Reducing Rivals Prices

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Reducing Rivals Prices

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Author : Michal Gal
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010

Reducing Rivals Prices written by Michal Gal and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with categories.

One of the most important market imperfections in modern capitalism and surprisingly one of the most under-regulated is oligopoly pricing (conscious parallelism). Only few suggestions have been made over the years to regulate oligopoly pricing. All suggestions pose serious obstacles to their efficient application. Accordingly, oligopoly pricing is not regulated. It is left to the workings of the market (or pure luck), while acknowledging the marketis limited regulatory force. This article proposes a novel method for regulating oligopoly pricing by way of introducing a government-supported maverick into an oligopolistic industry for a limited time. The maverick will price its products at competitive or near-competitive levels, based on considerations of consumer or total welfare. His rivals will follow his pricing strategy, or incur significant losses and possibly exit the market. As will be shown, the proposal may significantly reduce allocative inefficiency by reducing the welfare losses from supra-competitive pricing. The threat of intervention might be sufficient, in itself, to reduce the problem of oligopoly pricing. It may also reduce productive inefficiency by combating the problem of inefficient plant and firm sizes. This article analyzes the market conditions that must exist for this proposal to be operational and points to its benefits as well as its costs and limitations.

Reducing Rivals Prices

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Author : Michal S. Gal
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2000

Reducing Rivals Prices written by Michal S. Gal and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2000 with Competition, Imperfect categories.

How To Sell At Margins Higher Than Your Competitors

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Author : Lawrence L. Steinmetz
language : en
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
Release Date : 2010-12-23

How To Sell At Margins Higher Than Your Competitors written by Lawrence L. Steinmetz and has been published by John Wiley & Sons this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010-12-23 with Business & Economics categories.

Praise for How to Sell at Margins Higher Than Your Competitor "This is the complete book for both new and experienced salespeople and business owners to learn and re-learn the essentials for success. How to Sell at Margins Higher Than Your Competitors emphasizes the pricing strategies and tactics to increase the market share and profits of any organization. This is a book that is as important to presidents as it is to salespeople." --Bill Scales, CEO, Scales Industrial Technologies, Inc. "As the largest service provider in our industry, we have a significant market advantage. However, we constantly walk the pricing tightrope because, as this book so clearly states, 'business is a game of margins . . . not a game of volume!'" --John K. Harris, CEO, JK Harris & Company, LLC "If you live and die on price, this book could be your only lifeline." --Tom Reilly, CSP, author of Value-Added Selling and Crush Price Objections "How to Sell at Margins Higher Than Your Competitors successfully illustrates profitable sales truths to assist us in selling for maximum return. This book's well-researched, logical, and affirming words validate the simple fact that as a premium company we deserve premium margins. So, while our competitors reduce or match prices out of fear and scarcity, our managers, thanks to this powerful sales tool, can continue quoting and closing with profitable confidence." --Joe Bracket, President, Power Equipment Company "I learned a long time ago that it is pretty difficult to control what my competitors will do, but we must control what we do--like maintaining margins. This book is a 'wow!' that will help my salesmen crack bad habits. Sales organizations should design their entire training programs around the content in this book." --George C. Giessing, President, Brusco-Rich, Inc. "This energizing book is the 'right stuff' for every sales force. It should be a required study for every executive and sales professional who seeks to be successful." --David R. Little, Chairman and CEO, DXP Enterprises, Inc.

Vertical Integration As Strategic Behavior In A Spatial Setting

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Author : David T. Levy
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1988

Vertical Integration As Strategic Behavior In A Spatial Setting written by David T. Levy and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1988 with Industrial concentration categories.

Lowering Price By Buying Competitors In Order To Shut Them Down

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Author : Sheldon Kimmel
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996

Lowering Price By Buying Competitors In Order To Shut Them Down written by Sheldon Kimmel and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with Competition categories.

