An Empirical Analysis Of Price Quality And Incumbency In Procurement Auctions
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An Empirical Analysis Of Price Quality And Incumbency In Procurement Auctions
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Author : Tunay I. Tunca
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
An Empirical Analysis Of Price Quality And Incumbency In Procurement Auctions written by Tunay I. Tunca and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
The use of multi-attribute auctions for procurement of products and services when both price and quality matter is becoming more frequent. Such auctions often employ scoring rules and are open-ended in winner determination. Yet there is a significant gap in the literature on studying the efficiency of these procurement mechanisms. In this paper, providing a theoretical model and utilizing data from legal service procurement auctions, we study how open-ended scoring auctions can be used effectively in procurement, and demonstrate the roles supplier quality and incumbency play in this process. We demonstrate that open-ended auctions can generate substantial savings to a buyer without compromising quality. We study the underlying mechanism and show how the auction format can work to achieve such performance. We find that the buyer's revealed preferences significantly differ from her stated preferences. Finally, we contribute to the understanding of the role of incumbency in procurement auctions by providing evidence that what may be perceived as incumbency bias can in fact be a revelation of preference for quality.
Empirical Analyses Of Online Procurement Auctions Business Value Bidding Behavior Learning And Incumbent Effect
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Author : Fang Zhong
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Empirical Analyses Of Online Procurement Auctions Business Value Bidding Behavior Learning And Incumbent Effect written by Fang Zhong and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with Auctions categories.
While there is an ever increasing adoption of e-sourcing, where a buyer auctions off procurement contracts to a small group of pre-qualified suppliers, there is a lack of understanding of the impact of dynamic bidding process on procurement outcomes and bidding behavior. To extend the knowledge of this important issue, in this thesis, we explore empirically the value of online procurement auction on cost reduction, quality management, and winner selection from the buyer's perspective. We also explore how incumbent status affects the procurement outcomes. From suppliers' perspective, we characterize their bidding behavior and examine the effect of incumbent status on bidding. First, we collect detailed auction and contract awarding data for manufacturing goods during 2002-2004 from a large buyer in the high-tech industry. The rich data set enables us to apply statistical model based cluster technique to uncover heterogeneous bidding behavior of industry participants. The distribution of the bidding patterns varies between incumbent and non-incumbent suppliers. We also find that the buyer bias towards the incumbent suppliers by awarding them procurement contracts more often and with a price premium. Next, focusing on recurring auctions, we find that suppliers bid adaptively. The adaptive bidding is affected by the rank of suppliers' final bids. Finally, with field data of procurement auction for legal services, we demonstrate that service prices are on average reduced after dynamic bidding events. Most interestingly, the cost savings are achieved without the sacrifice of quality. Incumbent winners' quality is higher, on average, than the quality of buyer's supplier base before the auctions, while non-incumbent winner's quality is lower. These findings imply that the main value of online procurement auctions for business services comes from incumbents in the form of reduced price and enhanced quality. We find that after adjusting for incumbents' higher quality, incumbent bias disappears. Our results also imply that the buyer might possess important information about the incumbents, through past experiences, that cannot be easily included in the buyer's scoring function due to uncodifiability.
Empirical Analysis Of Competition In Procurement Auctions
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Author : Janne Tukiainen
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2008
Empirical Analysis Of Competition In Procurement Auctions written by Janne Tukiainen and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with categories.
Empirical Analysis Of Procurement Auctions
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Author : Cinthia Konichi Paulo
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Empirical Analysis Of Procurement Auctions written by Cinthia Konichi Paulo and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.
The second chapter analyzes the phenomenon of jump bidding, when a bidder places a bid that is larger than necessary to outbid the current winning bid. Models that explain this type of behavior say that jump bidding arise as a signaling strategy to communicate strength to competitors. However, using a large dataset of procurement auctions that spans across different industries, the predictions of those models do not match the patterns observed in the data. I find that winners place smaller jumps on average, which contradicts the signaling strategy and suggests that jumps might not be monotonic in the bidders' valuations.
Corruption In Public Procurement Auctions
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Author : Maria Monica Wihardja
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009
Corruption In Public Procurement Auctions written by Maria Monica Wihardja and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.
We provide a positive analysis of the equilibrium bidding and bribing strategies with and without corruption in a first-price, sealed-bid, procurement auction with two-dimensional-type bidders. With corruption, we assume that the quality of the bidders are unobservable and non-contractible ex-post. We show examples of equilibrium bids and bribes of N two-dimensional-type bidders in an incomplete information game where the type space is discrete and strategy space is infinite. The equilibrium bid and bribe decrease in the number of bidders. Moreover, we show that in this auction with corruption, quality is randomly chosen, constraining efficiency. In fact, no mechanism can be efficient in this auction. The empirical study suggests that increasing the number of bidders increases the percentage cost efficiency at a decreasing rate and it starts to decrease the percentage cost efficiency after it reaches a certain number of bidders.
The Role Of Buyer Power In Public Procurement Auctions
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Author : Elon Strömbäck
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
The Role Of Buyer Power In Public Procurement Auctions written by Elon Strömbäck and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
Essays On Procurement Auctions
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Author : Hidenori Takahashi
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Essays On Procurement Auctions written by Hidenori Takahashi and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
Essays On Structural Analysis Of Procurement Auctions
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Author : Bin Yu
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Essays On Structural Analysis Of Procurement Auctions written by Bin Yu and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
This dissertation addresses the empirical analysis of procurements based on the auction theory, which is known as the structural-form analysis of procurement auctions.
An Empirical Analysis Of Price Formation In Double Auction Markets
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Author : Timothy N. Cason
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1990
An Empirical Analysis Of Price Formation In Double Auction Markets written by Timothy N. Cason and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1990 with Auctions categories.
Equilibrium Analysis Of Procurement Auctions
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Author : Serkan Ozkan
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005
Equilibrium Analysis Of Procurement Auctions written by Serkan Ozkan and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with Auctions categories.
The ultimate benefit of our research is to offer a concise analytical tool that models multi-attribute auctions, where the generalized valuation function captures trade-offs between the primary attribute (price) and the secondary attributes such as quality, delivery performance and service level.