[PDF] Procurement When Price And Quality Matter - eBooks Review

Procurement When Price And Quality Matter


Procurement When Price And Quality Matter
DOWNLOAD

Download Procurement When Price And Quality Matter PDF/ePub or read online books in Mobi eBooks. Click Download or Read Online button to get Procurement When Price And Quality Matter book now. This website allows unlimited access to, at the time of writing, more than 1.5 million titles, including hundreds of thousands of titles in various foreign languages. If the content not found or just blank you must refresh this page



Procurement When Price And Quality Matter


Procurement When Price And Quality Matter
DOWNLOAD
Author : John Asker
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007

Procurement When Price And Quality Matter written by John Asker and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with Industrial procurement categories.




Optimal Procurement When Both Price And Quality Matter


Optimal Procurement When Both Price And Quality Matter
DOWNLOAD
Author : John Asker
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005

Optimal Procurement When Both Price And Quality Matter written by John Asker and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with Industrial procurement categories.




An Empirical Analysis Of Price Quality And Incumbency In Procurement Auctions


An Empirical Analysis Of Price Quality And Incumbency In Procurement Auctions
DOWNLOAD
Author : Tunay I. Tunca
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015

An Empirical Analysis Of Price Quality And Incumbency In Procurement Auctions written by Tunay I. Tunca and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.


The use of multi-attribute auctions for procurement of products and services when both price and quality matter is becoming more frequent. Such auctions often employ scoring rules and are open-ended in winner determination. Yet there is a significant gap in the literature on studying the efficiency of these procurement mechanisms. In this paper, providing a theoretical model and utilizing data from legal service procurement auctions, we study how open-ended scoring auctions can be used effectively in procurement, and demonstrate the roles supplier quality and incumbency play in this process. We demonstrate that open-ended auctions can generate substantial savings to a buyer without compromising quality. We study the underlying mechanism and show how the auction format can work to achieve such performance. We find that the buyer's revealed preferences significantly differ from her stated preferences. Finally, we contribute to the understanding of the role of incumbency in procurement auctions by providing evidence that what may be perceived as incumbency bias can in fact be a revelation of preference for quality.



Optimal Procurement When Both Price And Quality Matteri


Optimal Procurement When Both Price And Quality Matteri
DOWNLOAD
Author : John Asker
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005

Optimal Procurement When Both Price And Quality Matteri written by John Asker and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with categories.




Total Cost Procurement Auctions


Total Cost Procurement Auctions
DOWNLOAD
Author : Dimitris Kostamis
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006

Total Cost Procurement Auctions written by Dimitris Kostamis and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with categories.


We consider sealed and open-bid total-cost procurement auctions where two attributes are used for contract award decisions: price, which is bid by the supplier; and a fixed quality adjustment cost, which is included by the buyer to capture non-price factors such as a supplier's quality and reliability. Suppliers know only their own true production cost and their own quality adjustment cost, and the buyer does not know the suppliers' true production costs but does know all suppliers' quality adjustment costs, which she herself sets in order to make an informed total-cost decision. The buyer, who seeks to minimize her total (price and quality adjustment) procurement cost, can choose to announce the quality adjustment costs of all suppliers by running a descending open-bid auction, or conceal them by running a first price sealed-bid auction. We characterize the buyer's choice between the two formats as a threshold decision over suppliers' quality adjustment costs, and analyze the effect of supplier beliefs on her decision. We also study the impact of additional suppliers on the buyer's decision, the effect of correlation between suppliers' production costs and their quality adjustment costs, and additive as well as multiplicative total cost functions. The results suggest that procurement managers can use their evaluations of suppliers' qualities to make better auction format decisions.



Impact Of Quality And Pricing On The Market Shares Of Two Competint Suppliers In A Simple Procurement Model


Impact Of Quality And Pricing On The Market Shares Of Two Competint Suppliers In A Simple Procurement Model
DOWNLOAD
Author : CANDACE ARAI YANO
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1991

Impact Of Quality And Pricing On The Market Shares Of Two Competint Suppliers In A Simple Procurement Model written by CANDACE ARAI YANO and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1991 with categories.




Fuzzy Price Quality Ratio Procurement Under Incomplete Information


Fuzzy Price Quality Ratio Procurement Under Incomplete Information
DOWNLOAD
Author : Thomas Giebe
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012

Fuzzy Price Quality Ratio Procurement Under Incomplete Information written by Thomas Giebe and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.




Proactive Procurement


Proactive Procurement
DOWNLOAD
Author : David N. Burt
language : en
Publisher: Prentice Hall
Release Date : 1984

Proactive Procurement written by David N. Burt and has been published by Prentice Hall this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1984 with Business & Economics categories.




First Time Right Procurement


First Time Right Procurement
DOWNLOAD
Author : Oliver Münch
language : en
Publisher: Springer
Release Date : 2015-01-27

First Time Right Procurement written by Oliver Münch and has been published by Springer this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015-01-27 with Business & Economics categories.


Based on more than 10 years of practical experience in the field of supply chain management, Oliver Münch indicates that in favor of sustainability within the supply chain the paradox purchasing savings can and should be substituted with the approach of the First-Time-Right Procurement. This dissertation subjects the monetary measurement of purchasing savings to a critical examination and questions whether it still applies. It indicates that monetary purchasing savings exert a negative impact on sustainable company success. In order to achieve a long-term sustainable success, it is proposed that the monetary measurement of purchasing savings can be replaced by measuring process times within the procurement organization.



Optimal Procurement With Quality Concerns


Optimal Procurement With Quality Concerns
DOWNLOAD
Author : Giuseppe Lopomo
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2022

Optimal Procurement With Quality Concerns written by Giuseppe Lopomo and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2022 with categories.


Adverse selection in procurement arises when low-cost bidders are also lowquality suppliers. We propose a mechanism called LoLA which, under some conditions, is the best incentive-compatible mechanism for maximizing either the seller's or the social surplus in the presence of adverse selection. The LoLA features a floor (or minimum) price, and a reserve (or maximum) price. Conveniently, the LoLA has a dominant strategy equilibrium that, under mild regularity conditions, is unique. We perform a counterfactual experiment on Italian government procurement auctions: we compute the gain that the government could have made, had it used the optimal mechanism (which happens to be a LoLA), relative to a first-price auction, which is the format the government actually used. Finally, we provide software applications for computing the optimal procurement mechanism.