Can More Information About Rivals Costs Decrease Welfare

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Author : Duarte Brito
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016

Can More Information About Rivals Costs Decrease Welfare written by Duarte Brito and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.

We investigate if more information about rivals' costs increases welfare when firms compete in prices and cost-reducing investment. When firms compete only in prices, a firm sets a higher price under partial information than under complete information if it faces an efficient rival, and a lower price otherwise. Thus, more information redistributes market share from the more efficient to the less efficient firm, with a negative impact on welfare. When firms also compete in cost-reducing investment, more information leads a firm to decrease investment if it faces an efficient rival, and to increase investment otherwise. Welfare decreases if firms are sufficiently asymmetric and their products sufficiently differentiated.

Beating Low Cost Competition

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Author : Adrian Ryans
language : en
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
Release Date : 2009-08-27

Beating Low Cost Competition written by Adrian Ryans and has been published by John Wiley & Sons this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009-08-27 with Business & Economics categories.

Low cost competitors, who offer “good enough” products and services at very attractive prices, are currently significantly impacting the businesses of many leading companies, and some are starting to “move up” to challenge the traditional companies in their core markets. It’s only a matter of time before most companies will feel the pressure from these aggressive, cut-price competitors. Beating Low Cost Competition offers a step–by–step structured approach to help executives in traditional companies with premium brands think through the options for responding to their low cost rivals and select the most appropriate strategy to win in their chosen markets. By examining a wide-ranging group of companies from around the world, Adrian Ryans provides numerous examples of how different companies in different industries have responded to low cost competitors and analyses the effectiveness of their strategies. He also discusses the leadership and cultural challenges that many companies are facing as they take steps to respond to their low cost rivals. Ultimately, the insights gained from this book will lead to better and more profitable business decisions. Adrian Ryans is Professor of Marketing and Strategy at IMD, Lausanne, Switzerland. He has designed and taught on executive programs for organizations in North America, Europe, Australia and Asia, including GE, Bank of Montreal, Medtronic, Deloitte, Borealis, Saurer, Vestas, IBM, Boeing, National Semiconductor, BioWare, ASML, Holcim, Varian, Hoechst, Amgen, Fluke, LSI Logic, Hutchison Port Holdings and Qualcomm. He has also acted as a consultant for a number of leading global corporations.

Exclusion Collusion And Confusion

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Author : Malcolm B. Coate
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1990

Exclusion Collusion And Confusion written by Malcolm B. Coate and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1990 with Antitrust law categories.

Exclusive Dealing The Theory Of The Firm And Raising Rivals Costs

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Author : Alan J. Meese
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2008

Exclusive Dealing The Theory Of The Firm And Raising Rivals Costs written by Alan J. Meese and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with categories.

