sector.
Patent Litigation When Innovation Is Cumulative
DOWNLOAD
Author : Gerard Llobet
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
Patent Litigation When Innovation Is Cumulative written by Gerard Llobet and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
This paper studies the effect of litigation as a way to enforce patents when firms hold private information. A structure to the legal system is provided, allowing a better understanding of the settlement and litigation decisions taken by entrepreneurs. The model is broadly consistent with recent empirical evidence. We show that the optimal license consists of a fixed fee and no royalties and that in some cases too much protection might be detrimental to the patentholder. We finally compare different legal systems and their effect on innovation and litigation.
The Patent Crisis And How The Courts Can Solve It
DOWNLOAD
Author : Dan L. Burk
language : en
Publisher: ReadHowYouWant.com
Release Date : 2010-10-19
The Patent Crisis And How The Courts Can Solve It written by Dan L. Burk and has been published by ReadHowYouWant.com this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010-10-19 with Business & Economics categories.
Patent law is crucial to encourage technological innovation. But as the patent system currently stands, diverse industries from pharmaceuticals to software to semiconductors are all governed by the same rules even though they innovate very differently. The result is a crisis in the patent system, where patents calibrated to the needs of prescrip...
When Does Patent Protection Spur Cumulative Research Within Firms
DOWNLOAD
Author : Ashish Arora
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2021
When Does Patent Protection Spur Cumulative Research Within Firms written by Ashish Arora and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021 with categories.
We estimate the effect of patent protection on follow-on investments in corporate scientific research. We exploit a new method for identifying an exogenous reduction in the protection a granted patent provides. Using data on public, research-active firms between 1990 and 2015, we find that firms decrease follow-on research after a reduction in patent protection, as measured by a drop in internal citations to an associated scientific article. This effect is stronger for smaller firms and in industries where patents are traded less frequently. Our findings are consistent with a stylized model whereby patent protection is a strategic substitute for commercialization capability. Our results imply that stronger patents encourage follow-on research, but also shift the locus of research from big firms toward smaller firms and startups. As patent protection has strengthened since the mid-1980s, our results help explain why the American innovation ecosystem has undergone a growing division of innovative labor, where startups become primary sources of new ideas.
Patent Ligation When Innovation Is Cumulative
DOWNLOAD
Author : Gerard Llobet
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2001
Patent Ligation When Innovation Is Cumulative written by Gerard Llobet and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2001 with categories.
Patent Scope Antitrust Policy And Cumulative Innovation
DOWNLOAD
Author : Howard F. Chang
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
Patent Scope Antitrust Policy And Cumulative Innovation written by Howard F. Chang and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
This paper presents a model of cumulative innovation to investigate what factors should influence a court's decision when a patentee alleges that another inventor has infringed the patent with an improved version of the patented product. The model reveals how the optimal patent policy would extend broad protection to those inventions that have very little value (standing alone) relative to the improvements that others may subsequently invent. This paper also examines whether courts should allow a patentee and competing inventors with improved versions of the patented product to enter collusive agreements. The model indicates that such a policy could create incentives for inefficient entry by imitators who quot;invent aroundquot; the original patent.
Patents And Follow On Innovation
DOWNLOAD
Author : Julian Boulanger
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Patents And Follow On Innovation written by Julian Boulanger and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.
Patents motivate innovation by rewarding inventors with exclusivity rights over their inventions. But scholars have argued that this reward theory of patents is not sufficient to justify the patent system. When innovation is cumulative, patents can either promote or block follow-on innovation and knowing the conditions under which these effects prevail is key to understanding whether patents are, overall, desirable or not. In this paper, I study how patent protection on existing technologies affect follow-on innovation using data on patent renewal decisions in the U.S. To address the endogeneity of renewal decisions, I construct an instrument using the large increases in maintenance fees that took place in 2013 following the enactment of the America Invents Act. My findings show that, on average, patents have a strong blocking effect on follow-on innovation. But this average effect masks considerable heterogeneity. First, I explore variation across the three stages at which patents must be renewed over their lifetime and find that the blocking effect is entirely driven by patents in the first and second stages. At the third maintenance stage, patents appear, instead, to promote follow-on innovation. Second, I assess potential heteregeneity across different technology areas and find that patents block follow-on innovation more in discrete technology areas and when patent ownership is highly fragmented.