For several decades antitrust courts were extremely hostile to exclusive dealing agreements, banning such contracts, regardless of their benefits, whenever the manufacturer held a significant market share. The FTC went even further, banning such agreements whenever the manufacturer had a non-trivial share of its market. This article attributes the original hostility to exclusive dealing contracts to neoclassical price theory's technological theory of the firm and its derivative model of workable competition. According to price theory, firms existed to allocate resource and realize efficiencies of a technological nature that, by their nature, arose within the firm. At the same time, price theory identified no beneficial explanation for partial ᑼontractualň integration. The result was the so-called Ňworkable competitionň model, which privileged Ňunilateralň ᑼompetition on the meritsň over ᑼoncertedň ᑼontractual integration, the latter of which was presumed to have market power origins. The article then recounts two responses to this hostility. The first response, from Ňwithinň price theory, came from the Chicago School, which argued that a firm with market power could only realize one monopoly profit, with the result that exclusive dealing contracts could not ᑾnhanceň the power that a firm otherwise possessed. Unlike, say, the Chicago School account of minimum resale price maintenance, this attack on conventional wisdom offered no affirmative wealth-creating reason that firms would adopt such agreements. Instead, Chicagoans simply inferred that such agreements produced benefits because they supposedly could not create harms. The second response ő Transaction Cost Economics or TCE ő sought to undermine price theory itself, or at least its conception of the firm and other non-standard contracts. Unlike the Chicago School, TCE offered to explain how exclusive dealing within and between firms produced benefits. In particular, TCE argued that complete and partial integration was a method of reducing or eliminating the costs of relying upon unbridled markets to conduct economic activity, particularly costs flowing from anticipated opportunism. Exclusive dealing, it was said, was no exception, and economists have identified several beneficial effects that such contracts can create. Unlike the Chicago School, TCE did not contend that exclusive dealing contracts could never reduce welfare. Still, TCE helped undermine the unmitigated hostility that once characterized antitrust's attitude toward exclusive dealing contracts. Raising Rivals'Costs (RRC) theory, it is shown, filled the void left by price theory's discredited lesson that exclusive dealing agreements were almost always harmful. That is, RRC offered a coherent and plausible theory regarding how such agreements may, in certain circumstances, raise the costs of rivals and facilitate the acquisition or protection of market power. The article ends by attempting to integrate the lessons of TCE and RRC theory with a view toward developing a standard for evaluating exclusive dealing arrangements that reflects the lessons of both paradigms, neither of which purports to exclude the other as a useful tool for interpreting such agreements. The essay critiques certain aspects of modern rule reason analysis as applied to exclusive dealing arrangements. Thus, it is argued, mere significant foreclosure of rivals from portions of the marketplace should not establish a prima facie case requiring the defendant to establish that the restraint produces benefits. Nor should courts allow plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case based simply upon a showing that such contracts result in prices that are higher than those that existed before the restraint. Moreover, if courts allow plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case based upon such showings, then there is no basis for 𔞺lancingň the benefits that the defendant proves against harms that are presumed once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, as such balancing depends upon the assumption that benefits coexist with harms, harms not logically presumed once the defendant shows that the restraint produces significant benefits. Instead, the essay concludes, plaintiffs seeking to establish a prima facie case should be required to establish the numerous conditions, including relevant input markets, output markets, and barriers to entry, that are necessary to any raising rivals' costs strategy. Once the plaintiff establishes such a case, the defendant should be allowed to establish that the arrangement produces benefits. Those who embrace a Ňpurchaser welfareň approach to antitrust have not explained how courts should go about balancing the harms produced by such agreements against their benefits, given that such agreements might harm some consumers while benefitting others. At the same time, those who embrace a Ňsocialň or Ňtotal welfareň approach to antitrust may be content if courts declare Ňlawfulň any such agreement that produces significant benefits.

The Oxford Handbook Of International Antitrust Economics

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Author : Roger D. Blair
language : en
Publisher: Oxford Handbooks
Release Date : 2015

The Oxford Handbook Of International Antitrust Economics written by Roger D. Blair and has been published by Oxford Handbooks this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with Business & Economics categories.

More than any other area of regulation, antitrust economics shapes law and policy in the United States, the Americas, Europe, and Asia. In a number of different areas of antitrust, advances in theory and empirical work have caused a fundamental reevaluation and shift of some of the assumptions behind antitrust policy. This reevaluation has profound implications for the future of the field. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics has collected chapters from many of the leading figures in antitrust. In doing so, this two volume Handbook provides an important reference guide for scholars, teachers, and practitioners. However, it is more than a merely reference guide. Rather, it has a number of different goals. First, it takes stock of the current state of scholarship across a number of different antitrust topics. In doing so, it relies primarily upon the economics scholarship. In some situations, though, there is also coverage of legal scholarship, case law developments, and legal policies. The second goal of the Handbook is to provide some ideas about future directions of antitrust scholarship and policy. Antitrust economics has evolved over the last 60 years. It has both shaped policy and been shaped by policy. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics will serve as a policy and research guide of next steps to consider when shaping the future of the field of antitrust.